Existential Mitzvah
In the SD
Hello Rabbi,
The Rabbi mentioned in a previous correspondence that an existential mitzvah is a mitzvah that cannot be canceled (unlike a conditional positive mitzvah).
1. Is there a source in Rishonim/Achronim that defines an existential mitzvah in this way? I would be grateful if the rabbi could write to me.
2. Searching the internet, I came across this article that clearly appears to have been co-written by the rabbi. https://gabihazut.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A814-%D7%95%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%91.pdf
You touched on the point there of fulfilling an existential mitzvah instead of a danger, but I didn’t find much expansion.
I asked – Does an existential mitzvah also reject mitzvahs that conflict with it? Is it possible to fulfill an existential mitzvah in place of danger (assuming that a positive mitzvah is given)?
Thank you very much,
1. I don’t remember a source right now, but I also don’t know which source is needed. This is a purely semantic question. It is up to the NPM whether this falls under an existential mitzvah or not. What is important is that there is such a category (if there is one), and that it is not the same as conditional positive mitzvahs (which can be canceled). There is a well-known debate between Rabbi Feinstein and Rabbi Avraham Shapira about the mitzvah of settling in Israel. Rabbi Feinstein claimed that it is an existential mitzvah, and Rabbi Shapira argued against him that there is no such animal in the halakhah.
2. There is a Rav at the beginning of the Sifra that discusses women who are authorized to perform a mitzvah (the fulfillment of mitzvot that women are exempt from, such as in the case of Maaseah 73), and says that even for women, they are rejected by no one. I argued (there or elsewhere) that the fulfillment of such mitzvot by women detracts from existential mitzvot, since they are not mitzvot at all. In existential mitzvot, we are commanded, but the type of command is existential (this is defined as the fulfillment of a mitzvah and there is no possibility of canceling it, and for women it is not even defined as a mitzvah). Therefore, it is reasonable that an existential mitzvah would be rejected by no one, at least according to the Rav.
Now I found this (the thread is mine): https://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?cat_id=24&topic_id=2090933&forum_id=1364
In B”D
Thank you very much.
1. True, and yet I prefer not to define myself if I am not obligated but to rely on previous definitions.
2. This is an example of there being no difference between an existential mitzvah and a positive mitzvah – both are acts of a mitzvah and therefore are of a high degree (rejecting a ”t, etc.).
I am trying to understand whether there is a priority for fulfilling a positive mitzvah over an existential mitzvah or is there really no difference between them – except perhaps not a mitzvah and a doer.
In short, is giving a third of a shekel a year a stronger mitzvah in halakhic rules than giving the additional ”epsilon” tzedakah?
Thank you,
You mean if there is an existential act versus a positive act, who will reject whom?
Apparently, a positive act will reject, because if you uphold the existential, you have the cancellation of the positive act.
In B”D
I am more inclined to do existential versus x and do positive versus x.
Is it possible that the results will be different in the two cases?
In principle, it is possible. Why not? Even the words of the Rabbi (who rejects existential action) are apparently not agreed upon. One could think of the obligation to take a five-fold payment from one's account for an action, perhaps it was not said about an existential action.
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