Gay living together
To Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham, Shalom Rav,
I will say in advance that I am not homosexual. I do not know whether it is to my regret or to my joy, but if God has decreed it this way, I am happy. In any case, out of concern for homosexuals in the Jewish people, for their social moral strength, and as a light to the Gentiles, I am concerned with the issue of homosexuals (and I also discuss the matter with Rabbi Yuval Sharlo, whose yeshiva I studied in the Seder).
I’m trying to argue for permission for homosexuals to live together for the purpose of parenting, but with maximum sexual distancing. And I’d love to hear your opinion on the matter.
From a halachic point of view-
The argument is mainly about the issue of the afterlife, from which it is implied that a person is permitted to walk along the path where women are washed, only that he must force himself not to look.
And he closes his eyes, seeing evil. Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, this is the one who does not look at women while they are washing their clothes. He is a sinner, and he
In other words, if there is a common goal, it is permissible to take risks in eroticism. And if there is a goal of shared parenting, this is indeed a common goal.
I emphasize that I am talking about living together, without attempting to achieve erotic intimacy (and also trying to overcome as much as possible), but only for the sake of parenthood, which probably includes romantic love. Romantic love, in my opinion, is not forbidden, as implied by the sacred aid- “And what is written in the name of the Ari, the late, about someone who reflected and distracted himself from the tefillin by saying, “Let us not touch the void,” seems to have been due to the immersion of reflection and the awakening of desire in his soul, in the drawing in his imagination of that desire in action, which is a style that determines and impresses upon the states of the soul to awaken to that which has a pull, may God have mercy on him, for actual open fornication and also for impurity at night” (Even HaEzer, 23:3)
And regarding the prohibition of uniqueness –
1. I ask you – it is said that Israel was not suspected of having sex with a man. Even though we know that two are homosexuals, does that mean that they are suspected of having sex with a man? Can’t they come at each other from the front all their lives? I’m not sure there is any reason to say that the statement that they are not suspected does not apply to two homosexuals if they can only come at each other from the front. And the prohibition of sperm for nullification was not stated as a prohibition of exclusiveness. For example, most rabbis believe that there is no exclusiveness law with the Internet…
2. Regarding exclusiveness , there is no prohibition in the earlier halakha on two men or two women being together. This is an extension that some may be thinking of making in recent times when the issue of homosexuality has become more discussed. According to the halakha that is earlier than our time, there is no prohibition on exclusiveness within the same sex, but only between a man and a woman. In any case, we will examine two cases-
A. The exclusiveness of two women with a man is forbidden. The exclusiveness of two men with a woman is permitted. Hence, a woman does not protect a man and a woman, and a man protects a man and a woman. Hence, there is no prohibition of exclusiveness prohibiting two men from living together, and the reason that a man protects is a transgression.
B. It is said that a man only guards a couple of which he is not a part, but two men as a single couple are forbidden, because there is no one to guard? Then in the case of a man with two wives, one woman would be alone, and yet it is forbidden and does not guard. Hence, this is not the reason that there is a single person from a couple who would guard.
There is no mirror like this, this is the equal side of them, that there are two men there and they are guarding. And a woman is not guarding, that “women are easy on them” (“…because women are easy on them and cover each other’s heads and not from each other’s money” (Ritva) and see the article http://www.oranim.ac.il/sites/heb/sitecollectionimages/documents/hamidrasha/nashim/parshanut-feminist/israeli-isurei-yichud.pdf and the opinions of Rabbi Steinsaltz and Rabbi Amit Kula there.), and therefore the prohibition does not apply to two men in any case. Regarding the matter of “women who are betrothed,” a separate discussion could be opened, but I have not dealt with it much, and in any case, it is not at all certain that it is “fornication,” but rather “fornication.” And the question is what is the definition of “fornication,” and I have not yet researched much into it.
And a question for thought – are homosexuals forbidden to live together in the same apartment despite everything I wrote, compared to a man and his wife Nida who are allowed, but they just have to move the beds a little further apart? (After hearing the comparison of homosexuals living together to living with the neighbor’s wife…)
And an argument that not only permits homosexuals to live together but also encourages them from a halakhic perspective, provided they can abstain from male intercourse and only ejaculate together for the purpose of incest.
From an ethical perspective and from another halachic argument (according to the book Hasidim) about the ethical argument – I consider it appropriate that failing to ejaculate with a homosexual partner is a “better” failure than failing to ejaculate in front of the media.
In my opinion, the religious public has lost its way on this issue. The prohibition of ejaculating for no reason has a clear purpose, and not as it is presented, almost maliciously, as if God imposed it on us without a purpose. The presentation that it is forbidden because of “holiness” and that is it, and there is no purpose that we can understand – distorts the entire work of God. Those who consume promiscuous media encourage promiscuity (just as those who consume animal food encourage animal abuse). A homosexual couple ejaculating for no reason within their relationship is a halakhic failure, but it is infinitely more positive ethically than ejaculating through the consumption of promiscuous media, which causes the exploitation and enslavement of people in a cycle of prostitution, drug addiction, and terrible things. Ejaculating in vain in front of the media is considered fornication according to the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 5, 12 [9] If someone sets his eyes on a woman and she becomes ill and is about to die, and the doctors say that there is no cure for her until she becomes pregnant – even if she were free, and even to speak with her behind the fence – they do not instruct him in this, and he dies, and they do not instruct him to speak with her behind the fence: so that the daughters of Israel may not be unchaste, and come with these things to commit fornication. And what does it matter whether behind the fence or behind the camera if it encourages prostitution on a public scale by homosexuals who consume whorish media when they can “only” fail to ejaculate with a partner?
And it is clear that if he fears that he will commit a serious offense in matters of sexuality, he should prefer the lighter option, and on this the book Hasidim, 16:16, says: In one case, a person whose desire overcame him and feared that he would sin by sleeping with another man’s wife or with his wife who was divorced or with other forbidden sexual relations, asked if he could ejaculate so that he would not sin. He was told at that time that he had to ejaculate. If that was not possible, it was better for him to ejaculate a layer of semen and not sin against a woman. But he needs to make atonement by sitting in the cold during the winter or fasting for forty days during the hot days. And they ruled similarly, according to the law of the legislator, the House of Samuel and the Wisdom of Solomon (who emphasized that this was about weighing the seriousness of the offenses).
