Free choice and strong will
Hello Rabbi,
It is often said that a person has free choice, but it is difficult for me to understand how it is carried out in practice.
For example, when a person has an 80% strong urge to smoke a cigarette, and in contrast, he has a 60% strong desire, caused by the understanding that cigarettes are unhealthy. So it is clear that he will choose to smoke a cigarette, because the desire to smoke outweighs the desire not to smoke.
And vice versa, if he has a strong desire to do good because he was educated that a certain action is “right” and important, and on the other hand he has a less strong desire to be lazy, there is no reason why he should not carry out his good will.
Therefore, it is not clear where choice can operate. After all, a person’s values, in terms of what is a proper value and what is not, are not the product of choice but of thinking/cognition, and the more he internalizes them (for example, by studying morality), the more he “wants” them. And the question is how strong they are in relation to the local instinct.
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- The decision of how powerful each value is. This is not the result of mere passive recognition. There is a decision here. I have discussed this in previous posts.
- The decision to act according to my scale of values (against weakness of will).
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1. As soon as you understand that one value is true. Then it automatically receives a modifier that translates into desire. And the more you get it wrong (as the moralists recommend to learn morality) then it will also become stronger. So it is not clear where the choice is.
I would love to know which posts they are?
2. This argument goes back to no’ as soon as you understand that it is important and have memorized it a lot then its desire will also become stronger. And if not no. Then you will “go down” the slope.
You not only “understand” but also “decide” to go with it. There are two stages here: understanding what is right, and deciding to go with what is right. Even the decision to “make more mistakes” is the result of a free will decision. And of course, even after you have made a mistake and understood and internalized that it is important, there is a decision whether to act on it.
See 35, 175, 172-3.
“Value” is not just a neutral and casual fact. But a charged claim that is supposed to “tell” you what to do or dissuade you from doing it. In any case, a person who understands what the value is right will act on it. So there is no decision here to follow the right thing. The understanding that the thing is right is the “decision” to go with it.
Thank you.
Absolutely not true. A person does not necessarily do what they think is right. This is weakness of will. Please
A sign that he has not sufficiently internalized the importance of the thing.
As soon as he fails, he will “ask” himself how he got to this point. If this value is important to him, then he will “repent”.
The meaning of repenting is that he will internalize it a little more until the strength of the will increases. It will not always be enough in relation to the physical will. But after many, many times it will happen.
However, if he discovers that the value is not important to him, then he will simply abandon it.
I think this reflects the world clearly. So there is really no room for choice.
I see no point in continuing. If you insist then it is clear that your conclusion will be that there is no choice. Your own arguments, to the best of my judgment, are baseless and I have already explained why. We are repeating ourselves.
All the best.
Thank you,
I understand the argument you wrote about the weakness of the will. So a person may not want enough to uphold the proper value against the impulse he has at the time of the shift, and therefore, he chooses to roll down the slope. But if so, he can act against the slope and go up.
But I really failed to understand the second part, how can a person understand that there is a proper value X and not “want” (in the deterministic sense) to follow it? After all, there is really no real reason why this value would not affect him at all. Even if we assume that he continues to follow his impulses. But with that, how can the mind understand that something is proper and not “want” to carry it out.
After all, values are prescriptive claims, and there is no doubt that they are translated into desires, because that is their purpose. And the internalization of understanding is the will. In other words, these are not only knowledges but in addition they are forced understandings.
Tuvia, I'm a little unclear whether there's a reading comprehension problem here or something else.
You yourself say that you understand the phenomenon of weakness of will, which is: even though a person understands that it's right to do X, he does Y. This is the explanation I suggested why a person who thinks it's right to do X doesn't do it. And you understand that. So what's not clear?
Immediately afterwards, you ask how it's possible for a person who understands that it's right to do X not to want to do it and that this value won't affect him at all. Who said he doesn't want to? Who said it doesn't affect him? What I'm saying is that it affects him and that person also wants to do it, but because of his instincts (weakness of will) he doesn't actually do it. What's so complicated here?
