Free choice – deterministic interpretation

Regarding the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, it seems that the intention there, as in other places in the Bible, is that since Pharaoh had hardened his own heart by choice earlier in such a severe way, he was now already destined to be punished, and the punishment includes the inability to repent, as the Maimonides explains in the Laws of Repentance and in the introduction to the eight chapters. The Torah explains, "And I will harden his heart, and he will not let the people go" (Exodus 4), meaning I will harden it in a way that ensures that he will not let them go. And it is also said of the sons of Eli, "And they will not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desires to kill them." (1 Samuel 2:25), “The heart of this people is waxed fat, and their ears are dull, and their eyes are dull: lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and turn again, and be healed” (Isaiah 6:10) and more.

Indeed, some have interpreted Pharaoh's hardness of heart in this way, but I did not understand it that way. In all the examples you gave, it is possible to explain that this is not a deterministic action. And the logic is that if this is a deterministic action, there is no point in it. If they want to punish him, let them punish him directly. The fact that he does not send because of a deterministic hardness of heart should not add to his punishment. He is not guilty of this.

But none of this matters to the person being discussed. Even if it was deterministic for Pharaoh, it follows that without the heaviness of heart he certainly has a choice. To depend on this in a “limited” situation where value and desire are exactly equal is ridiculous. The chance that this is the situation is 0 (it cannot be reduced).
Beyond that, the very discussion of what happened to Pharaoh cannot be conducted according to Tobias, who believes that in a situation of heaviness of heart there is no possibility of choice.

I didn't understand how, according to your method, one can choose the weak instinct when the strong value tells one not to do it.
And a person who works on autopilot does not choose not to choose. Because when there is an instinct <<< value. Or an instinct without value, then one cannot choose it. Because there will never be a purpose to do so. An example of this is the empirical proof of the Libet experiments.

Tuvia, I will explain one more time and with this I end this pointless discussion that repeats exactly the previous thread (and therefore it is not clear to me what the point was in opening a new thread).
There are two models that stand against each other:
1. The deterministic model: There is a set of pressures and impulses and values in a person, and what he will do is the result of weighing all of these. The bottom line forces the person to do what he does. He cannot deviate from it.
2. The libertarian model: There is a set of pressures and impulses and values in a person, and the weighing of all of these creates a bottom line that tries to push him in a certain direction. But the person can decide whether to go in that direction or not. Of course, the stronger the pressure, the greater the difficulty in acting against it, and vice versa.
You assume model A again and again and again, and I repeat and tell you again and again that I hold to model B. And you again and again and again repeat Model A and also open a new thread and do the same thing in it, and I again and again tell you that you assume what is wanted, that is, if you assume determinism you will get determinism. What is the point of this pointless discussion? If you do not get – health.
As for the Libet experiments, I explained in both my article and my books on the science of freedom that they have nothing to discuss.
That's it. I'm done. I will not answer any more.

I agree with the very issue of free choice in the sense of a realistic ability to do otherwise. I was just making a side note that from the biblical perspective it means that there are extreme situations in which a person is deprived of the ability to choose. If we can say this about situations such as temporary insanity, there is no reason not to think that there are situations in which this is the result of an act of providence, as a reward for previous sins.

Where is the point in this type of punitive action? The fact that Pharaoh does not send because of his hardness of heart is not the *reason* for continuing the punishment. The nature and extent of the punishment were already determined beforehand according to his previous sins and not because of God's intervention in hardening the heart. But there is something appropriate in the fact that part of the punishment will include hardening the heart. Pharaoh became the instrument through which the name of the ’ became known in the world. “And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt” – Because I will punish them for their stubbornness – Therefore my signs and wonders will be multiplied in the land of Egypt. And again: “But Pharaoh will not listen to you, and I will lay my hand on Egypt, and I will bring out my armies, my people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great judgments. And the Egyptians shall know that I am the LORD, when I stretch out my hand upon Egypt, and bring out the children of Israel from among them. (Exodus 7) Because he will not hear, therefore all this will be possible. The sanctification of the name of the LORD is done through him in the negative sense, through his punishment, this is precisely the punishment. A rational person prefers that the name of the LORD be sanctified by him through participation in the positive purpose of history.

The sons of Eli did not listen to the voice of their father *because the LORD wanted to kill them*. If it had not been the LORD's desire They would have heard that their father spoke wise words and any reasonable person would understand that these were acts of abomination. But God keeps His promise that those who truly repent are not rejected, and therefore repentance was withheld from them so that they could be instruments for receiving the punishment that had already been decreed.

This biblical theology is important because it shows that it is impossible to disrespect God and that there is a certain stage after which a person will no longer be able to repent.

As I wrote, I'm not sure that this is the simplest of the readings. It seems to me that one can read them all in the way I suggested (= changing the weights between which the choice is made). As for your explanation, I think it is more reasonable to punish right away when the act that requires punishment occurs and not to postpone it and create artificial situations of heaviness of heart. As for Pharaoh, right when he weighed his heart for the first time, to inflict a few blows on him that would force him to submit and that's it. Wasn't the same Kiddush Hashem here? Why do we need to create another artificial situation? It is much more likely that the situation that was created is not artificial. Indeed, there is also a way for Pharaoh to repent and if he had done so, he would have been saved. However, the sinner and the changed are made to him as an exception, since he has weighed his heart, it is already more difficult for him to act correctly. And in this case, the current act constitutes part of the punishment for the previous acts. But oh, if he does repent, he can be saved. And so we have come to accept that the door to repentance is never closed, it can only become more difficult to perform. In my opinion, even when a person serves as the staff of the Almighty, he and his decisions still have a part in the matter. And this matter takes us to what the author of the book calls the leadership of a "terrible plot", and so on.

The creation of the artificial situation simply constitutes the very purpose of the act: And yet in this passage I have made you stand, in this passage you have seen my power, and in order that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. And so with regard to Sihon: And Sihon king of Heshbon did not return to us, because the Lord your God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate *in order to deliver him into your hand, as it is this day*. The avoidance of sending the people *stems* from the act of artificially strengthening the heart: “And I will strengthen his heart and he will not send the people” (and additional citations can be seen in the Rambam”Heb. 6, 3. and in the eighth chapter of eight chapters). It should be noted that the hardening of the heart always comes for the purpose of freezing it in accordance with the state that the person had previously shaped by choice, and not in order to change it.

Why did the blow not fall on him immediately after the punishment was pronounced? The question is equally asked if the hardening of the heart would have left him with the possibility of choosing otherwise. Such hardening “involuntarily” also causes an artificial situation: instead of the chance of choosing the logical act being almost certain, the chance is now almost certainly not. In a normal situation, there would be a small enough number of such impressive signs that even a wicked man like Pharaoh would almost certainly prefer the good of his own obvious personal interest to consciously going to perdition. But God desires the creation of the artificial situation for the sake of His name being written throughout the land.

In general, we all agree that there is some stage when the choice of repentance is prevented, and what is the fundamental difference whether it is only at the moment of death, at the time of Judgment Day, or some time before a person's death. The fact that the door of repentance is never closed does not speak of the time after the sentence is pronounced.

And regardless of all this. The hardness of Pharaoh's heart can prove that the plagues could have been interpreted by those who wanted to as unusual natural phenomena and nothing more. And as is sometimes explained in research. This was beautifully shown by the director of the film “Gods and Kings” about the epic of the Exodus from Egypt starring the immortal actor Christian Bale

I was not convinced. The heaviness of heart that leaves him with a choice allows him to repent if he tries hard enough.

In the Book of the Law of Moses, the hardness of heart denied Pharaoh the choice of evil. According to this, Pharaoh was punished not for his refusal at the time of the plagues, but for everything he had sinned before, the enslavement, abuse, and murder of innocent people for more than eighty years, in addition to what he had transgressed against the commandments of the children of Noah in idolatry, incest, robbery, and bloodshed.

Some commentators, such as Rabbi Yosef Albo, author of the ‘Haikrîm’, have interpreted that the hardness of heart did not prevent Pharaoh from choosing evil. On the contrary, it allowed him to choose evil even though he saw visible miracles that verified the power of God and His mission. By being hard of heart, Pharaoh found excuses to reject the clearly tangible, and thus he was left with the option of choosing between the two sides.

With blessings, Schutz Levinger

It is possible that one of the ways that strengthened Pharaoh's insistence on not believing was Moses' statement that the purpose of the exodus was to worship the Lord in the wilderness, which implied that he did not have the power to lead the people out completely, and that he himself doubted the truth of his mission; or that he was resorting to deceit - seeking to escape under the pretext of going out for a religious purpose - and to such a deceiver, Pharaoh believes, God will not give His support.

In this direction, the punctuation of the reasons in the verse "May the Lord be with you" helps, since the stopping reason, "tefah", is found in the day of the Lord. For you, and the lesson of the matter: "So may the Lord deal with you, just as you want to do me wrong and escape, so may the Lord deal with you and punish you."

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Some of the commentators (Rabbi Yosef Albo, Sefer HaEchikrim, article 4, chapter 25; Rabbi Ovadia Seforno, Torah Commentary, Exodus 7:3) have interpreted…

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… It is found between the Lord and your people’. And a lesson…

Rabbi Levinger,

These approaches are more apologetic than they emerge from the scriptures themselves. The interpretation that the hardening of the heart is nothing more than giving the possibility to choose evil despite the signs is certainly creative, but it would be almost ridiculous to say that it is well reflected in the plain text. The biblical motif of the hardening of the heart by the Creator as a punishment is not a one-time occurrence regarding the Exodus from Egypt, but is embedded several times throughout the Bible, and already in the Book of Samuel, which is undoubtedly considered ancient, and of course in Jeremiah and Isaiah and more. In my opinion, Maimonides describes the simple essence of the Bible without sophistication. Note that when the Torah speaks of the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh and the Sichon, it is done in the form of “Thus the Almighty will ensure” that the signs will be done, “Thus I will ensure” That Sihon will be defeated, etc., and this is not consistent with the possibility of choosing otherwise.

The emphasis on these approaches contributes to the perception of God as if he were an imaginary friend and a Santa Claus-style indulgent one, in contrast to the biblical self-perception of the incomprehensible severity of sin: “Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean lips, and I live in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the King, the LORD of hosts.”

In 2 Sam. 2:9

The Bible is full of calls for repentance from the understanding that He is long-suffering and forbearing over evil and accepts those who return to Him, including the people of Nineveh who were already doomed to become like Sodom, and including Manasseh who filled Jerusalem with blood, and yet when they returned, He accepted their repentance.

Even according to the Maimonides, when a transgression is ruled out, the possibility of repentance is denied, for this is an exceptional situation, not intended to teach the generality. And even where the Mishnah says, “It is not sufficient for him to repent,” the Maimonides interprets that they do not help him to return, but they do not close the gates of repentance in his face.

The author of the principles and Rabbi Seforno believe that even before Pharaoh, the paths of repentance were closed. Hardening the heart, as it is meant in the Bible, is the adoption of the heart so that it will not be afraid, and as in the proverbs, ‘a man is always afraid’ is the opposite of ‘hardening his heart’.