And if there is another question, in any case it is about ejaculating, then one can put on a condom and the semen will be nullified before it actually comes out, thus only passing through reflection according to the decoding encryption.
And if that’s not enough, I know a method by which you can reach orgasm even without having the penis and the sperm and blood blocked from exiting the penis. Instead, the sperm returns to the urethra and only comes out after it is eliminated in the urine. This is certainly only a prohibition against contemplation , and I would be happy to send you an explanation of it in another email soon .
Conceptually-
Regarding the verse “and clung to his wife” –
It says, “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother,” as in “Therefore the rulers shall say, ‘Come, I will give account.'” In the literal sense of the verse, we are talking here about a description of a widespread reality and not about a normative obligation. (The midrash of “The rulers in their passion” is not the literal sense.) Or, “Therefore it will be said, ‘As a mighty hunter rebels against the Lord,'” or, “And a man from there answered and said, ‘And who is their father?’ Therefore it was for a parable that Saul also asked the prophets.” And there are others, and I have not gone through the entire Bible.
The verse is directed at marriage in order to have children. It is about devotion to the purpose of man and his wife being “one flesh.” In the minor passage of Genesis 2:24, there is almost counter-proof that a romantic relationship between men is ruled out. “And they became one flesh – they came out of the living beast and the fowl, and the male mating, which do not make one flesh, and they do not bear fruit or reproduce.” And was it a mistake to form a romantic relationship with an animal? And besides, it does not say “male,” but the midrash actually reduces the problem to “male mating.” In other words, there is no contradiction here to romantic feelings for a male, but only an obligation to one flesh, which is procreation.
That is, one must marry to have children, and within this system there must be adherence. Adherence is not an obligation in itself. Regarding the obligation to marry, I will discuss it later in the email, but here I wanted to emphasize that there is no obligation to “adhere.”
Even in what the Midrash said, “You shall not do as the land of Egypt did,” which was a man marrying a man and a woman marrying a woman, marriage can be viewed in two ways, and “my” proposal for homosexuals living together who try with all their might not to reach erotic intimacy is not included in either of them.
A. Human
B. Religious
A. According to the first possibility – it is a marital relationship in Egypt, which according to the context of the verse in Leviticus – regarding incest, and also according to its placement in the Rambam – regarding adulterous women, is related to a sexual relationship. Therefore, the attempt to say that a relationship of fostering, adopting a child, shared by two men is considered marriage in the land of Egypt is puzzling to me. It is also difficult to argue that “society is forbidden to recognize a couple together.” This is a very strange prohibition. “The prohibition of recognizing” is almost unknown to me in Halacha. Society simply organizes for certain purposes (such as raising a child together), and someone’s recognition of something is not important at all. And would we actually be allowed to establish an orphanage staffed by only two men because society recognizes them as an “orphanage” and not a “parental couple”? There is hardly an obligation to recognize the existence of the Hereafter or the coming of the Messiah, or even the “existence” of God. Even if so, it seems that the prohibition will be on the company and not on the couple, let’s say a prohibition on saying to someone “Your partner told me that…” but rather on saying sentences like “The person raising the child with you told me that…” and it is clear that we have reached absurdity.
B. From a religious perspective, beyond the human content that is also included in it, which I have already discussed, marriage is what permits intercourse (and the Responsa Torah Temima further said that the Rambam meant “those who do so regularly and consistently” and hence he literally attributed the issue of marriage to sexuality). Because I do not claim to permit homosexual intercourse with homosexuals (neither in front nor behind), I do not claim to allow marriage together.
After it seems to me that I have refuted the arguments against a parental-romantic relationship between men, I will argue in favor.
Love between men, between women, between men and women, between everyone, is a positive thing. It says, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” The verse also requires loving “your wife” and not sanctifying her until she is purified. David says to Jonathan, “Your love to me is more wonderful than the love of women.” Moreover, the attempt to say that a homosexual is forbidden to love a man is almost to say that he is like a donkey and less than him and cannot love God, as Rabbi Eliyahu says , “He who does not desire a woman is like a donkey and less than him… for from what is felt, one must discern the divine work.” . It is certainly about romantic love.
The bond of adoption is a bond of kindness with the adopted child. This is analogous to teaching him Torah, and this is “These are the accounts of Moses, Eleazar and Ithamar, the sons of Aaron.”
And now regarding fertility and reproduction-
Can we still find solutions for this? Maybe not the most ideal for children. But it seems to me that those who make halakhic rulings for the public should allow the public a degree of freedom to decide on their lives if these are things that are indeed permissible and not to determine for them. I can suggest marriage/concubines for the sake of procreation. Or surrogacy (I don’t know the subject in halakhic law and ethics) or a combination of both, such as taking sperm from a gay man and an egg from an egg donation in the uterus of a lesbian woman, (and the opposite in taking a sperm donation for a lesbian seems much easier to me… and many verses have been written about “removing sperm for a need” and the Wisdom of Solomon put “for a need” as a mitzvah or “good deeds” that are the history of righteous people and it is clear that this is a mitzvah of kindness.)
Maybe it’s not the most ideal for the children, but I ask myself. Let’s say I know someone and we’re compatible. But then I discover that she has a mental illness with the same diagnosis as me. And there’s a high risk of the children getting sick. So is it necessarily appropriate for me to cut off contact with her? Is this a halachic obligation? Ethical? Is there the same obligation in all cases, so it’s appropriate for a general law to be passed in the country “for the children”?
It is said, “Do not judge your friend until you have reached his place.” Every homosexual has personal considerations, including an ethical system, that he can decide for himself whether he is willing to raise a child in such and such a way, and it seems to me that there is a limit to how much a judge can impose on one family system.
