Explanation KV

In the article there (Shemini 5765, number 26) to explain two opposing laws from two data that operate in parallel, the “two transparent laws” model appears, according to which the law is discussed according to the data that is explicit in the Torah only, without the laws that are taught in the midrash. Therefore, at the stage of the law, the missing law is used as if it does not exist, even though in reality there is another teaching (the second law) that teaches about this missing law.
If I understood correctly, then this is a very strong and general claim. And if it is correct, it is a bit difficult to assume that the first will not be successful in it. What about a prepared question regarding something taught in the Gezâsh that is repeatedly taught in the law? And one can also find examples of interpretations of something that is not explicit in the Torah, such as at the beginning of Yevamot, what does the monk have to do with the question, even though the rest of the vows are floating around in the air.
Why not formulate the rule in a more limited way – that two studies that follow each other start together from the data (two data) and teach their own in parallel, but we always do studies and exegesis from the products of sermons.
I remember some who wrote that a study that lacks such two data is actually a parent building.

I assume you meant something that is learned in the Koch to be learned in the Koch.
I don't remember exactly what I wrote, but I don't think that what is learned in the Midrash doesn't play on the field at all. One could say that only where it is possible to fill in both boxes in a contradictory way do they leave them empty as if there is a negative law there. Maybe that's what you meant here.
This could be a parent construction, but that's not the wording in the Gemara. She is learning Koch here. Otherwise, this two-sided Koch would really always remain by virtue of the parent construction.
Now I thought it was also possible to say that when the law does not appear in the Torah commentary, it is not as if it is not there, but that it is a weaker law (since what is explicit in the Torah is stronger than what is not explicit). Then one can build a line from a weak law to a strong law (and not from the absence to a positive law): And what about the place where the Torah did not write that one who owes a blessing before it (in food) is obligated after it, isn't it a law that instead of the Torah writing a blessing before it (Torah), one will be obligated after it? And maybe I raised this possibility there, I don't remember anymore.

You raised this possibility there and rejected (around note 7) that if the explicit is stronger than the implicit, then this gap remains even after the Q&A and can be used as a pirkha. For example, in the Q&A you wrote that the Torah is more severe than food and therefore we learn that a blessing is obligatory after it, we will explain what the food is, since a blessing is explicit after it, therefore there is a blessing after it. It will be said in the Torah that even though it is not explicit in it, then perhaps for the same reason there is no blessing at all in it. [Although perhaps that is why people try to narrow the gaps, and since we found a more severe Torah than food in the blessing before it, we will try to narrow the gap also in the blessing after it, so that the Torah will at least be obligatory even if it is not explicit in it. But in any case, if it is possible to make a pirkha from the gap between explicit and implicit, then it turns out that many more pirkhas can be found for the studies that are in the Shas, and this requires serious examination.]

If what is also learned from lectures is a game on the field, then my standard of conduct is once again a logical standard (i.e. one that deals with actual laws) and not a textual one (which ignores laws if they are not learned directly from the text). Now I noticed that in the last comment (comment 11) you wrote, “It is possible that the question of learning from the learned is also linked to this topic (see the page for Parashat Pakudi) and, yes, that is what I asked, interestingly, it is repeated and instructive, although I did not understand why “it is possible” and not certainly linked (I will see in the evening on the page for Parashat Pakudi).

By the way, as usual, whenever I have the opportunity to engage in sermons, I am reminded of the initiative you wrote in one of the issues of Mida Tova to build a segmented and organized database of all sermons in the literature of the Sages.
In particular, all the topics will be there with all their severities and voices, and it will be possible to find all the sermons with a single query (catalogized, for example, by realistic sermon such as ‘Shechen Nahâf’ or by exegetical sermon ‘Shechen Chaiyê Olam’ or by explicit sermon or interpretive sermon or by sermon analysis).
In addition, it will be possible to create all the easy and hard things that can be done based on the data that appear in the Shel but do not appear (for example, the easy and hard thing in the aforementioned issue 26 that a mirror will be required to have a tzitzit, let alone a four-cornered one that is exempt from a mezuzah and requires a tzitzit. The answer “it is not relevant” is not so clear to me. There are discussions about whether to do a “pircha that does not belong”, but “easy and hard thing that does not belong” is a matter that requires a more orderly analysis). And perhaps to create an “equal side” from a large number of teachers.
The problem is that this is hard, long, and very difficult work, and it is likely that those who engage in it themselves will not have sufficient tools to even analyze and eat the fruits of the carob orchard they are planting. May I ask whether, from your position and connections at the university, you have tried to interest groups in raising such a project? If I had a jar with nine more souls, I would invest two of them in building such a database.

Here you have returned to a different problem: the contradiction between the two directions of the course. I am blood in the study of each of them separately.
Since I have no connections at the university, I do not know how to raise this.

The possibility that an unexplained law is easier than an explicit law and allows one to learn a code, you rejected as stated, on the grounds that it is a contradiction in terms: “Such a problem arises in every light and matter; therefore, the conclusion of the light and matter contradicts its premises [7]. In another word: the result of the code constitutes a contradiction in terms of the inference itself: what to teach, since the validity of the law in it is easier (since it comes from a lecture) than in a lecture (which is explicitly written in the Bible)?”
Is it in itself that it is a contradiction in terms, that is, it is included in the innovation of the degree of sermon, especially, that it is not a contradiction. But it is still possible to make it a contradiction. In other words, you assume here that what is considered a clear/clear statement in terms of a contradiction is also always considered a clear/clear statement in terms of establishing the axis of hierarchy. Maybe not? I have no explanation to offer on the matter, but we can say that since this is a pirka for all the qu'un, then we learned from the measure itself that this is not a good pirka, but we have nothing in it but its innovation, and it can indeed be used for the purpose of studying qu'un.

Now I understand what you said (meaning my words). You may be right. This is a difficult issue for me.