Adopting the heart and removing the fear of punishment can also lead to avoiding repentance and receiving a more severe punishment, but also provides an opportunity for true repentance from an inner desire, and it is clear that ’ will prefer this scenario ‘because he will not be crushed by the death of the dead, but rather by returning from his way and living’

And contrary to your understanding that ’promises to make sure that Sihon hardens his heart so that he is defeated –Moses understands that the words of ’ ‘See, I have given Sihon king of the Amorites and his land into your hand. He began to provoke him to war’ (Deuteronomy 2:24) as a ’default’ option,’ that does not prevent an attempt to avoid a confrontation by ‘words of peace’. The Lord removed the fear from Sihon by making his heart strong, but the responsibility for refusing to hear ‘words of peace’ rests with Sihon alone.

With best wishes, Sh’z Levinger

To anyone who thinks that God never cancels a person's choice:

Regardless of the simplicity of the Bible, is there a moral or theological reason that compels you to think so, and if so, what is it? I can't find one. If God gives a person enough opportunities to repent, and in each of them the person decides to repent, and one day that person suddenly has a stroke and dies in his sin: is there a contradiction here that "it is clear that God would prefer a scenario where he turns from his ways and lives"? After all, from his death onward, his ability to return was canceled. And the fact is that there is no contradiction: in the same prophet who presents the principle of God "I have no desire for the death of the dead" there is several references to death penalties as a reward for sinners.

In other words, either way, it turns out that there is a certain moment from which there is no longer any opportunity to return, and what about me if it is a sudden death and what about me if it is a cancellation of the choice. Now the only question that remains is whether the scriptures seem to speak of the possibility of canceling the choice before death. If it seems so, there is no reason not to accept it. The questioner will ask: Why not punish the sinner with death immediately instead of canceling the choice? There are many reasons for providence and there is no room here to go into them. But certainly there could be reasons for this, as it is said, for example, regarding Pharaoh: “But for this very reason I have made you stand, for the sake of showing you my power and for the sake of proclaiming my name throughout all the earth”.

To Levinger, hardening the heart simply means: When you harden something, you keep it in its unchanging state (despite reproofs, signs, or warnings), as opposed to ”And I will remove the stony heart from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh”.

Regarding Sihon, the Torah clearly states that God made sure that He would not choose otherwise: And Sihon king of Heshbon did not turn away from us, because the Lord your God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate *in order that you might deliver him into your hand, as it is this day*. Notice what the purpose of the action is: *in order* to give you this day. When God performs an action for a specific purpose (preserving the heart in its previous state), the purpose must achieve its purpose, and this is the same as the annulment of the choice. If there is no other option for Sihon except to harden his heart and go to war, then his choice is annulled, because the meaning of the words free choice is the ability to choose differently.

The question of why Moses nevertheless turned to Sihon is an interesting question, but it does not touch on the essence of the Torah's words regarding the annulment of the choice. Moses may have initially thought that the intention of the prophecy was conditional, and its purpose was only to make him not shy away from it, knowing that if he refused to help the people of Israel he would be defeated, and only later did God clarify to him that this was the purpose from the beginning, “except to give you this”. It is possible that Moses' action was merely a message to the generations about how to turn first to peace and not for oneself, and it is possible that the individual himself should turn to peace in any case, even though the refusal was known for certain according to the prophecy. However you interpret it, Sihon certainly could not have chosen otherwise.

“And they would not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desired their death” (1 Samuel 2). Rashi: “That the sentence had already been sealed, but before the sentence was sealed, it was said that I will not desire the death of the dead”.

I did not claim that God never cancels a person's choice, although that could also be the case. What I claimed is that the burden of proof is on the one who claims that this was done in a particular case, because usually this does not happen. When a person no longer functions as a person (he is deprived of choice), there is no point in his existence. He can already die. As long as he lives, the assumption is that he is supposed to function as a person, that is, to choose. As stated, a different situation is possible, but the burden of proof is on the one who claims this. In the case of Pharaoh, I do not think that was the case, nor is there any need to say so.

B”D 2’ Bishvat E”9

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

Without going into the moral-theological question (which the author of the Ekirarim and the Seferno I mentioned have extended), – I have already shown that ’he who hardens his heart will fall into evil’ is opposed to ’blessed is the man who fears always’. This means that hardening the heart is the removal of fear. And so in the Sishon: ‘for the Lord hardened his spirit’ and strengthened his heart– he strengthened his heart so that he would not fear.. Where is there a complete negation of choice here?

In the case of Sihon, as it is said, "To give it into your hand," it may be that the option preferred by the At this stage, Sihon will choose evil in order to be defeated (unlike an ordinary sinner who is more desirous of his answer), but his turning to him for peace indicates that the opportunity for a peaceful solution has not been closed.

Even Moses' repeated appeals and rebukes to Pharaoh indicate that the possibility of a reply has not been closed. And if Moses believes that there is no possibility that Pharaoh will turn back on him, why is he crying out to the Lord to remove the plagues from him, and is Moses praying a vain prayer?

There is also a claim against Eli for not being hard on them after they did not listen to his gentle rebuke. Perhaps if he had rebuked them forcefully, they would have listened to him even though their hearts had been hardened.

As long as the candle is burning, man's ability to choose exists, and even if it has already been There is no help in returning – the door is not completely locked.

Best regards, Sh”t Levinger

To the Rabbi,

Of course, it must be assumed that this is only in rare cases, both because “I will not desire the death of the dead” and because it is an intervention in human nature, and the mere fact that a reflection on repentance passes through a person's mind is decisive evidence that he is not one of them. But I find no reason to think that today this will happen less than in the past, and perhaps it is precisely during the period of concealment that this should happen more, because the mere freezing of a person's heart in a state of refusal to repent is a miracle that is not visible to the eye, unlike punishment by unexplained death.

This does not mean that this involves a total cancellation of choice in all areas, but may focus on hardening the heart only for a specific issue, or only for a specific period, as in Isaiah, after he observes the holy call of the seraphim, who were told: “Go and say to this people, “Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not.” The heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull, and their eyes are dull of sight; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and turn and be healed.

Then Isaiah asks how long the punishment will last: “And the Lord will say, How long? And he said, Until the cities are taken away without inhabitant, and houses without man, and the land is laid waste.” That is, until the exodus is completed. Here we are talking about the cancellation of the possibility of repentance for an entire people. Why? Because after prophets were sent early and late and the people persisted in their rebellion, a stage was reached in which the judgment was pronounced, from which there was no turning back.

Levinger,

I think it is appropriate to enter into the moral-theological question because it is the driving force behind these interpretations. I noted that there is no reason to think that there is any fundamental difference between the impossibility of returning after death and the impossibility of returning following a temporary suspension of death, when in the process the choice is canceled.

In ”he who hardens his heart will fall into evil” what is in question is not the removal of fear, but the actual hardening of the heart. The person who is ”always afraid” is one who allows his heart to be influenced by the rebuke of conscience or the fear of sin, in contrast to the condition of the one who hardens his heart, that is, the one who has become hard – and a hard substance is not affected by an external influence that may mold and change it – therefore he is not always afraid. The absence of fear is only the sign and not the cause. The cause is the hardening of the heart.

Regarding Sihon, it is not possible that his choice of evil was only the “preferred option” over the ’. It is not written “for the sake of giving him into your hand” simply but more than that – That the purpose of hardening the heart was intended to bring about a certain result “For the Lord your God hardened his spirit and hardened his heart, that He might give him into your hand” and as I mentioned before, if the Almighty performs an action that is intended to bring about some result, the result necessarily occurs – meaning that choosing goodness was impossible for Him. Again, the question of turning to him for peace is a side issue here. The plainness of Scripture is that the choice was nullified, and now you have a question as to why Moses nevertheless turned to him for peace, which can be answered in all the ways that I mentioned before and probably also in others, but you cannot presuppose a certain and certainly unwarranted interpretation as an answer to an interpretive question and on this basis contradict the plainness of Scripture.

Regarding Pharaoh, there is no hint in the Scripture that Moses prayed for him to repent, but only that he would say, “And he shall say according to your word, that you may know that there is no one like the LORD our God.” (Exodus 8:6)

Regarding Eli, this is precisely the meaning of the commandment, “And they will not listen to the voice of their father, for the LORD desired to kill them,” as Rashi points out there. Since the reason for the disobedience is the LORD’s desire to kill them, it does not matter what their father would have done, the LORD’s desire It would have happened and they would not have repented (of course, God keeps His promise and when there is a true repentance, God does not reject it, which is why He did not allow it to happen).

Hello Rabbi,
I accept that the approach you present is indeed coherent and explains the libertarian approach.
But why hold on to it, when we have a much better approach – the deterministic model.
This model explains well why we act this way and not otherwise. It fits well with the reality around us in which we see that every event has a reason. It feels much more reasonable and possible than the creation of something out of nothing. And it is also much more reasonable to continue holding on to the materialistic approach than the mystical dualistic…
And what if you say that the only reason for this is because we feel a choice? That is really unconvincing, because the deterministic model also explains this feeling in a very reasonable way why it is a mental-experiential illusion.

Secondly, I would like to know whether, according to the libertarian method, a person can choose evil? I mean, when he has no inclination to do the evil deed. And he does not see this as a positive value, but rather a negative one.
The rabbi claims in the context of the Libet experiments that the reason for the success of the experiments is that there is no act of choice here but rather the awakening of the instinct, and as long as the person chose not to veto the instinct, he followed his instinct.
So it is implied from your words that a person cannot choose in a random reality. Is the same thing true of choosing evil?

Third, the rabbi wrote in one of the answers here that the Libet experiments showed that there is a possibility of vetoing. I would like to know, do the findings today still align with the possibility of vetoing without an RP before him?

In the 3rd of Shvat 9th

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

According to your words (following Rabbah, Radak in the first commentary, and the Rambam in Hal’ Teshuva 6,3) the words of Isaiah in chapter 6: ‘Hear the sound, but do not understand; and see, see, but do not know; the heart of this people is fat, and their ears are dull, and their eyes are dull, lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and return, and be healed’ are a divine decree that will prevent Israel from repenting until destruction comes.

However, the words need to be examined, since Isaiah already in the first chapter calls the people to repentance: ‘Wash yourselves, be clean; remove your deeds from before my eyes; cease to do evil…’, and promises the people that repentance will be accepted: ‘Go now and see, says the Lord’, though your sins be as white as snow, they shall be as white as wool’.

Isaiah's prophecies are full of hope, and he is the one who encourages the people not to be terrified by Rezin, king of Aram, and by Sennacherib, king of Assyria– who threaten the existence and freedom of the Kingdom of Judah?

Indeed, many of the Pharisees understood Isaiah's words in chapter 6: ‘Hear the report, but do not understand… the heart of this people is fat…’ Not as a promise that there will be no repentance until destruction, but as a complaint about the people who refuse to hear and understand lest they return and be healed (for example, Targum Yonatan, Rashi, and Radek in the second commentary). B’Da'at Mikra’ interpreted Isaiah's words ‘Hear the sound, but do not understand…’ as a sarcastic mockery.

The role of a prophet is to inspire repentance that will lead to correction, and not to discourage!

With greetings, Sh”tz Levinger

1. I can also assume that my vision is deceiving me and I have an excellent explanation for this. Simply, because my vision is deceiving me. I can also assume that your arguments are not really what you think, and I have an excellent explanation for this too: because your mind is deceiving you (you yourself admit it). I have nothing to do with skepticism.
2. The answer is yes (a person can choose evil even without a passion), but apparently in practice he will not do so unless he is a complete evil. Regarding Libet, I did not even mention passions. I mentioned that there are no arguments for and against (it is picking, not choosing), and very carefully.
3. They did not necessarily show it, but they do not deny it. As far as I know, there are new experiments in which the veto has already been shown. That is what I heard in a lecture by a brain researcher a few months ago. But you can read the details of my arguments in the article and in the book.