Unless there is a clear Torah reference to the issue.
I would love to hear your opinion.
With many thanks and best wishes for a good week and much appreciation for your work,
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
To the honorable Rabbi, peace and many thanks for the response.
I am just repeating what I presented as the main point in the entire argument, and I put at the beginning of the question, which relates to the fear that they will sin -
“The argument is mainly about the issue of the hereafter, from which it is implied that a person is permitted to walk in the way where women are washing, only that he must force himself not to look.
And closing his eyes shows evil. Rabbi Hiya bar Abba is the one who does not look at women while they are washing, because he is a blood relative, and if he is a That is, it is permissible to live together only if they need to “rape themselves” so that they do not reflect and do not sin.
I will continue that if the goal is to have a romantic relationship, this is also a goal in itself that is not found in a gay (male)-lesbian couple as the rabbi suggested, and the romantic feeling can also support their ability to function as a couple and remain as a couple for the long term, and to deepen the emotional connection.
Therefore, for the purpose of the question of whether there is a Darka Achreta – it seems that there is no Darka Achreta to achieve these essential goals, and according to this source, it is permissible to risk eroticism. (Eroticism can also lead to any sin in this source from the Gemara. They just need to rape themselves so that they do not sin as much as possible, and what sin they commit in rape is not our concern here.)
I would appreciate the rabbi's response,
With many thanks!
The argument of Likha Darka Achrina seems problematic to me. This is a basic situation of not being prepared, and then it is possible or not possible and Ka is prepared or not prepared. But here it is very close to being prepared. Putting oneself in a state of constant stimulation over years is unlikely to be considered as not being prepared. And the prohibition of exclusiveness itself will prove that exclusiveness is not permitted for reasons of Likha Darka Achrina.
Furthermore, I have not heard that it is permitted to come on a free date in order to hold a po”r, although here too, if he does not find a match then Likha Darka Achrina. And even if he does find a match – it is enough for him to find it difficult to marry in order to be considered Likha Darka Achrina.
Regarding the prohibition of exclusiveness, which is forbidden even though he does not intend to, in my opinion this is a strong argument that the Rabbi brings, and I need to look into it.
Does the Rabbi know the division of “intended” and “not intended” somewhere in the halacha that pertains to this issue? I would be happy to look into it.
Regarding the free woman - after all, he does not “risk contemplation” but actually reaches an orgasm, which is contemplation in itself, and therefore it is not similar. “There shall be no adultery in you, whether by hand or by foot,” meaning that orgasm with ejaculation is considered erotic contemplation even without evidence, but rather the very “warming up.”
Shalom Rav.
See the issue of Pesach 25:2 – 22:1. The classic case of it is impossible (=likha darka akhiraina) and not a choice is the case of a person who has two ways to reach his desired destination, one of which is a shop with the scent of perfumes of ez. If the path with the shop is shorter, it is considered impossible (=likha darka akhiraina). But in such a case it is clear that he is not going to smell, but rather to reach his desired destination. The forbidden smell is an external constraint and independent of his original purpose that was imposed on him. Furthermore, even when he smells, it is not an act that he chooses, but rather by the very fact of being in that place he smells (even if he can hold his nose, he is not obligated, as the poskim wrote). In contrast, in the case of Didan, there is no other unrelated prohibition at issue. This is the essence of the problem, that it is forbidden to live together lest they come under prohibition by reason. Beyond that, in the case of Didan, if he fails, it is a failure of his own choosing (dealing with the urge) and not something that was forced upon him by its very existence as in the case of smell (and in this there is a similarity to uniqueness, of course).
For example, in the novellas of the R”an on Pesachim, he wrote:
A pleasure that comes to a person in a certain way, such as the smell of a zebub, and in a certain way we would say that it does not come here for him but the pleasure of the smell is anyway unpleasant, and in a certain way even though it is intended for her in a certain way, so he reads, so let us consider them and forgive them by hearing it in the possibility and in the intention.
I was just reminded of the R”ashb”a Shavuot 18 (in fact, this is explained in the Gemara there), that if a man comes to his wife near her period and she sees blood, he is not considered a fornicator but rather an accident (and is liable to sin). Although the prohibition of coming near menstruation is a rabbinic prohibition. And the reason is that all the rabbis prohibited was lest she see blood and reach the severe prohibition of niddah. If this actually happened, then this is what he had to fear from and not something incidental.
And such a thing in law begins with a crime and ends with rape. A man hid a deposit in his hand in the forest. This is considered good protection against thieves and a crime against fire. If in the end there was a fire, he is a criminal and liable (because the fear was primarily from fire, and in this itself is a crime). But if in the end there were thieves, then this began with a crime and ends with rape, because what came in the end was not what he had to fear from in the first place. Again, we see that there is a difference between ultimately reaching a incidental prohibition (which in this case may have been rape) and reaching a prohibition that is primarily to be feared (which is not considered rape).
(It is clear that one should not intend and enter into such a relationship, as I suggest, intentionally. The question is whether there needs to be “purity of intention” that is, in general, he takes it upon himself to rape himself but knows that he probably will not resist his urge)
(And regarding coming to the open for the sake of profit and gain, reflection is part of the path and not a side like women washing themselves by the roadside)
In your opinion, it is about creating bonds of attachment to raising a child, and here too, reflection is part of the path.
I accept many of your arguments, and I think I cannot deny your conclusion because of the simple argument of the prohibition of solitude as an example of how even when it comes to work-related pursuits, solitude is forbidden.
At the same time, I am not sure that romantic emotion requires erotic contemplation as ”part of the path”. Today there are many erotically asexual people who nevertheless report romantic emotion. Perhaps they nevertheless experience little eroticism, but that is not really clear to me.
Regarding the question of whether an action from an instinct is in any case intentional as opposed to a smell that is forced upon a person, it is said “What shall the son do and not sin?”
