Formal authority and popular acceptance

There is both an ontological claim here (the group exists and the individual belongs to it) and a moral claim (the individual is obligated to the “decisions of the group”). Even if we accept the ontological one, I still at least see no point in the moral claim. Even before discussing why contracts should be kept (and in my opinion the justification should be for the future and not because of the signing ceremony in the past), there is a difference between contracts that I, as a small individual, decided on and contracts that were imposed on me as a small individual in one way or another.

Unless you say that God commands to keep public acceptances (He could also command to always make sure to do exactly the opposite of public acceptances), then I am sane.

Can the rabbi elaborate a bit on the mechanism?

1 How do you sign?
It seems to me that most Jews (unfortunately) do not see themselves as obligated to the Talmud. So what happens in a situation like this? Are only some Jews obligated to the Talmud? What if 55% of the people have accepted a norm? Are the remaining 45% also obligated? What is the threshold?

2 What if the signing is "forced"?
What if the group makes immoral decisions? Are you also obligated to that? Probably not. So what are the restrictions?

Tolgi,
I'm not entirely sure that an ontic assumption is needed here. It's enough that he was part of the public in the normative sense (although one can also ask why).
The consequentialist question is already an old debate between us.

Yosef,
What needs to be specified? We signed at Mount Sinai as a public and it binds us. And if there are criminals who don't fulfill their obligation, that doesn't absolve them. And because he ate garlic, will he come back and eat garlic? There is no threshold.
If the signing is forced, it is not binding. In immoral decisions, if they have a religious justification, they are binding. Morality is just one of the considerations.

But every example you come up with makes me harbor false hopes that, upon seeing the example, everyone will admit and succumb to consequentialism. There must be some name for this bias/deviation.
Do you think contracts should be kept simply like that as a moral axiom? Maybe in your opinion it is a consequence of a categorical imperative like paying taxes?

Indeed, the connection between the categorical imperative and consequentialism has already been discussed in detail here.

Thank you. I understood from what you said that formal authority that stems from the acceptance of the people is equivalent to the acceptance of every individual from the people. And if I accepted a norm on myself, it is as if it stems from an institution with formal authority.

Still, I have a few questions (which may stem from a misunderstanding of the concepts):
1 If someone accepted a norm on themselves and then decided not to accept it any longer. Is he allowed to do so?
@ If so, a group can also decide not to accept a single norm any longer.
@ If not, what is the justification for this? The mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. (If the people who signed the contract want to break it, why can't they do so?)
2 I don't understand how the acceptance of a group can create an obligation on me. It seems to me like a forced signature.
3 How can my ancestors oblige me to accept them (as if I accepted it myself)? It also seems to me like a forced signature.

1. No. He made a commitment and I cannot withdraw it. Otherwise, what is the meaning of this commitment? I have already written that it is a commitment to another entity (God). If both parties agree, it can of course be changed, but one party cannot break a contract. It is not like a commitment that you accept upon yourself (which, again, the halakha says requires permission and without it you cannot withdraw).
2. You are part of the group. It is like you yourself accept upon yourself. It is just like the law of the state that you cannot decide not to accept.
3. I have already explained that acceptance belongs to the public and not to you, and everyone who belongs to this public is obligated by it. Just like a law that also binds future generations (as long as it is not changed).

Thank you for your answer. That's clearer. But unfortunately the concept of "accepting upon oneself" is still vague to me.

1- It seems to me that people don't accept things "out of the blue" about themselves. But from data through a thought process, people come to a situation where they accept things about themselves.

What if there is a problem with the data or the thought process? Isn't that like a mistake? Can the contract be void?

An example of the giving of the Torah.
@ Data: God commanded us a commandment.
@ Thought process: The concept of God makes everything that God commands binding on me.
@ Conclusion: I accept upon myself to be obligated to the commandment (the word of God)

What if they think the data is incorrect? For example, a Rabbi of the Jewish people thinks that the status of Mount Sinai did not exist and was not created. Can the people not accept the obligation to the commandments?

What if the people have a different concept of God? For example, the people think that God is unfair and therefore there is no obligation to obey him. Can the people not accept the obligation to the commandments?

(You might answer that in reality they are wrong. Therefore, the truth is that they are obligated to the commandments without being aware of it, because after all there is no room for error, but they are coercive.)

2- I don't accept many of the laws of my country. I think they are harmful and stupid. But I won't break them because I simply don't want to be punished.

3- I understand. Thank you!

1. I really don't understand this insistence. Who spoke of acceptance “out of the blue”? The people of Israel took upon themselves a commitment to the Torah. If in your opinion there was a mistake there, then you are exempt, as in any contract.
If someone thinks that the status was not there, there is no need to cancel the contract because no contract was ever signed.
You are asking me if you don't believe in God or in the status of Mount Sinai, are you supposed to keep the commandments? Clearly, as far as you are concerned, you don't (and indeed, in my opinion you are wrong and you are obligated). What is the question?

1- The question was: What if one of the two parties to a contract is convinced that there is a mistake (even though there really is no mistake)?
If I understood correctly, the answer is that this party is obligated but forced.

2- Sorry, but I couldn't understand what you said: "You are part of the group. […] It's just like a state law that you can't decide not to accept."
I wrote that there are state laws that I don't accept (because I think they're stupid) but I won't break them because I simply don't want to be punished.
Don't you also call not breaking a law for fear of punishment "accepting a law"?