1. It's not exactly the same thing but I have nothing to argue… these are two interpretations.

2. If Libet is Picking then it's about a desire that was not vetoed. Otherwise, how did you choose what to do, you don't have the tools to decide. And also, how did they see rp before.
3. When you write that they showed the actual veto, do you mean that they showed the creation of the veto that was also rp before?
As I think you mentioned less than a year ago that they are still doing experiments on this, so I asked what you know from the recent period and the book would be old in relation to that.

2. It's a picking and there is no inclination. The rp arises at some time as a deterministic result of circumstances and the state of the mind, and I have no reason (=consideration) to veto it. Therefore I obey it. If it were a chosing, there would be considerations here and there, and then I would decide (freely) whether to veto it or not.

3. As far as I understand, no. By the way, in my opinion, there is no possibility in principle to distinguish rp before veto, and so on.
In the book, I talked about the Libet experiment in a choosy situation. I don't know where it stands. But I explained there why even if they succeed, it won't decide the debate.

2. If it comes from the state of the mind then it is an instinct. Maybe not an evil instinct but an instinct…
3. Why didn't you notice the rp before the veto.

You wrote that it is possible that this is a value dilemma that occurred long before the choice of the instinct dilemma.
But where is there discretion in the value dilemma? After all, it is a deterministic process of thinking about what is the right action. There is no room for discretion there. In particular, it is possible that the moral view is an ideal view…

Levinger,

This is not a serious interpretive dispute in the strict sense. There are certain forms and contexts in which it is reasonable to assume that the Scriptures are speaking sarcastically, but both the general atmosphere and the forms of expression of chapter 6 are not of these. Why does Isaiah ask until when? And why does God answer as He did? A strange question - after all, it is their free choice and it does not depend on God, so I will go and fulfill my mission to the best of my ability, hoping that they will listen. Both the question and the answer simply deal with the question of how long the punishment will last.

Shadel beautifully illustrates the linguistic analogy to the scriptures dealing with prophetic decree:

“The fat heart of this people - the prophet in his statement is as if he gives life to things, as we found in Jeremiah (1:10) ‘See, I have appointed you this day over the nations and over the kingdoms to pluck up and to pull down and to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant’, which means that after I have put my words in your mouth, behold, whatever you speak will come to pass, whether for good or for evil, and it is as if I have made you ruler over the nations and over the kingdoms to do with them as you please. And so in Ezekiel (21:24) ‘And you, son of man, set yourself two ways for the sword of the king of Babylon to come’, meaning, it prophesied that the sword of the king of Babylon would come in two ways. And then he said, “And make a place of thorns and stones.” “At the head of the road to the city, make a place for the soldiers of the king of Babylon.” This place, which you will make free for the soldiers of the king of Babylon, will be at the crossroads, where the roads divide, and one of them leads to the city. And now Ezekiel was not able to do any of this, but he was commanded to prophesy that it would be so. And so here God commands Isaiah to fatten the hearts of the people, that is, to prophesy and to decree that they would not listen to his words. And all this to inform them that this would be so, that his words would not be heard.

The fact that Isaiah promises that a response will be received is not relevant to our case. If he responds with a true response, his response will certainly be received. But the people of Israel described in chapter 6 He is not going to repent even when he sees the decree of exile beginning to be fulfilled because the Holy One will fatten his heart and blind the eyes of his understanding – and this was the purpose of the prophecy to say. At the time of the threats of Rezin and Sennacherib, no decree was issued against Judah, so this is something else.

Regarding the matter of hope, there is a lack of understanding here: There is no person in the world for whom the principle in question can cause him to lack hope. Someone who hopes to see the goodness of the Lord and who ponders repentance cannot be one of those who has hardened their hearts by definition. For him, the promise of repentance stands firm, and therefore it is rational for him to be full of hope. But someone who has hardened his heart does not ponder repentance at all, and therefore he cannot despair of it, and even before the hardening of the heart, it did not concern him, and Providence only leaves his heart in its previous state regarding this matter.

I will comment on what I argued is consistent with Scripture but does not exactly reflect the (more extreme) position of Maimonides in Chapter Eight:

“Sometimes God punishes a person by preventing him from choosing a certain action. And he knows this and cannot withdraw his soul and return it to that choice. And in exactly the same way was the punishment of Sihon, king of Heshbon: for God punished his former wife, who was not under compulsion, by preventing her from doing the will of Israel, until they killed her.” (Chapter Eight, Chapter Eight.)

From the wording “and he knows this and cannot withdraw his soul and return it to that choice” it follows that the hardness of the heart may cause a person to lack hope. After the people of Israel leave Egypt, Sihon realizes that he has no chance against the God of Israel. He would like to choose good, but the hardness of the heart prevented this.

In the S.D. In Shvat 9

After we explained the method of Baal Ekhirim (4:25) and the Rebbe of Sforno (Exodus 7:3), that the hardening of the sinner's heart is, as the Bible says, his strengthening and embracing of fear, but does not rule out the possibility of choosing good ((This understanding is aided by the fact that in all cases where the hardening of the heart is mentioned, God continues through His messengers the prophets to reprove the sinners and call them to repentance) – We said a few things in the method of Maimonides that there is a situation in which the severity of sin requires that the possibility of repentance be closed to him (Hilkot Teshuvah 5:6, 3).

Maimonides listed a series of sinners who were denied the possibility of repentance = Pharaoh, Sihon, the Canaanites in the days of Joshua, and the contemporaries of Elijah and Isaiah, and it seems that these situations More serious are the things that hinder repentance, which are included in the Book of the Law of Repentance, about which the following Halacha is stated there: ‘All these things and the like, although they hinder repentance, do not make repentance possible. Unless a person repents of them, then he is a Baal Teshuvah and has a share in the Hereafter.

It must be asked why the Rambam did not include in the Book of the Law of the Lord among those hindering repentance also the sons of Eli, about whom it is said: ‘And they will not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desires to kill them (1 Samuel 2:25), as it seems that their failure to listen to the one who reproves was a result of the Lord’s will. They will not return, and I explained in my book (cited in the book of Ezekiel) that after a judgment, the situation changes from "I do not desire the death of the dead" and they returned and lived (Ezekiel 18:3) to "I do not desire the death of the dead" (Ezekiel 18:3).

Perhaps the Maimonides did not believe that the sons of Eli were prevented from repenting, since in the Gemara (Nida 6:2) Rabbi Yehoshua did not divide between before the gazing and after the gazing, but rather "I do not desire the death of the dead" (Iry in Eshu Teshuvah) and "I do not desire the death of the dead" (Iry in Eshu Teshuvah) and "I do not desire the death of the dead" (Iry in Eshu Teshuvah). This means that even in the situation of the sons of Eli there could be a response. It seems that the Rambam understood that the sons of Eli had reached a situation where He did not help them to awaken to the rebuke of their father, but he did not completely close off the possibility of the rebuke from them (as in his words in the Piah, p. 8, Dumah, even those who are said to be “not sufficient in their power to make a rebuke,” meaning that they are not helped but are not prevented from doing so (as in his words in the Halacha, p. 4, 6).

With blessings, Shatz Levinger

The Maharash in Chiddushei Agdot Nidda, p. 2, explains that the Gem did not divide the Book of Revelation between before the rebuke and after the rebuke, because it is said, “I will not desire the death of the dead,” and even those who are already “a great and mighty man” That his judgment is over, God desires his answer to bring him to the life of the world to come.

The Tosafot there (which is here in the case of the answer) explained that it is “desugia deshmaetain,” as Rabbi Yitzchak said: “It is good for a person to cry out, whether before a judgment or after a judgment.”

To Rabbi Levinger,

I see a lot of theology here that is driven by Wishful Thinking and not serious arguments, and as is customary to quote: Facts don’t care about your feelings. You did not present a real explanation of the method of the author of the principles and our Sforno, because I have already explained in simple terms why these methods are impossible in the text, and so far I have not seen a substantive answer, especially since there are more and more scriptures that teach about the same matter that I did not even bother to mention here. God Almighty gave a prophecy to the generations and we must first understand what it says before we recite “methods”.

Maimonides did not list the sons of Eli simply because he already noted there at the beginning of the chapter that he only gives a few examples, so that we can tap into the rest of the verses: “There are many verses in the Torah and in the words of the prophets that seem to contradict this principle … And I will explain a great principle from which you will know the interpretation of all those verses.

Is it possible that the Maimonides believed that the sons of Eli were not prevented from repenting? He says that when the Almighty prevents repentance from a sinner, he cannot return but will die in his evil deeds that he initially committed, meaning a total closing of the possibility of repentance. With all due respect, the Maimonides does not build a worldview on a vague legendary statement by Rabbi Yehoshua, which is of course not a simple one. The entire purpose of the text was to say that the reason they did not repent was that God wanted to kill them, so we cannot turn the tables and say that the reason God wanted to kill them was that they did not repent.

The Maharsha legend that you mentioned is indeed beautiful as a legendary interpretation, but it is clearly impossible. The reason that the sons of Eli did not repent is that He wanted to kill them, and if they had repented, it would have contradicted this desire of He. Again, there is no relevance to our case in the words of the Torah. If a person is doomed to no longer be able to repent, there is no possibility that he would even think of crying out to Him, for his heart has been frozen in a state of rebellion against Him with no way back.

In the 1st century

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

When I read in the text that precedes X's pleas to Y and repeatedly pleads with him and even threatens him to do something – I have a strong indication to think that X really wants Y to respond to his pleas and not remain frozen in his position.

On the other hand, when X explicitly states that he is strengthening Y's heart by his refusal – I have a strong indication to assume that X does not want Y to change his position.

Your neighbor in the Kingdom of Denmark, Prince Hamlet, would say something like this: ‘To want or not to want – that is the question’ 🙂 Does X suffer from a conflict of contradictory desires and is not ‘closed in on himself’?

Even the people of Alexandria feel an internal contradiction in X's desires – does he want Y to change his ways and be saved, or does he want Y to insist and stay on his way and sink into the mire with no way out.

The text itself, as is customary in the Holy Scriptures, leaves us in a dilemma.

The Rambam and R”Y of Albu offer different solutions to this dilemma, with the basic premise of both being that ’there is logic and method’ in X's behavior.

The Rambam's suggestion is that X's desire is unequivocal: to bring Y down to the Kantians. The intensification of Y's refusal is merely a game designed to abuse him, to lower him into the abyss while he is tortured and humiliated. He deserves it after everything he has done.

On the other hand, R.I. Albo's proposal is more optimistic. X does not despair even of a formidable refuser like Y. He will beg him, threaten him, and shake him because he really wants Y to improve. But X's desire is that Y will not be a ‘robot’ who does good out of compulsion, but will be a person who chooses where he will lean. And he will decide between the conflicting desires that X has so powerfully impressed upon him.

These are the methods that have been proposed. And the chooser will choose!