And in the righteousness of the righteous man, sometimes a person is faced with such great temptation that he wishes not to sin (Berachot Lev, 1) What will the son do? And in this he is considered a complete rape, according to the mercy of God. And also in inciting the desire with such great force that he wishes to overcome it, rape belongs [and if the Lord turns his heart, then this sin is not a sin at all, only that the will of the Lord is so] and according to the writings (page 15:) Gabi begins his rape even Finally, she says that if she does not assume that her husband is allowed to wear it because of her strong desire, then this is considered complete rape, even if it is voluntary, because such a strong desire is not in a person to force him, and it is complete rape, and there is no punishment for it, even though it is forbidden because it was forced. But the person himself cannot testify to this because perhaps he still had the power to force the desire [and as I heard about this from Zimri, who was wrong about this]:
I am still thinking about the subject and would like to hear your opinion.
The question of whether this is God's will or not is not important to our case. The question is whether there is an exemption for rape here. There is nothing new in this: if one's instinct is to rape, it is rape (an impulse that cannot be conquered). But our discussion is about putting oneself in a situation that provokes such an instinct, and here it is not rape.
Ok. I think I agree with you.
Out of interest stemming from questions from my religious-philosophical worldview, I will ask-
Do you think that the Sanhedrin in the future will be able to change and allow homosexual relationships in cohabitation or even homosexual intercourse, which is their natural tendency?
Or- To what extent do you think the Sanhedrin can make it easier for homosexuals here?
This is an ill-defined question. The Sanhedrin can do almost anything, as long as it thinks so (see Rambam 2:2, 3). Therefore, there is almost no limit to what it can do, except for teaching against things that are explicitly stated in the Torah (which the Sadducees admit). Any interpretation of what is written, no matter how new, is within the authority of the Sanhedrin.
The question that can be asked and probably what you meant is: Is there such a permission from the interpretation? If so, it is possible that we do not have the authority today to change the interpretation, and only a future Sanhedrin that is convinced that it is correct will be able to do so. Therefore, the main question is not a question of the authority of the Sanhedrin, but whether there is room for such an interpretation on its part.
Regarding this question, I think I have already written here once that there is room for the interpretation that the prohibition is generally imposed only on those who desire male intercourse because of the evil inclination, and not on those with such a tendency. Admittedly, this is a new interpretation and I do not know how far one can go with it. If the Sanhedrin in the future is convinced that this is true, it will of course have the authority to interpret the Torah as it understands it, and so on.
It is interesting to note that it is precisely according to the method of Rabbi Feinstein, who has a very strict attitude towards the subject, that there is room for leniency. He claims that it is impossible for any person to have such a tendency, otherwise the Torah would not prohibit it. Therefore, it is clear to him that for everyone it is an instinct and not a tendency. But in light of his words, the opposite conclusion is drawn, if one does not accept his factual assumption. That is, if one is convinced on a factual level that this is indeed a tendency (contrary to his words), and at the same time accepts his meta-halakhic view that it is impossible for the Torah to prohibit a tendency, the conclusion is that this is not prohibited for those with such a tendency (as I suggested above).
For myself, it is quite clear to me on a factual level that at least in some cases it is a tendency and not an instinct, not according to his method. On the other hand, I also do not accept his meta-halakhic view that the Torah does not prohibit tendencies. Kleptomania is also a tendency and it still seems that the Torah prohibits theft even for a kleptomaniac. Therefore, relying on the words of the Ram”P is pure gibberish from my perspective.
As for the substance of the matter, even without his words, there is room for such an interpretation, but it is very new and I do not know how to validate it.
And another question - can you morally and philosophically justify (regardless of tradition) the blanket denial of a marital relationship that is not for fertility and reproduction, since romantic love is not the main goal of man in the world, but rather the main goal is to engage in intelligence and "the mind and the known me", and on the contrary, romantic love can be disruptive in that it takes a person out of equanimity and can even cause great suffering. (I am really thinking about this and would love to hear your opinion.)
I didn't fully understand the question. A romantic relationship is a human need, and it's not just for bringing up children. The fact that it's not a mitzvah doesn't make it a prohibition. Even food and sleep or recreation and rest can interfere with engaging in mindfulness. We haven't heard that a person has to avoid their basic needs in order to engage in mindfulness. If their heart is generous - perhaps there's a place for that. But there's no obligation or prohibition in that.
Thanks for the insightful answers.
I'm trying to demand morally correct commandments.
My view is that even resting, resting, and sleeping are permitted – they are for the sake of the Torah ideal, and there is also a vice within the Torah's authority. The Torah cannot cover all cases, and therefore it gives specific commandments; one can always find loopholes in the law.
And it is clear to me that there are many positive things about sexuality and romance, and many negative things as well.
I see that a couple who can have children are allowed to have a sexual and romantic relationship.
Whereas two people who cannot have children – are not allowed to have a sexual relationship, and probably can hardly have a romantic relationship either.
Perhaps the reason is that a sexual-romantic relationship is only intended to establish a home for fertility and reproduction. And this – so that there will be more people to engage in enlightenment.
But a sexual-romantic relationship that is without a child only distracts from enlightenment and is therefore forbidden.
The assumption here, for me, is that engaging in mindfulness is the greatest pleasure, even more than a relationship, at least for someone who is used to it and knows how to calm their mind.
First, even if engaging in intelligence is the greatest pleasure, is there an obligation to enjoy it? A person wants to suffer within a romantic relationship at the expense of the pleasure of engaging in intelligence. Is that forbidden? You can say that engaging in intelligence is the greatest value, but the fact that it is the greatest pleasure does not sound relevant to me.
Beyond that, even if it is the greatest value, there is still room to address needs or smaller values. This is completely legitimate. Thus, in distributing a state's budget, they do not put everything on security and health even though this is the most important (because this is life). They also invest in culture and sports and other things. Human life and society are complex and it is a mistake to invest only in the greatest value. There are many value fronts and it is permissible and perhaps appropriate to invest in all of them. In addition, there are fronts of needs, and it is also permissible to engage in them.
