Gifts from the poor who were able to get rich

A. Thank you
B1. Could you please clarify why, according to the Torah, he is not considered to be lacking a finger?
B2. Thank you very much. I would like to ask something a little vague – Is it clear that he is not entitled because he is rich and there is no interest in the spiritual definitions of his wealth but in practical definitions of whether he can buy himself food and the like. Or is he always poor beyond measure but it is an external law that since he can enrich himself, he is prohibited from giving gifts to the poor.

B1. I didn't understand.
B2. I don't see any point in this argument.

B1. In the Torah, he is permitted to do the deed and become rich, and therefore, in the Torah's perspective of giving to the poor, he is like someone who decided on his own not to lift a finger and become rich. Is there evidence that the Torah recognizes the barriers created by the prohibitions of the rabbis? Or is there no need for evidence?

For example. His father told him to bring me a cup of tea. There is one cup of tea for free, but to get to it you have to go through a rabbinical prohibition. There is another cup of tea that costs a thousand shekels. The father has no money. And let's assume that honoring a father is only a father's example. Does the son say that I cannot go through a rabbinical prohibition, I don't have to pay a thousand shekels, therefore I don't have to serve any cup of tea. Or from the perspective of the Torah, he must go and bring the free cup of tea. And what he himself has a problem with a rabbinical prohibition is his problem, and therefore by virtue of this rabbinical prohibition he will have to go and bring the cup that costs a thousand.

No evidence is needed. The barrier here is measured on the factual level, not the halakhic level. Just as a person's stumbling in a rabbinical prohibition is before a blind man from Torah, because he is a horse that has stumbled in something harmful. Likewise, the Gemara in Shavuot 18 (and Bar-Shabbat 18 there) states that if a man comes to his wife near her period and she sees blood, it is an accident and not rape, even though the rabbinical prohibitions are true.

[ Is a person's failure to comply with a rabbinical prohibition a prohibition from the Torah? I saw an entry on Wikiyshiva before the Torah that the Tosafots' opinion on the celebration of 18.45 that it is not a prohibition from the Torah. But I looked there and the evidence from the Tosafots seems dubious to me.
The Tosafots write there that work on Chol HaMoed is rabbinical. The Gemara in 7:22 says that a person's failure to comply with a rabbinical prohibition on Chol HaMoed is rabbinical. And this bothered the Tosafots. This means that the Tosafots understand that there is no rabbinical prohibition before the Torah. This is apparently what the Wikiyshiva understood.
But from the Tosafots' excuse, it seems that this is not what bothered them. The Tosafots excuse that work on Chol HaMoed is indeed rabbinical, but it has support from the Torah and the Sadducees/Kutites admit it. And it is apparently not understood how this reconciles. After all, it is a rabbinical prohibition, and yet there is no pre-Ior, and who cares if the Sadducees admit it. Therefore, it seems that the Tosafot understood that if the Hittites think that the rabbinical prohibition is nothing and that in their opinion it is a complete permission, then there is no pre-Ior in it. Therefore, they were made difficult in the Gemara. And to this they will settle that the Hittites admit that this rabbinical prohibition is truly forbidden, but that the Hittite may fail in his work on Chol HaMoed. Therefore, there is a pre-Ior in it.
If anything, I would learn from the Tosafot a beautiful innovation that there is no pre-Ior in a place where the other believes according to the law that this is permitted even if in my opinion he is wrong. But never mind that the stumbling block of the rabbinical prohibition is for someone who admits that the rabbinical prohibitions are binding, for he is transgressing the pre-Ior of the Torah.]

This is clear as a matter of interpretation, regardless of the sources. If you mislead a person with bad advice, it is a Torah prohibition, but a rabbinical prohibition does not detract from bad advice. And so it is stated in Ramah Yod regarding witnesses to a loan involving interest who pass through a blind person (and simply this is from the Torah).
Although the early scholars apparently disagreed on this in 7:22, עד טודה טיפוק. See there the Ramban and the Rân. But I saw Rabbi Yitzchak Reimon say in Toto that it is only here that the one who passes knows that there is a prohibition in this. But when he does not know, then it is clear that there is a Torah prohibition here. See his words here: http://asif.co.il/?wpfb_dl=1439 Section E.

Regarding the beautiful innovation you brought, see Ritva Sukkah 10 Eb in detail, and Rashi on the issue of Chulin 11 "I have mercy on Abba bar Abba" mentioned in the aforementioned Ritva. And in explanation of his words in my article “Is Halacha Pluralistic”: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%90-%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%99%D7%AA

How wonderful this place is! I have studied all of the above and I am impressed.