Best regards, Sz Levinger

And to your claim that when he wants to kill a person, there is no way to escape, the will of the Lord will be fulfilled, and there is no one to save him, Zipporah did not agree. When she saw that the angel of the Lord wanted to kill Moses, Zipporah did not accept the judgment with humility. She stood up and did something and circumcised her son, and she saw that it was a miracle that changed his fate from death to life.

Perhaps Moses learned from her that even when he heard explicitly from the mouth of the Most High, “Depart from me, and I will destroy them,” he did not accept the judgment, but asked for mercy and was answered. And so when the Lord said, To Moses and Aaron: ‘I lifted him up from among the congregation and devoured them at once’, Moses takes the completely opposite path, sends Aaron with incense in his hand into the heart of the plague, and the plague is stopped…

For God does not seek man to kill him, but to make him alive!

This is indeed the doctrine of wishful thinking that Moses our Lord taught us in his Torah, and his power was confirmed!

With blessings, Sh”z Levinger

And regarding what you asked about the words of Rabbi Yehoshua (Nida 6:2), who placed what is said, “And they did not listen to the voice of their father, because the Lord desired to kill them,” in the context of “not repenting,” and you objected to this: After all, the failure to repent was the result of the Lord’s desire to kill them, not the reason for this desire.

Radak already answered this, saying that even if they had listened to the voice of their father and stopped committing the serious acts for which he rebuked them, it would not have been a true repentance out of recognition that those acts were unworthy.

And so it turns out, for the scripture describes the sons of Eli as sons of Belial who did not know the Lord, who proudly trampled on both the people and the laws of the Torah. And in this sad situation, it turns out that the rebuke of the old father, a member of the old-fashioned generation, a kind of old-fashioned sucker who is not familiar with the ’laws of the priesthood’ accepted by the surrounding peoples, among whom the priest knows how to stand up for his rights and make it clear to his subjects ‘who is the master of the house’

They may have obeyed the father out of minimal politeness towards him, but not in his presence and certainly after his death – they would have returned with pride and determination to their ways. In temporary obedience for the sake of appearance without a real change in consciousness – God is not interested, and therefore this situation is considered ’not making a confession’ that God is not willing to accept.

It is possible that when they were killed, Eli's sons came to a true repentance "out of a sorrow of soul," for (as Rabbi Beshab 55 stated) in the Chronicles, the scripture attributes Ahijah the son of Ahitov as the son of Ichabod the son of Phinehas the son of Eli, and does not see Phinehas the son of Eli as a stain on the lineage that should be cleansed.

With blessings, Schutz Levinger

It is possible that "because" is not in the sense of "because" but in the sense of "because," the meaning of the scripture: "And they did not listen to the voice of their father who wanted to kill them." Eli warns his sons that they are sinning against God. They are ‘on his watch’ and ’who will pray for them’ to save them because of the ’on them. And this is why the scripture says that the sons of Eli did not listen to their father who warned them, who ’wanted to punish them.

The text does not leave us in doubt. It clearly teaches that in principle God is merciful and gracious but also a just judge. There is a moral demand for just retribution for crimes that must be satisfied. He does not desire the death of the dead but rather their return from their way, but the text consistently shows that in serious and consistent cases of sin the law ceases to apply and He desires their death. This is a normal and simple reading of the text. The Bible is full of descriptions of God as a punishing judge without giving way to repentance, and this is part of His goodness, holiness, and justice. After all, a judge who does not punish rapists, enslavers, and murderers who intentionally harm others and who nevertheless persist in their sin despite repeated warnings is undoubtedly a bad judge: “Whoever sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God He made man.” And the judge of all the earth is obligated to do justice.

The prophets teach: “When the wicked flourish like grass, all the workers of iniquity spring up”. Why? – “To destroy them forever. And some understood “And he will repay his enemies to their faces”. Why? – To his destruction” And so “And they will go out and look on the dead bodies of the men who have transgressed against me, for their plague will not die, and their sin will not be quenched, and they will be abhorred by all flesh.” “And because of this, your people will be destroyed, all that are found written in the book – Only those who are written in the book. “And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake– some to eternal life, and some to everlasting contempt” and so on.

In other words, the text itself makes it clear to you how to resolve the ”debate” and nowhere does it offer the ridiculous solution that everyone has an infinite, unconditional opportunity to repent. Sooner or later, judgment is decreed, and the sinner does not know when this will happen. Perhaps in the next sin. The principle is supposed to produce in a person a healthy dose of fear of God, and if it does not produce it, perhaps it is one of those whose purpose is the contempt of all flesh.

You claim: “Rambam's suggestion is that X's desire is unequivocal: to bring Y down to the pit. Enhancing Y's refusal is merely a game designed to abuse him, to bring him down to the abyss while he is tortured and humiliated. He deserves it after everything he has done.”

Thus mocking the justice of the punishment. It is like saying about someone like Eichmann: “Rambam's suggestion”is to bring Eichmann down to the pit. Enhancing Eichmann's refusal to acknowledge his sin is merely a game designed to abuse him, to bring him down to the abyss while he is tortured and humiliated. He deserves it after everything he has done”.

A fitting retribution for sinners is a just thing. A judge who does not punish is a bad judge. God is not bad – and therefore punishes.

The cases of Zipporah and the people of Israel (fortunately) did not reach such a level That will force the judge of justice to destroy them completely. And even this while they were in the land of their enemies, I did not abhor or abhor them, to destroy them, to break my covenant with them. And yet, a 1900-year exile is no small thing. In biblical theology, this cannot be an exile related to the sins of the fathers, which can end at the latest after 4 generations, but must come as punishment for the sins of the exiled generations themselves.

Radek's answer is not simple. There is no way in the Bible that you can deduce such nonsense from it. The simple meaning is that if they had repented, it would have contradicted God's desire to kill them, and not that if they had repented, the repentance would not have been true.

On the 17th of Shvat

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

It is clear that there are situations in which the sentence must be cut short and then there is no room for repentance to exempt from punishment in this world, and yet, the condemned person is encouraged to confess and repent of his crime so that at least he will arrive in the next world as clean as possible.

Therefore, I do not understand why a person whose sentence has expired should be prevented from repenting before he dies, and thus sanctify the name of heaven and atone at least somewhat for what he has sinned?

Another question that arises is: After all, someone whose sentence has expired – is put to death immediately in order to prevent ‘torture of the sentence’. What, then, are all the exhortations and warnings, which create in him the illusion that he has some chance? The prophet will tell him: ‘Order your house, for you will die and not live’, and immediately the angel of death will come and collect his debt.

Therefore, I understand better the method of the ’Ekrim’ that the door to repentance is not closed, and therefore there are entreaties and warnings that encourage the sinner to return, and on the other hand the pressure exerted on the sinner also leaves an opening for refusal, so that here there is an internal repentance and not an act of a ‘robot’ in vain.

I proposed the Maimonides”s method to reconcile that he deserves torture in ’measure for measure– – He abused his slaves and tortured them for more than eighty years, and therefore he also deserves some abuse, but this consideration does not apply to the other cases of preventing repentance. Perhaps it should be said that the one who sinned in the spiritual corruption of many and brought them to be punished in the hereafter will be punished in proportion to the extent that he too will not be able to return and improve his situation in the hereafter.

In any case, nowhere in the Bible is there mention of the hardening of the heart, a definite prevention of repentance, certainly not a prevention of repentance in the world to come. The hardening of the heart is the reinforcement of the refusal, and it is not necessary that this reinforcement be hermetic.

Regarding the sons of Eli, it is said that they will not listen to the voice of their father, for the Lord desires to kill them, and as I explained, the hearing of their father can be a temporary obedience out of politeness towards the father, which does not include a repentance that includes the abandonment of sin and acceptance for the future, and there is no name for this at all

With blessings, Shéz Levinger

It should be noted,

If the condemned person does not refuse to repent, he is not one of those whose hearts have been hardened by Heaven, and therefore there is always hope for atonement. On the other hand, when it comes to one of those whom God has designated to "destroy them forever," then it is not at all his desire to return (or according to Maimonides' more extreme position in eight chapters, the sinner was willing in principle to return but is unable in practice, which is a much more frightening possibility for someone who is "addicted" to some sin of one kind or another and cannot free himself from it). Therefore, there is definitely a point in encouraging those condemned by man to return, especially when they do not refuse outright (and even when they refuse outright, you do not know whether this is metaphysical hardening after a sentence or self-hardening that has a natural possibility of softening).

Regarding the “torment of judgment,” again, the simplicity of the scripture is that the reason for “when the wicked flourish like weeds” is to destroy them forever. That is, God, the Holy One, pays their wages in this world so that they will be lost forever in the next world (and as in other quotes above). There is no torment of judgment here because they do not hope to return in any case and it does not interest them, and if it did interest them, it would be evidence that they are not among those whom Providence has at this stage destined for destruction.

True, in principle it must be assumed that there is hope for exhortations and warnings. But there are cases, such as in Isaiah and Ezekiel, and we see this from later stages of Jeremiah’s prophecies of destruction, that God, the Holy One, sends out of knowledge that judgment has already been decreed. Why? Perhaps to serve as a lesson for generations, or as Ezekiel describes, so that the nations to whom the exiles who were rebuked would reach would recognize the providence of the Lord.

I did not understand what exactly you wanted to establish in the Rambam. Does the punishment not seem just to you?

I have already explained above why the simple explanation regarding Sihon is the hermetic hardship intended to kill him for his sin (and as the Rambam emphasized). The Torah clearly states that the purpose of the hardship was to cause him to go to war and be defeated. That is, he could not choose otherwise. And the same is true regarding the sons of Eli - the explanation you gave from the Radak is not simple. If the reason for not listening is that it contradicts the Lord's desire to kill them, it simply means that if they had listened, the Lord would not have killed them. That is, "hearing" means repentance, not obedience out of mere politeness (which does not obligate God not to kill them). In other words, God prevented them from even having the option of choosing to repent.

In the book of Proverbs, we will draw and take for ourselves 20:9

And in another study of the laws of repentance, in which the Maimonides speaks of those whose sins require that they be prevented from repenting, it seems that even in these situations there is hope for those who come to be purified, for the Maimonides concludes there with the law 9-10:

And in this matter, the prophets and the righteous ask in their prayers from the Lord to help them on the path of truth, as David said, “Show me, O Lord, your way” (Psalms 10:11), meaning: Let not my sins prevent me from the path of truth, from which I may know your ways and the holiness of your name. And so is the one who said, “And a generous spirit will strengthen me” (Psalms 14:14), meaning, "Let the wind do your will, and let not my sins prevent me from repenting, but let the authority be in my hand until I understand and return and know the way of truth."

And what is this that David said: "Good and upright is the Lord; therefore He instructs sinners in the way; He guides the meek in judgment and teaches the humble His way" (Psalms 25:8-9) "He who sent them prophets to inform them of the ways of the Lord and to bring them back to repentance." And He gave them the power to learn and understand, which is this measure in every person, that as long as he continues in the ways of wisdom and righteousness, he desires them and pursues them. And it is this that the sages said: "Come and be purified, and they will help you." (Yoma 33:2), meaning: He will find himself helped by the word.

It seems that a person has the power to pull himself away from the nine gates of impurity in which he has sunk, and when he comes to be purified and adheres to the ways of truth and righteousness and prays to God to save him from the destruction of his sin, he has hope to return and gain God's help towards repentance.