It is permissible to be in a romantic relationship even if it is not for the purpose of having children. But usually when there is a relationship for the purpose of having children, it also meets the romantic need, and it is certainly not permissible to interfere with it with another romantic relationship or another. But someone who is unable to have children and has no other marital relationship is not prohibited from forming a romantic relationship without the need for children.
Regarding the comparison between male sexual intercourse and kleptomania, you wrote: “Kleptomania is also a tendency, and it still seems that the Torah prohibits theft even for a kleptomaniac.” The big difference is that male sexual intercourse is a crime without a victim. This is reminiscent of David’s question to the Sanhedrin regarding theft for the purpose of saving lives, whether it would be permissible. There are two levels to the offense of theft, an offense against Heaven, and an offense against the one who has been robbed. The offense against Heaven is rejected by the Piko’n like all offenses, but the offense against the one who has been robbed is not rejected even if there is a Piko’n. In the same way, even if a kleptomaniac has a tendency to steal, this may help him in the offense against Heaven, but not in the offense against the one who has been robbed. But with regard to male sexual intercourse, it is still possible to say that since this is an offense against Heaven only, an innate tendency may be a sufficient condition to exempt the person from the original prohibition.
The comparison is not for every purpose. The argument is that the fact that there is a tendency towards something does not mean that there is no offense here. Indeed, the Torah also refers to actions that do not harm others as offenses, and the comparison still stands.
To Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham Shalom,
I wanted to know the Rabbi's opinion, if you find a method in which homosexuals can satisfy themselves sexually completely together without male intercourse at all, but only by the prohibition of contemplation or by Shazal - would it also be forbidden due to uniqueness?
I know a method that I naturally masturbated to since my youth and that is how I became acquainted with it, and I don't know if there is anyone else in the world who has tried it, in which the penis does not harden, because the blood does not enter to harden the penis, and the sperm does not enter the penis but goes back into the urine, and comes out after being eliminated in the urine. I called the method the "displacement method" because the sperm is displaced from its place but does not come out as sperm. See below for sources on the relevance of this from Tzitz Eliezer and the Deciphering of the Code.
When I asked about masturbation (a person with himself), Rabbi Sherlow forbade it because of the prohibition of reflection, and Rabbi Yaakov Ariel said, “I outright disallow it because of the prohibition of reflection” when I asked him in a situation without time to dwell on the matter. There was a rabbi who did not want to permit it because he was afraid of reactions (he told me this explicitly), there was a rabbi who deals with homosexuals (and when I consulted him, I did talk about the connection to homosexuals) who told me that if I was okay with it, I would go with it, Rabbi Aharon Lechtenstein, when I sent him the matter through the yeshiva secretariat, and I do not know how he received it, told me on the phone that “he does not have time to deal with it.”
The method is that when the organ is flaccid, lie on a carpet on the lower abdomen, and the flaccid organ is directed towards the feet, and put some kind of raised towel that will press on the part of the organ’s connection to the body and penetrate a little deeper towards the pubic bone, and then move to massage the place. The sperm is displaced but is blocked at the massage site and therefore does not come out.
A psychologist (Prof. Shulman Shmuel from Bar Ilan) said that orgasm is the same orgasm as masturbation.
Two urologists and a family doctor I asked confirmed that there is no medical problem at all.
The question is whether, instead of a carpet and a lift, the Tzomet Institute could produce some kind of lift device on the pubic bone, which gays would rub against while facing each other, and each would rub against the other's pubic bone with this lift that goes in both directions, or maybe a towel would be enough for that, I don't know. I am not homosexual and I have not slept with a girl either.
Here is a drawing (I edited materials from Wikipedia) of the method alone and a drawing based on my thoughts on its implementation with homosexuals.
See image:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwJAdMjYRm7IUG0wTzkycEUtbjQ
My thought is that if this only prohibits contemplation or “adultery with hand and foot” without ejaculation or at least without male intercourse, there is no point in prohibiting exclusiveness. And there is nothing unique about the Internet that leads to adultery. That is, if they can accustom themselves to this method until there is no significant fear of male intercourse. And again we will return to the fact that Israel was not suspected of having male intercourse. (And if we try to push that there is even a small fear that they are forbidden, then a man lives with his wife Nida because he is used to her and can wait two weeks.)
Attached is a Word file with the rulings of Tzafnat Pa’an Part A, Section 9 and Part 3, Section 124, and of Tzitz Eliezer Part 14, Section 125 that are relevant to the argument of permissibility in the matter (which in my opinion is prohibited because of the prohibition of contemplation or “adultery with the hand and foot” but is permitted in terms of the removal of semen from the organ itself.) In any case, it is more important in my opinion if gays can reach a relaxed, reasonable, and pleasurable ejaculation through the method so that we do not suspect them of having male intercourse (after all, why would they choose male intercourse if they have intercourse that is only adultery and is equally pleasurable?) Then perhaps we can allow uniqueness.
With thanks and blessings,
Hello A.
It's a bit embarrassing for me to deal with things in such detail, but it is Torah and we need to learn (by the way, it seems to me that the question itself can be presented even without the personal confession. There is something jarring here, especially when it is written under your name).
As for the matter, such an act should be prohibited from the law of reflection. Although you are sparing the ejection of semen, I doubt whether this in itself is the main point of the prohibition or is just an expression of the level of prohibited reflection. Those who prohibit hand-to-hand adultery as an accessory to sexual intercourse, of course, see this as a prohibited act on its own part, but this is a puzzling method (according to this, coming on one's wife on a day when it is clear that ovulation is not occurring is also an accessory to sexual intercourse).
Regarding exclusiveness, I think it should still be prohibited. Even if there is a way to achieve satisfaction in this way, and even if we assume that this way is actually permissible (see above that it is not), exclusiveness may lead to a prohibited act. After all, ordinary people are usually not satisfied with these acts and prefer a truly utilitarian act. If so, it seems to me that this is also the case with gays (unless something in reality is different about them that I am not familiar with).
I don't know. Maybe it will satisfy gays more than a male bed.
