Error in the Rabbi’s Proof of Newcomb’s Paradox on the Question of Knowledge and Choice
Peace and blessings,
The rabbi wrote in his book that Newcomb’s paradox proves that there is a contradiction between knowledge and choice (i.e. the assertion that God knows the future and the assertion that man has free choice).
The proof was that in a paradox, a contradiction is reached, and hence, some party’s knowledge of the future contradicts the possibility of choice for those involved in that future.
But I think there is no proof here, and I will explain.
The paradox is indeed real – we reach two contradictory conclusions.
But in the paradox story, there is another event beyond the prophet’s knowledge of the future, and it can be said that it is the one that leads to the contradiction. The event is that the prophet intervenes in reality based on that knowledge of the future (fills in the box according to what he saw happening in the future) and informs the person who is voting about the same policy in a way that can influence the choice.
Therefore, it can be said, for example, that there is indeed a contradiction in the understanding that some factor knew a future event that is affected by a choice if the prophet intervenes (in the future) in the choice and influences it (especially in such a way that he tells the voter that he (the prophet) determined reality according to his (the voter’s) choice).
But there is no contradiction that the prophet knew the rest of the future.
In figurative words, as in the book – in the prophet’s library of future tapes, there are several tapes that don’t work. These are tapes that claim to document events in which the prophet intervenes, as described in the paradox.
I would love to hear whether the Rabbi agrees with the refutation of the proof.
thanks
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You didn't really address the refutation.
You answered, "In any case, it means that he doesn't know the future."
Not true. What follows from the refutation is that "it means that he (the prophet in the paradox) doesn't know *all* of the future." He doesn't know futures that involve elections that are actually affected by his knowing the future (it makes sense that these inputs would be excluded because feedback is created here that creates a problematic circle. But this is specific to such events and not necessarily to all future events).
This doesn't say anything about God's knowledge of the future because you haven't shown any example in which God performs (or is claimed to perform) intervention in elections in a manner similar to that described in the paradox.
Isn't there a refutation of the proof here?
If he does not know the entire future, this refutes the conventional assumption that by virtue of his omnipotence he knows the entire future. Now what he knows and what he does not know is another matter.
1. You have not proven that God does not know all of the future because you have not proven that there are necessarily events in reality, as in the paradox, in which God informs people about actions he has taken in the past based on his prediction of their future choices (and that these actions change reality in a way that affects the feasibility of the various choices, as in the paradox).
2. Even if you were to prove that there are such events, there is no reason to say that the accepted assumption is that God knows all of the future, even events that it is paradoxical to think that he knows. Just as the question of the “stone God cannot create” does not question the accepted assumption that God is omnipotent.
In light of the refutation, would you consider omitting the “proof” in the next edition?
PS
You wrote in the first response –
“An event that depends on free choice cannot be known in advance.”
This is what you tried to prove about the Newcomb paradox, but from what you wrote, it seems to be easy for you regardless of the Newcomb paradox, doesn't it?
If so, why is it easy for you?
*with
I'll come back to that because we're going around in circles. My argument is that if God knows the future, there's no reason why He shouldn't tell the future to a prophet. And then a problem arises. This is an indication that He doesn't know the future, and therefore it doesn't deal specifically with this looping case. I think we've exhausted it.
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