With blessings of Shabbat Shalom, Sht. Levinger

The quote is about the ’prophets and righteous’ who ask, and the ’meek’ who are guided, because this is not the path of the wicked who have hardened their hearts or who have been fixed in their hardness. But in order for a person to pray for this, he needs to understand that there is such a risk, something that simple biblical scholars miss.

Blessings and Shabbat Shalom

Copenhagen and Schleswig, why do you believe that there is free choice?
After all, the world around us is so deterministic. And it seems that we are just a lump of matter. Behaving like matter, we have no reason to assume that we act differently.
Moreover, this interpretation fits well if our feeling is that almost after every act we have performed, when we think “was it done by choice,” it almost always seems to have been closely and probably causally connected to the previous thought/the previous act/the previous speech, etc. So, the fact that almost always in retrospect we find a very reasonable causal interpretation of the act we did does not mean that it is better to choose this hypothesis.

In the year 2079, Esau came to Pharaoh

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

You are right that we must be aware of the risk of reaching a situation where the law already requires that the door to repentance be closed to man, a risk that even prophets and righteous men fear and pray that He will save them from..

But in order to pray and make an effort not to fall into the abyss, we must be aware that along with the risk – there is also a chance. Otherwise, we will reach a situation where with every fall and crisis (and especially the recurring crisis) we will reach despair, and we will say to ourselves: ‘We are already hopelessly lost, and it is a shame to make the effort to get out of the mud’ and since we are discouraged from the chance of correction – we will sink into the mud and at least enjoy life here and now.

Therefore, Maimonides continues that he sends the prophets to rebuke us and guide us on how to get out of the mud. But this is also the quality of every person, who, when he is “drawn,” drags himself to the paths of truth and justice, and ends up “desiring” to walk the path of truth and justice (note that “drawing” in the language of the Bible and the Sages is the opposite of “desiring,” and in contrast to modern Hebrew where “drawing” is desire).

Indeed, the key with which a person breaks the locked door is, as you mentioned, humility. The lock that locked the door of repentance in the face of Pharaoh and Sihon and in the face of those who insult the angels of God is pride and contempt. Pride in one's wisdom and power, and contempt for every other sense. Pride and contempt are the hermetic lock to repentance.

But this lock has a key, and its name is ‘humility’, from the root ‘en”h’ the ability to respond to a different thought, to a deeper thought. When we look superficially, we see only a literal ‘eye for an eye’, but when we follow in the footsteps of the sages of Israel, Chazal and our first and last rabbis, we find atonement and forgiveness, in a way that will restore both the injured and the offender.

The written Torah presents the values in all their force. They are the immense seriousness of the sin, that there are situations where ’h’ He desires to kill him, and they are the chance to escape sin even for a person who set up an idol in the temple and filled Jerusalem with blood from mouth to mouth. And the Torah Sheva teaches how to coordinate and apply all the values together for a life of correction.

With blessings of Shabbat Shalom, Sh”tz Levinger

and

Tuvia,

The world does not seem so deterministic. This seems to me to be a nice delusion of Spinoza and some rationalists that managed to hold out for a while, mainly because they took the principle of causality in a way that is not required by common sense. Although everything contingent has a cause, the cause does not have to *force* the result, but only has to be a cause that is *capable* of doing so. It could not have led to the result, or to a different result, and there is no violation of the principle here.

I am not even sure that, as in a predator, the feeling of courage arises to attack some animal and this is contrasted with a feeling of despair in view of the fact that he is unable to perceive it, that this is determined deterministically. And what about quantum physics, the fundamental physics of particles in nature?

Note that when you are debating between two alternatives, you are only able to seriously consider them because you believe that it depends on you which one will come true. As they say, It’s up to YOU, and this Up to YOU is a very strong concept, but it stands in complete contradiction to determinism, because in determinism, *you* do not determine what will happen. The fact that every choice has some reason is not contradictory, because there was always some reason to choose differently, and what decided it was the chooser.

Levinger,

How exactly can this lead to despair? From the things mentioned earlier, it means that someone who has made up his mind does not despair because he does not at all yearn to return. Therefore, it seems that if a person is worried that he may not have a way back, he can be assured that there is a way back. Again, these seem to be rare and extreme cases, but they are certainly possible.

The Oral Torah is binding regarding halakhic interpretation of how to fulfill the details of the commandments, but theology is learned either from common sense (what is called ‘natural theology’) or from the words of the prophets, as the Maimonides and some of the early ones did (although they did not refrain from occasionally bringing one or another midrash of Chazal as a ’helpful’). This is a serious problem today, especially in Hasidic books that collect certain midrashim according to their own convenience and build from them a worldview that contradicts the view of the prophets, and no one can correct them for their error, because one can always find some midrash that ’supports’ their system.

Shabbat Shalom

You wrote that although everything contingent has a cause, the cause does not have to force the result, but only has to be a cause that is capable of doing so. But if it does not bring about the result. So how can it be called a cause.
And in general, why not assume that the cause does not force the result?!? The whole idea of the concept of cause is that it necessarily causes the result. The world is not so irrational as to assume that things can happen and suddenly stop happening for no reason.

On the Sabbath of Shvat 9

To Tobias, Greetings,

The tangible cannot be denied. Man (unlike matter) has thought and will. He hesitates between different sides and often chooses contrary to what the society in which he lives and grows up has chosen. Apparently, man is something beyond the donkey. Matter does not think and does not love. Man has will, and his will is the reason for his choices.

With best wishes, Sh„ts Levinger,

Line 2-3:
……That man is something beyond matter. …

The tangible is denied at every moment, and it is obvious that at every moment the result is caused by the cause. And so, apparently, is the “decision” which is not an illusion. The environment of course has an effect, but in addition to the living conditions, the feeling and experience that the person experiences also have an effect. Usually, the ’outsider’ changes his opinions because he does not feel like he belongs in his place of life.
And regarding the serious material matter, the question has already been asked how it is possible to study the cause of the creation of the experience following a single case. And Spinoza already stood with monism, which explained that there is only one cause behind the entire body and mind.

Tuvia,

You did not respond to the question of how we are possibly capable of seriously considering alternatives – a capacity that assumes that what will happen depends on us (It’s up to YOU to decide).

To your question ‘How can we call a cause if it does not bring about the result’? If it does not bring about the result then it is indeed not the cause of the result. But it is not necessary that if it does bring about the result, that it *must* bring about the result.

For example, you insert a measuring device into a quantum system and say that for this reason the wave function collapsed and we obtained some value. Now, the value we obtained does not necessarily result from placing the measuring device, because it is completely consistent with quantum physics that we would have obtained a different value and according to the standard interpretation (the most plausible) there are no hidden variables that are responsible for the fact that we obtained the value we obtained and not another.

You ask: “Why not assume that the cause does not force the effect?!? The whole idea of the concept of cause is that it necessarily causes the effect.” Not necessarily. The idea of a cause is something that, given certain conditions, is capable of causing a certain effect, plus the fact that the conditions were met and he exercised the ability. For example, you ask why a certain person decided to buy the luxury bottle of wine, and states his liking for boutique wine, plus the fact that he passed by the store and had the idea of buying it for kiddush for the upcoming Shabbat. Still, it is certainly consistent in our opinion that if all of these conditions were met (his liking for the wine, his proximity to the store, etc.) he would not have decided to buy it. All that is needed is for the conditions to be met that allow the cause to cause the effect, but not necessarily that force it.

If we are talking about contingent matters, I certainly agree with the statement: “The world is not so irrational as to suppose that things can suddenly happen and stop happening for no reason.” Anything contingent that happens or stops happening happens through some cause or the cessation of action of some cause.

B”D’ Bishvat E”T

To Tobias – Hello,

You mentioned Spinoza as a’helper’ to the view that man is completely controlled by his environment and experiences.

‘And here the son asks’: Dear Spinoza, do you really believe that you are just a chimpanzee chasing bananas because of the instincts that control him?

Is a chimpanzee capable of polishing lenses to see better than his natural vision? Is a chimpanzee capable of weaving a theological-political tract’ that will organize in a new and revolutionary way the entire worldview accepted in his environment? Will a chimpanzee fight for his view and for that reason be rejected by his Jewish community and not accepted in Christian society?

Of course I don't agree with your method, but the very ability of a person to ‘think outside the box’ and defend his opinion ‘against the whole world and his wife’ – is overwhelming evidence that there is something in a person beyond matter that is acted upon by natural forces and beyond an animal that is controlled only by its natural impulses.

Man is ‘bi-terministic’. He is indeed matter that is subject to natural impulses, but he also has the urge to break through the ‘glass ceiling’, to seek explanations for reality beyond the simply tangible, and to pave the way for him to think and act beyond what he is accustomed to.

In the tension between the two aspirations and the constant need to choose between them – The ‘human right’ is expressed;

Best regards, Simpan Zevi Lvingang-Utang

On the 9th of Shvat 9th

Indeed, Rabbi A. A. Dessler noted (in the booklet “The Choice” in the book “Mikbat Eliyahu”) that not everything is in the choice. Everyone has a lower threshold below which there is no way he will choose evil. Degrees of goodness that are inherent in him from his upbringing, which he would never think of crossing. On the other hand, everyone has an upper threshold of demands for goodness that are above his strength in the situation he finds himself in.

And in the middle is the “point of choice,” the space in which there is a rush and hesitation in the heart of man about what to choose. If he chooses good and perseveres in it, this level will become his complete possession, and the “space of choice” will rise a level, and the person's eyes will be at higher levels (and vice versa).

And so, for example, someone whose eyes are between the number of eight or nine - if he strengthens and locks onto the number of eight, his good instinct will begin to progress to the number of seven, and when he reaches that too - he will begin to "squint" upwards in holiness to the number of six or "correct". And so the "point of choice" grows step by step

When one aspires to rise to too high a level, one can easily fall. But when one knows how to locate the point of choice, each person, according to his condition, grows slowly and raises the bar of choice more and more.

***

This insight leads the person, on the one hand, to a firm demand of himself to rise and not be satisfied with his situation, since it is clear to him that he is capable of more. And on the other hand, to learning to be right and patient towards others, with the understanding that according to his background and point of departure – it is very possible that what is obvious to me, is ‘below the point of choice’ for him.

Best regards, Sh”z Levinger

In B”D 9; Bishvat ”9

We mentioned the opinion of the Rambam that he hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to prevent him from repenting so that he would be punished for what he had done to mistreat and torture the Israelites, and the opinion of R”A Albu and R”A Seferno that the hardening of Pharaoh's heart was intended to allow him to return out of an internal choice and not just out of external pressure.

The Torah mentions several reasons for the hardening of Pharaoh's heart. In Parashat Va'ara (7:4-5) it is said: ‘And Pharaoh will not listen to you, and I will bring my people the Israelites out of the land of Egypt with great judgments, and the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord; I have stretched out my hand against Egypt and brought the Israelites out from among them.

Besides bringing the Israelites out of Egypt through “great judgments” against Egypt, another purpose is mentioned here: “That the Egyptians may know that I am the Lord.” It is important for the Egyptians to know Him too!

This purpose, to show Pharaoh and Egypt the power of the Lord, is also mentioned later: “But for this very purpose I have raised you up, to show you my power and to proclaim my name throughout all the earth” (9:16), and also in Parashat Ba: “For I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his servants before the people by performing these two signs among them” (11:1); “Pharaoh will not listen to you, so that there may be many signs in the land of Egypt” (11:9).