A man and a woman should also darken the room and not kiss everywhere, so we should prohibit bed because there is an urge to come in all kinds of forms?
Why does the rabbi call male bed “actual use” more than that?
Sorry again for the confession.. I have no other way. And as the rabbi said, “Torah is and we must learn” with all the efforts not to sin, when I sinned in a “normal” way when the organ hardens and the pleasure was less with this method.
Don't you think it would be best to find out and investigate in reality?
I didn't understand the claim. What should be investigated? Is the pleasure in such a situation greater than the pleasure in a full act (with penetration. an act of coming with another person)? I have almost no doubt that it is not (beyond the physical pleasure, there is the contact with another person, which is also important in this context), but if you have other information – I would love to hear about it.
Following on from this question, is it correct to say that the prohibition of male sexual intercourse is more similar to the prohibition of court marriages today? That is, both are prohibited from a formal halakhic perspective, but on the other hand, from a Torah perspective (i.e., extra-halakhic value), it is clear to us that the matter should be permitted.
I don't see the similarity. Regarding homosexuals, not much has been changed in terms of the constraints. What I wrote is that perhaps there is room for an interpretation that permits the act (and I highly doubt it) in light of the words of the Supreme Court that the prohibition was stated only for those who have a tendency. But this is a real permit and there is no necessity to permit the forbidden. If there is no such permit, I do not see a necessity or possibility to permit. In the context of courts, there is a Torah value of a normal life with an effective judicial system (this is a commandment of the laws that also applies to the sons of Noah), and this value, which today cannot be realized in Torah law, compels the permitting of the forbidden. But in male intercourse there is no value but difficulty, but the difficulty has always existed.
Just as there is a value of a legally sound life, why don’t we say that there is a value of a normal life of relationships and personalities? Or even a normal family life.
By the way, I recently came across an article on the subject that presents a similar permissiveness to the one you mentioned:
Regarding the treatment of members of the gay community within religious society, Rabbi Riskin said that “we cannot permit what the Torah prohibits.” However, he surprised when he said that “on the other hand, ‘rape, mercifully, patria’ – the Torah exempted the rapist from the obligations arising from what he did.” According to him, the word abomination in the Torah was interpreted by the Gemara as ‘you are mistaken in it’ and does not refer to all LGBT people, “someone who could have been heterosexual, and chose to be homosexual, of whom it is said ‘you are mistaken in it’. ‘rape, mercifully, patria’ belongs only to someone who cannot receive some kind of satisfaction in any other way.”
The value of a good life cannot justify going beyond a Torah prohibition, since it has always existed, so why did the Torah prohibit it? (This is a fundamental and not accidental conflict, according to my definitions) It is true that if the prohibition exists only when they have no inclination for it – then fine, but then there is no need for permits. It is simply not prohibited.
The rape exemption is of course a side exemption and not a fundamental permit. But indeed the permit he proposes is very similar to my proposal. Even the interpretation of the abomination from the Gemara in Vows is written here on the site against the interpreters who say it is a moral abomination. He reiterates that this teaching also supports the reasoning for the permit itself: only those who err violate a prohibition. That is interesting, and I had not thought of that.
Now I thought that perhaps the prohibition of male sexual intercourse is based on a factual error by the Sages that males are always attracted to females (a common error in the ancient world). But it is very possible that if the Sages had known that it was possible for a male to be attracted only to males (similarly to a female), then they would not have prohibited it. And just as the prohibition of fish with meat, which is based on a factual error, can be relaxed in our day, perhaps this prohibition can also be relaxed. Perhaps this doubt can be added to the branch of the Kola.
I think that in the ancient world, the phenomenon of homosexuality was well known and very widespread. The taboo on it was created under the influence of the Bible in later periods. To this day, in non-Biblical cultures, it is much more common.
In honor of Rabbi Michael Shalom,
I pray to her’ and I still have a hard time with the fact that the Torah is contrary to the nature of such a large group of the population, whose inclinations do not harm anyone (unlike sociopaths, for example) (I am not homosexual at all).
And in prayer I think about the verse “And a man shall not lie down as a woman”
And I say, Moses our Lord must have felt the souls, he did not give a Torah that contradicts the fundamental tendencies of nature. Not against the inner nature of the people of Israel. Otherwise they would not have accepted the Torah completely.
I can deny the Torah, but I still ponder.
And I wonder – Why does it say “mischav” and not “mischav”? And why does it appear at the end of the laws of incest?
Mischav? And there is only one mischav.
The sole opinion is about androgynous, but the Sages have determined that the prohibition of coming from behind on a male is learned from the word “woman”. And yet this makes the word “mischave” in the plural unnecessary.
And further, I believe that coming from behind on a woman is permitted “I prepared a table for him and turned him over”.
And further, the question arises as to why there are apparently no two kirtis for lying with his father, but only kirtis for a remembered bed.
And it seems to me that the little one, perhaps in his haste and haste, and after a slight and unconsidered study, that perhaps it is possible to excuse everything that ”mischave”is what turns all incest into incest in Parashat Kedoshim, not only will it be forbidden to reveal the incest of women, but it will also be forbidden to reveal the nakedness of a close relative (only that a woman does not sanctify the man and therefore a man may marry several wives and a woman may not marry more than one man). Therefore, it comes at the end of the sexual intercourse, and the words “mischavei isha” apply to all forbidden sexual intercourse of a woman, and therefore there is a special obligation on a sexual intercourse within the family that is distinguished from a sexual intercourse outside the family, where it is not forbidden at all. This is further clarified by the Sages’ move to learn from a woman about a man, that is, sexual intercourse of a woman.
And perhaps it is possible to cite the Mishnayot and the Gemara on this? Only those who interpreted “mischavei isha” as being in accordance with her and not in accordance with her, follow R. Simai.