A. Rabbi Rimon's opinion there (that if the transgressor knows that there is a rabbinical prohibition in this, then the rabbinic prohibition is only one of the rabbis) I do not know what totoch you found in it and it is nothing but a tīma (and especially the Netivot that a mistake in the rabbinic prohibition is nothing. Although the Kots are really rebelling against the authority of the Sages. And there is pepper). But I will write to Kamen a similar opinion in the Ritva, and it is indeed an understandable opinion.

B. The opinion of the Ritva is that the one who believes it is permissible can extend it to his friend who believes it is forbidden, provided that he knows. And you have taken it to the words of a monist who recognizes autonomy. And after all, this is a matter that is difficult to accept if not necessarily finished in an explicit Gemara what it means to recognize the autonomy of an error that commits an offense against the will of God Almighty.
But this should be understood in a somewhat similar but different way and according to Rabbi Rimon's reasoning. Autonomy makes this a complete permission, since if a person trusts his own opinion, then it is a complete permission for him and God does not come in a dispute with His creatures and may He not be allowed to do so because he believes that it is truly permissible according to the Halacha. But when he does not know (and not that he knows that it is permissible), then he is like the rest of the wrongdoers. In other words, there is indeed one monistic truth, but autonomy also makes other opinions equally true. And there is never any tzaddik to help his friend transgress a prohibition, in my opinion.
And from now on, since the guests see that the noyim are excessive. So if they believe that it is forbidden, then they will not sleep. And if the rabbis have praised them and believe that it is permissible, then they will sleep. And to fear that the Tzantseret Dadhava will fail to transgress this prohibition is not to be expected (just as it is permissible to hand someone a glass of water on Shabbat and not to be expected to run to the garden and water seeds).
It is not clear to me what you mean by the article there - does autonomy make it permissible and then from the perspective of the Holy One, he is exactly the same as me (I follow the true monistic law) and then I just repeated what you said there, or did he indeed fail in the prohibition and make a mistake in the higher worlds and strike his soul with a severe plague and the Divine Presence cries out, "Take me from my head, take me from my arm, and the angels of peace, may they weep and may they tremble and be seized," but there is value from the side that your mouth will bless us in the name of autonomy, for which we will absorb all the corruptions in the world.

(By the way, I read the article you referred to on pluralism in Halacha once. And that's probably why it was easy for me to think like this, in the Tosafot in the celebration that it is permissible to extend to the one who believes it is permissible. And I even felt that there was something important here, but I didn't dwell on its nature. And now that the matter and its significant implications are all there in the article, I understand in retrospect where the ideas in my head came from so easily, supposedly from myself, and the feeling that I felt supposedly from myself, etc.).

And no, in all this, regarding autonomy, committing a moral offense, such as autonomy to eat meat. If autonomy in Halacha is because God forgives and permits the one who believes it is permissible (as I suggested), then there is no place for autonomy in morality (and I do believe so. Granting autonomy is a lazy, utilitarian, anti-value and evil agreement, even though without it the life of the world is not life). And if because there is a real value in the name of autonomy, then even in morality there is no supreme conscious entity who can forgive one's desires, etc., there is still room for autonomy.

I think I have explained everything and answered everything, and they are simple and necessary things. I will comment a little on your words:
1. Your opinion is simple, that a rabbi does not hate an offense from advice that is unfair.
2. And none of this has to do with the Netiya, when the one who causes a stumbling block intentionally and the one who is stumbled is by mistake, then this is an offense against stumbling in the way of the Rambam, including hybrids and parallels. And as is known, there are many who disagree about the Netiya.

3. Autonomy in morality is generally a strange discussion, since a moral offense has consequences for others, and what place does autonomy have in this?
4. Your statement in the Ritva that there is no fear that they will intentionally fail in the prohibition, is certainly not the opinion of the Ritva himself, who learned from this a general law within the limits of failing others and did not limit it only to the righteous.

Nothing is simple and certainly not a decision. I don't know what the color of purple cabbage is without seeing the Rabbinical Council in the answer. I don't understand these words.

1-2. Rabbi Rimon says that if the one who fails intentionally then the obstacle crosses the line of the rabbinic law and if the one who fails is by mistake then the obstacle crosses the line of the Torah. What is simple in this explanation and what is complicated in it? God has solutions.
4. The Ritva writes there: “Here precisely because the prohibition is obvious to his companion and it is not reasonable for him not to be able to”. There is no compelling reason to interpret that if he fears that his companion will be tempted and stumble and eat even though it is not reasonable for him, then it is forbidden to offer. And he is as I said.

And from what I see in Rambam, Chapter 11, Halacha No. 1, this is not relevant to the matter, but it is.

On second thought, I understand that your interpretation of Ritva is better. Although it bothers me why he didn't interpret what I said. Thank you and sorry.