In addition to instilling faith in the hearts of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, God also desired to proclaim His power to the entire world, and to make My name known throughout the land (9:16), and in particular among the people of Israel for generations: “And you shall tell in the ears of your son and of your son’s son how I have dealt treacherously with the Egyptians, and how My signs which I have performed among them, and you shall know that I am the Lord” (10:2).

The purpose of bringing the Egyptians to know God is also repeated in the parsha of Beshalach: “And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and he will pursue them; and I will be honored over Pharaoh and all his army, and the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord” (14:4), and there are verses 17-18: “And I, behold, will harden the heart of the Egyptians, and they will follow after them; and I will be honored over Pharaoh and all his army, his chariots and his horsemen in the sea, and the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord” (14:4). In honor of Pharaoh and his chariots and horsemen.

We have learned that one of the main purposes of strengthening Pharaoh's heart is to show the Egyptians the power of the Lord and to bring the Egyptians to know the Lord.

It seems that this purpose was only partially achieved. After they had overwhelmed the Egyptian camp, the Egyptians recognized the greatness of the Lord, as it is written: And the Egyptians said, "We are overcome by Israel, for the Lord is fighting for them against the Egyptians" (14:25). This recognition did not benefit the Egyptians from this worldly judgment, but in any case they met their death out of an acknowledgment of the greatness of the Lord and His relationship with the people of Israel, and this was part of repentance.

The importance of the Egyptians recognizing the greatness of the Lord is also seen from the argument that Moses repeats in order to avert the wrath of the Lord. Over Israel: ‘Why should the Egyptians say, "Why did you bring them out? Turn from your fierce anger and comfort the people of your people" (Exodus 23:12).

The miracles that occurred in Egypt and the fall of Pharaoh and the parting of the sea certainly left a strong impression on the Egyptian people, but they did not bring about a revolution. Egypt remained in its idolatrous nature for many generations. New kings arose in place of the one who fell, and Egypt remained in its idolatrous nature.

However, the hope of ‘and the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord” has not been in vain. Many generations after the Exodus from Egypt, Isaiah prophesies: ‘In that day there will be five cities in the land of Egypt that speak the language of Canaan and swear to’ the Lord” In that day there will be an altar to’ And it shall be for a sign and for a witness to the Lord in the land of Egypt, that they shall cry unto the Lord because of their oppressors, and he shall send them a savior and a great man, and shall save them. And the Lord shall be known to the Egyptians, and the Egyptians shall know the Lord in that day, and they shall return unto the Lord, and he will hear them, and heal them (Isaiah 19:18-22).

The two great powers, Egypt and Assyria, shall be united in accepting the kingdom of the Lord under the leadership of Assyria, and Israel shall also be reckoned with them: In that day there shall be a highway from Egypt to Assyria, and Assyria shall come into Egypt, and Egypt into Assyria, and the Egyptians shall serve Assyria. On that day Israel will be a third to Egypt and Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the land, which the Lord of hosts blessed, saying: “Blessed be my people Egypt, and the work of my hands Assyria, and my inheritance Israel” (ibid. 23-25).

The acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven by Egypt and Assyria may have occurred during the Muslim conquest that brought the belief in oneness throughout the world, but their recognition of Israel as the source of faith and values, as the “elder brother” of humanity, still awaits the future. Abekih [=Amen in our days, so be it]..

With blessings, Sh. Levinger

Sh”ts Levinger,

I agree with the analysis of the trend reflected in the Bible to bring humanity to the knowledge of G’, but the truth is more important than the strong preservation of erroneous opinions as if they all have equal weight, and one must be puzzled by the flimsy excuses that aim to deliberately reject the word of G’: G”d says x and I am not willing to accept that this is what He says, and therefore I will force the Scripture to claim that He does not say x. Was the “strengthening of Pharaoh’s heart” intended to allow him to return out of an internal choice and not just out of external pressure?

It can be seen from the verses you mentioned alone that the opinion that disagrees with Maimonides is not consistent with Scripture: ‘And Pharaoh will not listen to you, and I will bring my people the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt with great judgments, and the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord, who stretched out my hand against Egypt and brought the children of Israel out of their midst.’ — The Lord says: The reason I will cause him not to listen to you is so that through the lack of hearing I will accomplish the purposes that I desire: bringing my people out with great judgments, Egypt knowing that I am the Lord, the ability to tell ‘in the ears of your son and your son’s son how I mistreated Egypt and my signs that I have set among them’, and more.

All of this would have been impossible if Pharaoh had decided to choose good. And this is why, the text teaches us, the Lord worked to harden his heart. Pharaoh's choice of good would have violated the purpose of God. But God's purpose cannot be violated when he performs some act intended to fulfill it. In other words, Pharaoh's choice of good was, according to the plain meaning of the Bible, impossible.

Understanding the Torah requires humility toward Heaven on the one hand, and insolence and lack of flattery toward humans on the other. If this is what the Torah says, it must be accepted, even if it means that we will have to say that the interpretation of the Seferno is not simple. When humility toward Heaven alternates with flattery toward humans, and conversely, insolence toward humans alternates with insolence toward Heaven, a distorted judgment results.

“Know that you are obligated to know, everyone who wants to present a known opinion, and to respect its speaker, and to accept his opinion without studying and understanding the matter of whether it is true or not, which is one of the bad opinions, and it is forbidden from the path of the Torah and also from the path of reason…The Lord said “You shall not respect the face of the poor, nor show favoritism to the face of the great; judge with justice” etc. And he said “You shall not respect persons in judgment” etc. There is no difference between accepting that opinion and presenting it without evidence, or between believing what it says and respecting it and claiming that the truth is with him without a doubt, because he is a great man, trustworthy, and wealthy. All of this is not evidence, but is forbidden. ” —- Commentary on R’ Abraham on the Sermons of the Sages

http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mahshevt/agadot/hagada1-2.htm

On the 9th of September, 2017, the spring of the Pashtan, whose residence is Eitan, in Copenhagen, near Istan, may you rest in peace and prosperity,

Please review my response again, and focus on the small question: Does the analysis of the scriptures I have made support the explanation of the Maimonides or of the author of the principles and the Seferno, or does the analysis invite a different direction of thought than either of them?

With best wishes, Sh„ts Levinger

On the 9th of Shvat 9th

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

Since I have already sent you to reread my response in order to understand it – I will give you some ‘tips’ for understanding my path in searching for the plain meaning of a text.

First of all, I go to the ’fair’, the fair of commentators, each of whom offers his ‘ware’. I discuss the various proposals, their advantages and their points of difficulty. After such a ‘brainstorming’ I have a wide variety of ideas and lines of thought that may be useful to me in the next stage.

In the next stage, I will approach the text itself again, while trying to determine the true meaning of each word and phrase, knowing that their meaning in the language of the author of the text is not the same as the meaning and connotation of those words and phrases in our modern language.

I will also look for parallels in the Bible that refer to the same personality or topic, and ask myself: Are there any parallels in those parallels that shed different light on the understanding of the text in question.

And in this regard: In my last response, I briefly summarized the first stage, and began, but did not finish, the second stage, and another vision for the time.

Best regards, Sh”t Levinger

Copenhagen,
I don't know anything about quantum theory so I can't comment.

Secondly, if a cause can lead to a result and can't lead to a result. Then of course there needs to be another reason that explains why it led to a result once and not the second time (for example, the necessary conditions did not occur).
In the example of the wine store, I agree that it is possible for someone to pass by a wine store and not buy wine, even though he is a die-hard wine lover. But there will be a reason for this - for example, the illusion of wanting to buy wine did not arise in him. Or he remembered that he did not have enough money to buy a fine wine now and therefore he avoided entering the store.
It would not occur to us that by chance someone was standing near a wine store and the same conditions occurred around him and the same thoughts ran through his head and he would act in two different ways, so that once he would buy the wine and once he would not buy the wine. Unless, he had a reason that caused it, but then the thought processes in his head were different. In any case, the picture you present is not correct.

If you accept that everything contingent that happens or stops happening happens through some cause or the cessation of the action of some cause. Then you have to accept that a change of an object cannot be caused without a reason.
And if so, even the reason why the wine buyer “decided” once to buy wine and a second time not to buy wine has a reason. I think it is a simple idea to understand.

Just because a person has no choice doesn't mean they can't polish lenses to see better or can't weave a theological political tract. Why assume that?!? It sounds like an argument that doesn't help at all. After all, if you accept that a person who has no choice can do all of this, then what's the argument here? And if you don't accept it, then prove it. There's nothing incoherent about me, if anything, quite the opposite. Especially in our day and age when we're familiar with the idea of artificial intelligence.

Also, it's important to remember what I started the discussion with - we have very, very serious and strong reasons to assume that there can't be a choice. And we barely feel the sense of choice. (After all, usually if we think back, we'll find that what we thought we chose was really because of a certain reason that made us act that way.)
From all of this, it makes perfect sense to assume that this is an illusion.

In the Bible, there is no single answer to all the cases in which the hardening of the heart, its hardening or its adoption are mentioned in the Bible, to the question of the purpose, punishment or correction? And each case must be considered on its own merits.

Regarding the Canaanites, the purpose was clearly defined: “In order to destroy them so that they would have no place to stand, but in order to destroy them as the Lord commanded Moses” (Joshua 20). Even regarding the sons of Eli, it is clearly stated “that the Lord desired to kill them.” Regarding Sihon, the goal was defined as ‘to give him into your hand’.. Sihon will be defeated and handed over to Israel and they will decide his fate to a tribe or a favor.

In these cases, it seems that the goal is truly punishment and not correction. However, here too, correction is not hermetically avoided. And the evidence: ‘The living in ‘Gibeon’ managed to break the rule and be saved.

In contrast, regarding Pharaoh and Egypt, the goal was also mentioned that they would receive ‘great judgments’ but the goal of the correction was also mentioned repeatedly: ‘And the Egyptians will know that I am the ” God; on the one hand I plead and release and on the other hand I make their hearts heavy, and even they waver between moments when they confess their sin and agree to partially obey, and a withdrawal from this agreement.

In the end, God draws them to pursue Israel to the Red Sea: ‘ ‘ And the Egyptians will know that I am the ’ when I am honored by Pharaoh, his chariots, and his horsemen’ (Exodus 14:18) It is clear that there is a purpose of punishment here ‘when I am honored by Pharaoh, his chariots, and his horsemen’, and on the other hand it is clear that there is also a purpose of correction ‘and they will know the ”.

Does ‘and I will be honored by Pharaoh and all his army’ mean inevitable death, which in any case leaves them an opening for a last-minute repentance, at a time of ‘distress of soul’, which is not a great repentance, but it will also be considered a repentance?

And perhaps ‘and I will be honored by Pharaoh and all his army’ In what God stunned the Egyptian camp and forced them to flee in panic, saying, "We flee from Israel, for God is fighting for them in Egypt," a terrible humiliation for the proud army that was forced to flee for its life.

And perhaps if they had not been content with admitting their defeat and their experience, and had taken the next step on the path of repentance, turning to God in prayer for mercy, they would have been forgiven, as will happen in the future according to the prophecy of Isaiah: (Chapter 19): "When they cry out to God because of their oppressors, He will send them a Savior and a Hero who will save them, and God will make himself known to the Egyptians, and the Egyptians will know God in that day." And they returned to God, and He answered them and healed them.