And it seems to me that the Rambam ruled according to the Sages - Issurei Be'a, 1:15
[One who comes upon a male or] comes upon an androgynous person through his maleness is liable, [and if he comes upon him through his femaleness he is exempt] and the tomtum is doubtful. Therefore, coming upon the tomtum or upon an androgynous person [through his femaleness] prepares him for the plague of rebellion, and the androgynous person is permitted to marry a wife.
With thanks and blessings,
Hello,
I think I've already written to you that the prohibitions of the Torah do not necessarily depend on human nature. If there is a prohibition on homosexuality, even though it does not harm anyone, then it is a religious prohibition (even if immoral). And in any case, it is not difficult why they prohibited someone with a tendency, any more than they prohibited theft in kleptomania. The question is whether you accept the existence of immoral prohibitions in halakha or not (see my column 15).
Such a difficulty can perhaps justify choosing one interpretive option and rejecting others, but it is not a difficulty in itself.
Your interpretation of a woman's intercourse is possible, but Chazal and all the poskim did not understand it that way.
Your view of the Rambam is not clear to me. An androgynous person is exempted because he is also a woman (his feminine side) and in such a case he is only referring to his feminine side, and therefore there is no prohibition in this. He is also a man, and therefore he is permitted to marry a woman from his female side, and when he comes to her from her female side, it is because of a man's wife.
In the same place, the Rambam writes to the Hadith that there is a prohibition on anyone who comes upon a male (he does not even bring the rest of the verse “Mischave Isha”:
He who comes upon a male or brings a male upon him, since the comment states that if both were adults, they are stoned, as it is said, “And you shall not lie with a male, whether he is a virgin or a virgin.” And if the minor was nine years and one day old or older, the one who comes upon him or brings upon himself is stoned, and the minor is exempt. And if the male was nine years old or younger, both are exempt, and it is appropriate for the court to strike the major with a whipping for lying with a male, even though he is less than nine years old.
I think I have already written to you that if there is an interpretive option that can permit such an act, it is to say that the Torah forbade only those who do so because of their evil instinct and not because of their natural inclination (and it is possible to base the opposite on the words of R”M. Feinstein wrote that it is impossible that this is natural because the Torah would not prohibit it. As is your opinion, which I do not accept).
Incidentally, intercourse that is not in accordance with its manner is permitted only in the case of one's wife. In fornication and other prohibitions of intercourse, this intercourse is prohibited as much as intercourse.
I have not studied today's poskim on this subject and I assume that they do not rule as I propose.
According to what the rabbi shows, it seems that my view of the Rambam is also wrong, and I will try to delve deeper into this.
In any case, I am talking about this issue, in which it seems that the sages do follow the interpretation that I propose for the Bible (which is apparently the literal interpretation, because what is "mischabi" in plural?).
Yevamot 3:2-
Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, ar-Rabba Achva Dr. Yehuda bar Zebedee said that Rav Yehuda said that Rav: An androgynous man is liable to stoning in two places. From my point of view, Rabbi Eliezer said: An androgynous man is liable to stoning in two places, as in the case of a male, in Deut. In his memoirs, but in his females – exempt! He said that the island of Tana; Datania, Rabbi Simai says: Androgynous – He is liable to stoning from two places. From ”9 Rabbi Simai? Rava said, Bar Maduri, explain to me: And a male shall not lie down where a woman lies – Is this a male that has two layers in it? He says: This is androgynous. And Rabbi? Even on the back of a woman who has two layers – it is written male. And Rabbi, male only, from a woman? From a woman. In a woman who is not in her way, from a woman? From a woman.
That is, Rabbi Simai interprets the phrase “from a woman” from behind and in front, including androgynous.
And the sages, the Gemara asks, where do we learn about a male at all??? From a woman. And the Torah leaves us with the light of Leviticus 18, meaning that we learn about a male from the section on adultery and not just the sexual intercourse that can theoretically occur with a woman.
And a woman, a woman in the section on adultery from which we learn about a male, where do we learn that she is forbidden from her sexual intercourse? Maybe someone who comes to his sister from her sexual intercourse is not obligated to cut off her hair? This is a question that the Gemara gives the ruling on, and it also directs us to learn about a male from a woman specifically from the section on adultery and not just any woman.
However, it says “and a woman” (or واشة, see the page) including coming from behind in adultery.
And in any case, the Sages followed the simple explanation that I propose that male is learned only from adultery. This is the only way I, the little one, can interpret the issue here.
There are places where it seems that the Gemara discusses it differently. But isn't this an interesting question worth investigating, and perhaps we will find an opening to rule here according to some jurist(s) who understood it this way or exactly according to the Gemara?
—
Regarding the comparison to kleptomania, I am not familiar with the field at all. Perhaps it is possible to overcome the tendency to kleptomania as one overcomes drugs, and if a person has a desire to be whole with himself and not steal, and he sees himself as a more complete being in this way. Which is not the case with homosexuality.
There are mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. Such a person is truly not obligated by the commandments while he is truly foolish (foolish, deaf, small). Perhaps a kleptomaniac is also a compulsive person when he cannot overcome his instinct at the moment of stealing. A homosexual is not a compulsive person to live with a partner. (Perhaps only in specific moments such as when he is alone with him). Does a kleptomaniac feel the need to steal his entire life or only in a specific moment when he is compulsive? A homosexual lives with a deep need for a relationship and it is impossible to hold the dictum of compulsive person against him.
The sexual urge is at the root of a person's soul forces and he must act with it in the world in order to fulfill the commandments, and it is not rape. A homosexual can not marry a man. It is worse than rape. And it is natural.
To Rabbi Michal Shalom,
Can the Rabbi still explain to me the issue here in Yevamot P”3: ? And why, according to the Rabbi, do the Sages believe that male intercourse is forbidden between those who are not incestuous? In other words, why is the innovation I am trying to introduce, that male intercourse is forbidden only between a father and his son, two brothers, etc., not implied by the issue?
I went over the issue again tonight and saw perhaps a difference between the Shas Vilna version and the glosses of the B”H. Previously, I worked with the Shas project and did not see the glosses clearly and did not delve deeply enough.