1. This is not a question. If the contract is valid, he is obligated. If he himself thinks that the contract is not valid, then of course he will not fulfill it (even though he is obligated). What is the question here? Can anyone say anything else about this question?
2. Even a stupid law is obligated to be fulfilled because you, as a citizen, signed a contract. This does not mean that you have to be ultra-orthodox in this matter, but there is a principled obligation to the law, regardless of whether it is stupid or not. If you do not think that the law should be obeyed, then we have a disagreement. But again, I do not understand what the question is.
I think we have exhausted it.

1- I understand. You're right. It's simple.

2- I'm really sorry, but I can't understand your doctrine.

From what you said, I understood that there is some categorical imperative: you necessarily belong to a group, therefore you are necessarily bound by the group's decisions. And that's it.

Personally, I think that one should obey the law for a consequential reason: if one does not obey the law, then the group is in danger. And why not endanger the group? For three main reasons:
a) An "egoistic" reason: people benefit from the group and need it to live (if there is no protection, if there are no bakers, if there are no doctors, one cannot live)
b) An "essential" reason: I don't want society to be compromised because I see value in its status (in what it represents, in its messages,...)
c) I am grateful to it because it allows me to live a good life. As a measure of gratitude, I see myself as obligated to do what is necessary to preserve it (or at least not endanger it)
But this has nothing to do with a moral claim (in Tolginus' terminology) that the public's decision obliges me as an individual from the public!

For example: I am a redneck. By necessity, I belong to the group of rednecks. What if all the rednecks (for goodness sake) agreed to eat one carrot every morning. Do you think I am obligated to eat a carrot every morning?

Not that you didn't understand. You disagree. I argue that my acceptance of myself binds me (a contract), and to the same extent, my acceptance of the public to which I belong binds the public (and me within it). Quite simply. It is not any categorical imperative, at least not beyond the imperative that underlies my obligation to uphold what I myself have committed myself to.

All the reasons you have given do not stand the test of criticism and I have already written about that. But that is not important to our matter. If that is what you think, good luck. What is your question to me?

Because what you say seems so wrong to me, it is proven that I misunderstood you (or there is a hidden assumption that I do not agree with).

Here are my assumptions:

Assumption 1 - There is no reality of the group as an agreement between people.
The group exists only in people's minds, it has no existence on its own. Unlike humans. I exist regardless of whether someone thinks I exist.
Despite the problem of personal identity, it seems to me that what I existed yesterday obliges me today. It does not seem simple for a group that what it existed yesterday obliges it (morally) today (after its details have changed).

Assumption 2 - The meaning of the expression "a person who accepts a norm upon himself" is quite clear. We have all experienced it. And it is binary: either I accepted or I did not accept. The same expression regarding a group "a group that accepts upon itself" is less clear (because it is possible that only part of the group accepts something). Therefore, because acceptance is binary and a group is just a collection of its details, I thought that "acceptance of the group" meant "acceptance of each individual from the group." Therefore, according to this definition, if the majority of the group accepted something, it does not bind me.

I asked: Do you disagree with my assumptions? Probably yes 🙂

Nb: I would love to read your criticism of the reasons I raised. Did you write a column about it?

You have identified the points of disagreement well. That is what I said: you certainly understand, you just disagree.

Thanks for the verification.

Do I dare ask more?

The concept of "accepting" in relation to a person is quite clear. We have all experienced it. But what does it mean that a group has accepted? In what ways is the acceptance of the group similar to the acceptance of a person?
I wanted to know how you define the concept of "accepting" in relation to a group.
What is the criterion to know if a certain group has accepted a norm? (Percentage of the group's individuals who accepted it, acceptance of individuals who represent the group, something else...)

My questions:
1- What is your definition of the concept of "accepting" in relation to a group?
2- What are the overlapping features between acceptance of a group and acceptance of an individual?

I don't know what definition you're expecting. Did the residents of Israel accept the laws of the Knesset? How did you determine that? If a whole people stands and accepts a commitment at Mount Sinai, then they accepted it. That's all. No Jew has ever questioned that, including the worshipers of the Holy Spirit in the Bible.

Perhaps through an example the definition I expect will be clearer.

Here are my definitions:

1.1-Definition of the concept of "accept" regarding a person: A person accepts a norm upon himself when he has decided to be committed to that norm. Meaning: to behave as the norm demands.
1.2- Protocol (one of many) to examine whether a person has accepted the norm 'n' upon himself.
@ Test that he is not a liar
@ Test that he understands the concept of "accept"
@ Ask him if he has accepted the norm 'n'

2.1- Definition of the concept of "accept" regarding a group: A group accepts a norm upon itself when an absolute majority of the group's members (say more than 95%) have decided to be committed to that norm. Meaning: to behave as the norm demands.
2.2 – Protocol (one of many) to examine whether the group has accepted the norm 'n' upon itself.
@ Loop of Protocol 1.2 on all group details

By my definition, the people of Israel certainly accepted the Torah upon themselves.
And it is likely that the absolute majority of the residents of Israel accepted the authority of the Knesset upon themselves (in my opinion for the reasons I raised: not to endanger the state, etc.). Therefore, by my definition, this means that it is likely that the residents of Israel accepted the laws of the Knesset upon themselves.

I understood that you do not agree with my definitions. I just wanted to know why and what your definitions are. If you do not have definitions (because everything is obvious and intuitive) then there is none.

You misunderstood. Exactly what I wrote, except for the number (95). What is the discussion about?

I understand now.

So the discussion is about the reality of abstract existence, as a group. And also about the problem of personal identity regarding such existence. I think I will find material in your book "That which is and that which is not" (which I have not read yet, due to my many sins).
I will not bother you any further on this subject.

Thank you very much for your answer and Shabbat Shalom.