This is apparently a difference of opinion between the scribes who divide between before and after the sentence, and Rabbi Yehoshua (Nida, b) who states that only when they do not repent, God desires to kill them, but when they do repent, there is nothing that stands in the way of repentance.

And as we mentioned above, even in chapter 6 of the Repentance where the Rambam lists those who were accused of sin preventing them from repentance, the Rambam brings the possibility of correction through prayer and continuing in the ways of truth and justice, which ultimately will be done out of a desire, so that the one who comes to be purified, helps him.

With blessings, Sh. T. Levinger

Regarding the meaning of "and they will not listen to the voice of their father because the will of the Lord is to kill them" as stated in the Book of Eli, it seems that the will of the Lord is expressed in the fact that the Lord does not send a prophet or torment to shock and rebuke them. When a person on his part does not feel remorse for his actions, and the Lord does not make an effort to arouse him to repentance, his path is paved with the abyss of the Lord. It is not said in the Book of Eli that their hearts should have been burdened or strengthened. The Lord simply leaves them in their natural state.

In Sihon, on the one hand, there is a prophet's call to him for peace, but the very call for peace, formulated as a request for permission to pass through, which he is apparently able to refuse, invites Sihon's feeling that the people of Israel are in a state of weakness. And the use of the option to refuse is almost inevitable.

Among the Canaanites, the hearts of the inhabitants of the land were hardened due to the initial defeat of the Israelites at Ai. The inhabitants of the land bore ‘light and heavy’, if the Israelites lost to a small city like Ai, how much more so to gates with shapes and strengths that could defeat them.

And as we saw with Pharaoh, it is not at all clear that ’wished to kill them’. It is worth mentioning here the explanation of Samson's mother: ‘If the Lord wanted to kill us, He would not have taken a burnt offering and a grain offering from our hands, nor would we have shown all these things, and now we have not heard such a thing’ (Judges 13:23). And here among the Egyptians, the Lord sends a prophet who pleads with them repeatedly and pleads with them and shows them obvious miracles. Is all this just to deceive them?

The heavy pressure that he exerts on them indicates a real sin to bring about correction. However, the very pressure and the means of coercion arouse the natural resistance of those who try to humiliate and bend him. Even presenting the demand only to go out to work the ’ without openly saying that their goal is to go out forever arouses the suspicion that there is weakness or deceit here. And the Egyptians' partial reflections on repentance fade when the pressure decreases. Teaching us that intense pressure – can itself constitute a reason to ’stand on one's hind legs’ against him.

And with this insight I will probably end the discussion on the subject. I thank ’Copenhagen’ for its insistence that forced me to delve deeper into this issue, on which the last word has probably not been said.

Best regards, Schutz Levinger

Tuvia,

Quantum physics governs all particles in nature. Both its founding fathers and scientists and philosophers of science today largely reject the possibility that nature is deterministic. It points out that open observation of nature is inconsistent with the hypothesis of determinism.

You say: “If a cause can lead to an effect and can fail to lead to an effect. Then of course there needs to be another cause that explains why it did lead to an effect once and not the second time”.

Absolutely not. All that the principle of causality requires is that if there is a positive and non-relative contingent phenomenon in reality itself – that it has a cause. The reason for the classification “positive and non-relative” is that ”the absence of a phenomenon” and “a relative phenomenon” They are just abstractions that exist in the mind that have no direct ontological equivalent in reality. For example, even though the sentence "unicorns do not exist" is true, there is still nothing in reality that satisfies the property of non-existence, and therefore there is no need for a reason to explain it.

For this reason, it is not possible to logically derive from the principle of causality the claim that for every fact in the form of "A happened instead of B" there is a reason from which this fact necessarily follows. "A instead of B" is just a sentence in the mind that represents a relation between possible worlds and the actual world, and not some positive and non-relatively concrete contingent being. The principle of causality is fundamentally an ontological principle that deals with the causal necessity of contingent phenomena, and only as a result can it be applied to a certain extent to sentences. Every contingent being must have a cause – and the principle holds true in its entirety in an indeterministic world and regardless of determinism – but not every question “why this particular result and not another” has an answer that logically forces the existence of the relation indicated in the question.

The example with the wine lover shows that even if all the reasons were present – let's say the desire arose in him, he has enough money, etc. ’, he still would not necessarily buy the wine. This is the commonsense view of things, and it shows that in human consciousness the principle of causality is not deterministic. We certainly imagine that exactly the same conditions would have occurred and he could have chosen one way or the other. This is the standard view of most people, and therefore they place responsibility for human actions on the person himself and not on a causal necessity that is independent of him.

Although any change of an object compels a cause, this is only in the extended sense of causality, because it can simply result from a *cessation of action* of a cause. As follows from the above, the question of why the wine taster decided not to buy instead of buying, or why once this way and not otherwise, indicates relations between things and not a contingent, non-relative being in reality, and therefore has no cause in itself. What happened in reality is the act of buying, and it has a reason – the tastes of the wine lover why he bought in conjunction with his will.

Levinger,

Of course, there is a need to consult the fair of commentators. But not every commentary expresses the plain meaning just because it was said by a famous commentator. After all, Rashi admitted to his grandson Rashba that he did not interpret according to the plain meaning, and if he had been able to, he would have had to write a new plain meaning for everything.

Regardless of the question of whether there is one answer for all cases, what is clear is that the view reflected in the Bible is that God, the Almighty, designates certain people for physical and/or spiritual destruction (as a result of their sin and their being punished, and He sent by His angels the morning and the evening, and they were sent). Regarding most of your objections that you have brought here, the reasons have already been presented earlier as to why they do not contradict the Maimonides' plain meaning on the subject, but I will not continue to defend them because you have already stated that you wish to conclude.

The problem, in my opinion, begins with the tendency that exists to a certain extent in Hasidism, and Martin Buber took it to the extreme, which prefers to see God as a God of love and grace (in their false sense), and not as a God of justice, and for this purpose requires endless sermons and distorted readings. God sends a prophet to say A, but I will interpret that he says B. At least Buber was honest enough when he explicitly said that one must refuse to accept the expression “before the Lord” in the verse “And Samuel shall cut off Agag before the Lord at Gilgal.”

But the wind that blows in the Bible is the complete opposite. This is precisely the goodness of God. And His supreme sublimity – “And Your righteousness, O God, is on high”. The explanation for the internal lie apparently begins with this tendency. The highest good could not exist without vengeance on the wicked – “The righteous will rejoice because he has seen vengeance” – And without this understanding, it is also impossible to appreciate and thank the power of grace in the possibility of repentance and the remission of sins – to those to whom it is given.

In response to ‘Heavyening and strengthening the heart is a natural process’,

Paragraph 5, line 1:
… Indicates true intention…

On the 1st of September

To Copenhagen, greetings,

It seems that even Rabash has a Hasidic side and that is why he sits on a mercy seat and behaves in Hasidism, forgiving sins and pardoning criminals 🙂

Even absolute justice requires those who sent material crosses to a terrible war in a world full of passions and temptations to take care of the rehabilitation of those whose souls could not withstand the pressure of the storm of battle and were broken.

The leadership of soldiers who are full of life and fit for war is not like the leadership of those who are in a state of battle shock. When the soldier is fit, they are careful to keep the thorn of knowledge with him. And punish him for every failure, even the smallest one. This meticulous care is what hardens him and makes him successful in combat.

This is not the way to lead someone who has already been injured in a ’battle reaction’. Of course, he must be removed from the battlefield so that ‘he doesn't melt the hearts of his brothers’, but he is not sent home. He is transferred to a hospital near the battlefield, and there the medics keep him busy with work that he is capable of doing, and thus his self-confidence slowly returns to him. He feels that he is not a worthless rag, and it is the beginning of the long road of rehabilitation that he will still have to go through.

Hasidism came to the Jewish world when he was in ’battle shock’ Terrible, after the Holocaust of 1988 and 1999 in which tens of thousands of Jews were brutally murdered, and after the terrible spiritual crisis of the Sabbatarians and Frankism that broke the spiritual resilience of the Jewish people.

And Hasidism began to bandage the wounds of the broken Jew, teaching him that there is no despair. It taught him to weep for the divine spark in him that had fallen and been blown away between the husks, and on the other hand to rejoice in the little spirit of life that remained in him and to deepen and develop it.

Hasidism taught him that even in the mud and ugliness in which he finds himself, he is still a son of a king, whose Father in heaven cries out to him, "My sons and daughters," and that he too must seek with all his might to return to the loving and eagerly awaiting father.

And in our generation, which has gone through the horrors of the Holocaust and the spiritual crisis of modernity, these things are even more true. We will regain the feeling of being loved and confident in our worth, and from the feeling of love we will run anew to do the will of our Creator with all due caution and meticulousness.

With greetings, Sergeant (Ret.) Shimshon Zvi Levinger, medic

Rabbi Yosef Albo is also standing in a period of crisis for Judaism following the riots of Kna”a and the Christian and philosophical pressure on the one hand and on the other, which have brought the people to despair of all hope to the point of mass religious conversion. It is not for nothing that he refuses to accept the thought that there is a situation in which a person enters a fall from which there is no recovery, and he fights this thought with all his might.

Even if there is no ontological significance to the idea of why “A” happened instead of ”. Finally, the very reality that A’ happened needs a cause. And I think you accept that.
Therefore, your claim that ”the principle holds in its entirety in an indeterministic world and regardless of determinism” is not true. Because the very occurrence of X still distils a cause.

I don't think that the wine lover's example is the commensal concept. But it doesn't seem relevant to me what other people's commensal is when they understand that you are talking about the same conditions in both cases of wine.

I didn't understand what you wrote when you mentioned that it could result from a cessation of action of the cause. But in any case, I am willing to accept that what happened in reality is the act of buying, and it has a cause – the wine lover's reasons for why to buy combined with his will. And I even accept that it is a very good explanation for the act of buying. But then I will ask you one question back regarding the will itself, does it have a reason or not? If it does have a reason, then it is not a matter of free choice. And if it does not have a reason, then how can it be that it does not have a reason? After all, you accept the principle of causality, that there is a change here in a contingent, non-relative being.

Levinger,

The emphasis on longing and adherence to it in Hasidism is correct in itself, and the Book of Psalms is full of it, but along with it the Torah emphasizes the transcendence and righteousness of God and His judgment, and on this issue things are presented in a distorted way. The aviators' idea of reincarnation and the claim that God will ensure that He will not reject anyone rejected from Him in an absolute way (while ignoring the original meaning and context of the text) effectively erase the biblical view of the possibility of a final and total judgment, and in its place glorify the error that there are infinite opportunities and that everyone will eventually reach personal correction (as opposed to the correction of the world in the loss of the wicked).

The focus on the therapeutic aspect is of course appropriate, but there is nothing curative in the fact that a person can only feel good about themselves without learning to recognize the consequences of their actions. The physician understands that dressing wounds must come together with the eradication of the infection – and this is not done by emphasizing the love of God alone. In the original, healthy Torah approach, if a person errs, he deserves to receive clear information about it, and he himself must understand that he is sick and acknowledge his mistake, and only in this way may the cure come (and if he repents, the cure is guaranteed to come).