According to the Shas Vilna version, the Sages study the entire verse “And you shall not lie with a man as he lies with a woman” for an androgynous person, when the word “male” It implies that the androgynous is forbidden only what is forbidden for a male. But how do we know about a male exclusively? From a woman. That is, from intercourse. It should be noted that the study of male prohibitions from female prohibitions is exactly the same as the verse that prohibits intercourse with a woman, and this is what the Gemara says “from a woman”. But the Gemara is meticulous in order to see what is forbidden for a woman in order to convey to a male exactly what is forbidden for a woman and asks “from a woman who is not as it should be?” Then it says ”from a woman” (meaning from a woman) so that the prohibition of coming from behind is threaded from the prohibitions of adultery for women to the prohibition of androgynousness through the study of intercourse with a male. But this is the prohibition of intercourse with a male exclusively – the study of intercourse with a woman. And in any case, we are left with the most limited range of study of intercourse with a woman. There is no study in itself about a male. There is no halacha that we have learned about a male not from a woman, even if we learn about a birth that is not like that, we learn from a woman. After all, this is the most minimal teaching in the laws of prohibition on which all laws are built.
On the other hand, the version of the New House is that the teaching is different according to the Sages, and it seems to me to be more narrow, and it is not according to the opinion of Rashi, or I really did not understand it.
The New House changes the version and says that we learn about a male and the word “and” and not from a woman. This already seems narrow because the word “and” is only a suffix for a male. If the ”male” is applied to the teaching that the androgynous is prohibited specifically from the point of view of the males in it, then the ”and”would be taught about the ”male” without the male being preceded by teaching that ”and” Does it even speak of the prohibition of sexual intercourse with a man alone? This creates a loop and->male->and->male->and->male->and->male->and->male->and->androgynous
Then according to the B'ach, it is as if the Gemara adds a sentence that is not related to the issue: "A woman who is not as a woman"; and why would the Gemara add such a sentence? Rashi himself says: "Not as a woman as a woman"? "Since I have come to you, I have come to you androgynous"; and this is not a simple sentence.
And what is more, the laws of adultery for a woman will be learned from the word "woman" in the verse about sexual intercourse with a man??
In any case, according to the version of the B”Hach, the laws of male sexual intercourse may be given in advance, even in the knowledge of the Sages in the prohibition itself, and are not necessarily learned from the laws of adultery of “female sexual intercourse”, that is, not exactly what is forbidden for women. And perhaps most of the poskim were familiar with his version and not that of the body of the Vilna Shas.
It should be emphasized that what the Sages say in the mishna “androgynus bears but does not marry” according to the understanding that I propose, is to say that he is simply considered male for the purposes of the laws of marriage, but that does not mean that he is considered adultery. After all, a woman and a woman cannot marry either, but that does not mean that they are adultery. And it should not be difficult for R’ Eliezer to continue the conditions and speak about adultery, as if he were disagreeing with the Sages who also spoke about adultery. After all, the Mishnah collects various laws (serich, tomtum...) and the Mishnah does not necessarily come to present disputes, but only implicitly, their opinions create a conflict in the Gemara itself, and the Gemara also divides the conditions between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer.
May you have a blessed and blessed Shabbat!! 🙂
Unfortunately, I won't have time for that in the coming days.
Have a good week and thanks for the answer.
Would it be more convenient if I went to the rabbi and he explained it to me verbally?
I don't think so. If you'd like - send it to me again in about a week.
To the honorable Rabbi, Shalom.
I thought the Rabbi might be busy before Rosh Hashanah, so I'm sending again now. Please, if the Rabbi could answer whether it is implied from the issue according to Shas Vilna that the sages on this issue believed that female intercourse is all the intercourse specified in the types of incestuous relatives that are valid for male relatives, since in a male there is only one intercourse, and this is apparently the simplest, as I detailed in the above email.
Thank you very much in advance,
Shalom Rav.
1. First, the version of the Bible that is learned from ”and” does not necessarily contradict the breakdown before us. It only explains why a male is likened to a female, because the Torah itself writes “and a male shall not lie down on a woman's bed”, meaning that it contradicted the male that should not be lain down like a woman. Even according to the Bible, this is still learned from a woman, but the word “and”is what commands us to do this.
2. The word “lay down” is taught in the Gemara according to all opinions (!) about an androgynous man who has two beds, and not as you suggest. Our rabbis (=Rabbi) also teach it this way, except that in their opinion it is written male, and therefore even someone who has two beds is forbidden to lie down only on his male. That is, according to their view, the word “mishchabi” is interpreted as Rabbi Simai interpreted it to refer to an androgynous person who has two layers. The debate is only about what is forbidden to do with such a person (from two places or only in his maleness).
This is also proven by the Hadiya in the Gemara, since it makes it difficult for the Rabbi to learn from where they learn otherwise than in a woman. Why not learn from “mishchabi”? Because according to him, “mishchabi” also deals with an androgynous person who has two layers, and not in a woman or a male. That is, according to the Rabbi, the word “mishchabi” is not interpreted to refer to a male, as you suggest, who has several layers (according to the types of kinship).
3. In essence, only the form of intercourse is learned from a woman (which is from two places), but not the persons involved (which is only in a male who is a virgin). Otherwise, you would also renew the prohibition of a man's wife in a male who is married to another homosexual, because according to your opinion, this should be learned from a virgin's wife?! This is unreasonable, and in any case it is clear that you will not find poskim who will support this (so it is a shame to look). The simplicity, as understood by the Gemara and all poskim, is that the prohibition applies to every male, and the comparison to a woman is that the bringing of a male is like all the fornications of women, and therefore the form of bringing is like that of them. And this is the rule everywhere: “adn minya wa minya wa oki ista” (even when learning from context A to context B, this is still applied according to the relevant circumstances in context B, and not copy-pasted from A to B).
Either way, beyond the interpretive question in the Torah and Gemara, on a practical level this discussion is worthless. You will not find a single rabbi who supported or will support this, and therefore salvation will not come from here.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