It seems to me that you're mixing up two concepts of "want". A person who thinks it's right to do X also wants to do it. But he also wants to enjoy it (the instinct). The weighing of the two desires is done in his own decision, and therefore sometimes he won't do X even though he wants to do it. Alternatively, it can be phrased as he doesn't want to do X enough. These are just two different formulations of the same thing.
Maybe I'll try to put it another way,
Does the Rabbi agree that when a person understands that value X is worthy, a deterministic urge to do it develops in him.
Because values are prescriptive claims, so that their internalization is their will. A kind of “forced” understanding.
Even though a person understands that X, they continue to claim that it is not X.
Are you saying he's lying to himself? I'm sorry, but that doesn't sound logical or possible at all. After all, if he thinks X is the truth, then it is the truth.
I will join your move:
Yes.
It sounds like you don't believe that, why?
B. Assuming that it is, then you agree that the moment a person understands that the value x is worth doing, the desire to do x is also born in him. The desire is measured by understanding the importance of the value, the more he feels that he is connected to the idea that the value expresses and ”finds himself in it” the desire strengthens. If he has not yet felt this, then no.
If the value x is at war with the “instinct”. It depends on who is stronger (the strength of x depends on the previous distinction) and therefore it is possible that following continuous stimulation of the instinct, then the instinct will prevail over the strength of x and the person will “choose” the instinct.
If there was a significant attempt to save the existence of the value against the instinct. Then the power of the value will increase, among other things, due to a feeling of regret and a host of other psychological factors. (And this is the weakness of the will.)
But if not, then the power of x will weaken automatically. The possibility that the value will rise again is only by understanding that the value is indeed important.
Of course there are many more factors but this is a general outline of the idea.
This sketch is incredibly complicated. I do agree that the stronger the understanding of the value, the greater the desire to do it.
And I also agree that there is still no guarantee that this is indeed what will be done. Because of passions, for example, or simply choosing evil.
So far, that is exactly what I am claiming. I am still waiting for us to get to the point where you disagree with me.
Thank you for the praise.
And if so, then we conclude. Because according to what I said above, there is no “place ” in which the choice will be made.
If the urge is greater than x. Then it will prevail, if not, not. There is no possibility that the urge will be stronger than the will x and the person will still do x. Because if he did the value x, then it means that the will x was greater than the urge, and we have already written that it was not. (Law of Contradiction)
Besides, there is no possibility for a person to choose evil. The only possibility is when he had the evil urge.
If you assume that a person has no choice, you will surprisingly receive the conclusion that a person has no choice. I have exhausted it.
I didn't understand. The only possibility that I understand what you mean:
He even if he happened to have a stronger urge than the desire that developed in us to perform X. It is still possible that in this topography we will act against the urge. Because we will mobilize a "will" force that is external to the internal system of considerations. If we ask where the force came from, then we say that it is the desire, and it is also a creation of something out of nothing without a reason but a purpose.
But then, if we have a purpose and a goal to speak of. It can also be represented in a causal way - that we do X because it is what seems right to us. But if so, why not say that this entire desire is a local development from our thinking that quickly concluded that the value X is important enough to overcome the urge. So it is a completely deterministic act.
“Why wasn't it said” is not a problem. You didn't need all this discussion for that. You're just assuming determinism because why say there is free will and that's it. My answer: Because I feel there is. Just like the question of why say that what I see or think is indeed true? My answer: Because that's how I feel.
Thanks, so the reason for the whole free choice claim is because of the experience of choice. Although it seems that the rabbi completely agrees that it might be even easier and more reasonable to interpret the findings in a deterministic way.
But even according to the rabbi's method, the sense of free choice cannot easily develop in a deterministic way? So it sounds unlikely to trust it.
On the other hand, claiming that the eyes are wrong is unlikely because we can feel, hear and smell that what we saw is right.
And claiming that the entire sensory system is wrong is unlikely because it operates harmoniously.
I really disagree. But if you agree that the previous discussion is irrelevant and the whole question is why I assume there is a choice, then a new, neat discussion should be opened about it.
See more here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%91%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%93%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA/#comment-19707
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