The terrible crises of Shabbos and Frankism are not a “disaster” that we simply stumbled into (and in particular Shabbos, which it is said that most of the great men of Israel erred in) but a result of the same type of spiritual decadence that led to the preference of lies over the truth. The solution is not in another system that is only intended to please the ears of the listeners, but in the pursuit of knowledge without compromise. After all, the madness of knowledge led to the madness of God Build it as the prophet said: My people are astonished at my lack of knowledge, for you have rejected knowledge, and I will reject you as a priest to me.

The Torah's way of dealing with crises of heresy and apostasy is to show that the contradictory worldviews are false, and as the Maimonides points out in the Yemenite Epistle: “The Holy One, the Almighty, has foretold us through Isaiah… (that) anyone who claims that he intends to nullify what is in our hands will be bound by the law in his claim, and will nullify it and it will not be fulfilled. As it is said (Isaiah 45:17), “All my weapons will be formed against you, but they will not prosper, and every tongue will rise up against you in judgment. This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord, and their righteousness is from me, says the Lord.” We are assured in prophecy that no serious evidence will ever come that will succeed in contradicting the Torah of Israel.

Tuvia,

That's right, the very occurrence of x, assuming that x is a positive contingent phenomenon in some entity in reality (and not a comparison between states), requires a cause. How do you tap into determinism from here?

There is an ontological difference between the cessation of the action of a cause (which means that the state is now that there is no cause), and the active action of a cause (which means that the state is that there is a cause). Change can come either as a result of the active action of a cause, or from the cessation of the action of a cause. Although a contingent state in some entity requires a cause that acts on the entity, the nullification of the contingent state does not require the action of a cause that acts on the entity (on the contrary - it requires that the cause does not act). The question of what caused the nullification depends on whether the cause that acted on the entity did so by its own power (because it inherently has the ability to cause a result), or by the power of something else. If it is by its power, there is no need for another reason, because the principle of causality holds only for contingent situations, but we have already assumed that the ability of the cause to cause an effect is not a contingent situation but an essential matter.

The fact that there is a will stems from the reality of man, because the essence of man is that he has a will. Of course, there is a reason why man was created with a will, but it must be assumed that this is not the discussion here. In other words, I understand that your question about the reason for the existence of the will comes after you already see that the will has decided in a certain way, and then ask why the particular choice is made. There is of course an answer to this – the will is defined as a type of thing that is capable of deciding between alternatives. This stems from its essence. The ability to decide is not a contingent aspect but something essential, without which the will would not exist. But we said that the principle of causality only operates on contingent situations, and not on what is essential.

If you understand that the will must be such that it is capable of choosing itself between alternatives, there is no question why it is capable of choosing. It's like asking why a person is able to think. If he weren't able to do that, he wouldn't be a person. Do we need an external reason to explain the fact that he chose it? No, because it is an essential, not contingent, ability, and the principle of causality does not apply to matters that are not contingent. His choice of a particular alternative is explained by the fact that he is a type of thing that is able to choose that alternative.

In other words, we are back to the fact that what you are actually asking here implicitly is why he chose x and not y, and I have already answered that x and not y is not a positive matter in reality but a comparison in consciousness between the possible worlds in which y exists and the actual world, but the principle of causality is a principle that relates only to concrete situations in actual reality and is not relevant to comparisons of this type.

Good week,
From the beginning of your words, we hear that this is not a causal relationship but a relationship of delegation, that the cause persists in the act. If I understood correctly, then note that human common sense does not attribute such a property of the will.
B. Why should we claim that we have a will? When the reality around us only demonstrates that there is no such essential property inherent in the objects around us. (Of course, this is part of the question I asked), and even more than that, modern science manages to explain all conscious things of this kind well. And already Spinoza about four hundred years ago spoke of matter having consciousness.
C. It sounds like you completely do not accept the principle of sufficient reason. That no fact can be true or exist without a sufficient reason for it to be this way and not otherwise. But this principle sounds much more natural than the principle of causality as you present it.

Thank you very much,
Tuvia

Have a blessed week,

A. Of course it is. There needs to be a state of ongoing will that prefers action A over action B in order for A to continue to be performed, and if the preference is eliminated – the action is eliminated. Assuming that all variables remain the same, as soon as the wine lover stops preferring wine over money or time, the buying initiative (entering the store, searching for the wine, etc.) is eliminated.

B. On the contrary. The simple concept is that things are geared toward achieving certain natural goals. Bacteria, mosquitoes, bees, trees, flowers, and countless organisms of various kinds, as well as every cell in your body, are geared toward performing certain functions. There is an objective answer to the question of whether a person's digestive system, heart, pancreas, or liver are functioning properly (i.e., healthy) or not, which depends on whether they are fulfilling the normal functions for which they are geared. There is no reason not to think that this is also the case with man himself. And even more so, when it comes to ourselves, beyond the objective perception, man's perception of himself in an indirect way, conscious of himself as a volitional being, is also added.

C. The opposite again. I mentioned earlier that the principle of causality in its primary and basic sense deals with the causal necessity that exists in the concrete world of objects and the causal effects that flow between them. Only then can we sometimes deduce how the ontological causal necessity translates into the necessity of intellectual reasons between claims. But the translation applies only to the extent that the principle operates with respect to concrete objects and not beyond that.

In other words, Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason is not the basis from which causal necessity comes. The necessity that operates on a basic level on claims is a necessity of a different kind - logical necessity. And indeed, logic does not require a necessary reason for a claim, such as why A instead of B. There is a possible world in which A exists and a possible world in which B exists (and these are well defined in modal logic, developed mainly in the 20th century), and logic cannot decide which of them exists in the concrete world. To do this, one must examine what the objects in the world have done, which have the causal abilities to cause either of the two alternatives.

On the 15th of Shvat, 9th of September

To Copenhagen, greetings,

Chassidism did not abolish fear. On the contrary, it called on man to devote time each day to contemplating his lowliness and distance from the Blessed One. And this feeling of a broken heart is what gives rise to the joy in his God who gave him the Torah and the commandments and the grace of repentance in order to bring him out of darkness into light.

The point of innovation in Chassidism (and even in the study of the Gracious One) is the shift in emphasis from the torment of the soul over sin to the joy of doing good. Thus, the hour of heartbreak encourages a person to work the rest of the day for healing through positive actions.

And regarding the reincarnation of souls, which you brought up. It is not an innovation of Hasidism. And it is explained in the Book of Clear and the Book of Zohar and in the books of the Kabbalists, from Rabbi Yitzchak Sagi Nehor and the Ramban to the writings of the Ari. A detailed review is in the article by Dr. Doron Danino, which appears in the link to the entry ‘Gilg Neshomut’ on Wikipedia.

Turning a person into an animal for a period of time in order to humble his pride and teach that ’there is a leader for the capital’ – Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, was punished as described in Daniel Chapter 4. And at the end of the period of his transformation into an animal, he returned to being a person and returned to the glory of his kingdom in order to be exalted and praised as the King of kings.

The ’ brings down Saul and raises him’. The Midrash describes the punishment of the king's servants who spoiled the dishes entrusted to them, that the king puts them in prison and sends the dishes to be washed. The torment of the soul washes and purifies it in preparation for its resurrection. Of course, it is better to keep the dishes clean and clean them with our own hands…

He who, like King David, internalizes his being a ‘worm and not a man’ ‘among the beasts I was with you’ and knows his value to his Creator – indeed does not need’root treatment’ of the kind that Nebuchadnezzar received.

With best wishes, Sh”z Levinger

Hey

The discussion here is getting way off track so I would suggest we open a new question like “Is it reasonable to believe in reincarnation” or “Is the belief coherent with the view of the prophets of Israel”

On the 15th of Shvat

To Copenhagen – Greetings,

The possibility of reincarnation has been empirically proven in this discussion, in which I was led from a bibliographical comment that the debate between you and Ramada on the question of the existence of a hermetic negation of election was already disputed by the Maimonides, the author of the Ekirarim, and the Seferno.

From this trivial comment I was led into a full discussion on the places in the Bible where the negation of election is implied, and I really enjoyed this reincarnation.

The second reincarnation was the discussion on the optimistic path of Hasidism, and from here I was led into a third into a discussion on reincarnation, for which it occurred to me to find a biblical source for it in the transformation of Nebuchadnezzar into an animal described in the book of Daniel, chapter 4.

Since, according to the theory of reincarnation, if my memory serves me correctly, no one reincarnates more than three or four times, I think I can be satisfied with that.

Those interested in an in-depth study of the discussion on the subject in the sources of Judaism can find material in Dr. Doron Danino's article, "The Belief in Reincarnation in Judaism" (link to it on Wikipedia entry "Reincarnation"), and in his book "The Essence and Meanings of the Debate Over the Belief in Reincarnation, in the Jewish Communities of Venice, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, During the 17th Century", Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 2010.

With greetings, Sz. Levinger

Since Hamburg was under the rule of the King of Denmark, you may also find material in the book about the King of Copenhagen. At Loewing in southern China the reincarnation thing was trivial 🙂

Regards, Ching Ching Ching, a Loewing man

In the 17th of Shvat, 89

And apparently, what is the problem with reincarnation? After all, even in our lives, our soul undergoes different reincarnations in the same body, as the Midrash says:

‘Seven vanities that Solomon went through, corresponding to the seven worlds that a person sees: A one-year-old is like a king, laid in a cradle and everyone hugs and kisses him; A two- or three-year-old is like a pig that spreads its hands in the garbage; A ten-year-old jumps like a goat; A twenty-year-old is like a horse, growing strong and with a strong jaw; A man who marries a wife – he is like a donkey; He has begotten sons – he puts on the face of a dog to bring them sustenance; An old man – he is like a monkey [who walks hunched over]’ (Ecclesiastes 1:3)

Why then cannot there be such a metamorphosis after death, in which a soul will communicate with another body, either as a punishment (like what happened to Nebuchadnezzar) or in order to give some of its powers to another person? Just as a person can bequeath material DNA to others, why is it not possible to bequeath spiritual DNA to another?

And I will conclude with a blessing, that our Sipah Midrash may be fulfilled: ‘This is among the people of the land, but among the children of Torah it is written: And King David was old’ – although he was old – he reigned’..

With blessings, Shࢭz Levinger

Copenhagen,
As I understand it, you wanted to argue, 1. That the only things that are distilled into a cause are only a kind of positive and non-relative contingent phenomenon.
2. You also mentioned that every contingent thing has a cause. You added that the cause does not have to *force* the result, but only has to be a cause that is *capable* of doing so. It could not have led to the result, or to a different result, and there is no violation of the principle here.
Due to these two things, you wanted to argue that a purposive action done by free will does not boil down to a cause. Because it is not a contingent phenomenon, but rather the action of the will is an essential phenomenon of the concept of will.

But I did not understand two things from your theory. And I did not understand your first principle.
A. Why did you also write the second part to justify free choice? It seems that according to your theory it is unnecessary.
B. How do you argue that the will is a non-contingent phenomenon. After all, it is not a necessity of reality or anything like that.
C. The accepted understanding of the principle of causality speaks specifically of relative phenomena. For example, when billiard ball A hits billiard ball B, then the displacement of B following the law of conservation of momentum is a relative phenomenon in space. After all, speed is not an essential property of an object.
Moreover, according to your method, there is a possibility of causality in the present. The cause is constant in the contingent entity. But the usual understanding of causality. That the causation is only momentary. (Like ball A hits B and gives it speed).

Bouncer, if you can answer (Copenhagen), I would be happy.