God Plays Dice – Chapter 1‎‎

There is a wrong assumption in your words at the conceptual level. It is a mixing of the existing with the desired. The question is not whether this is a rational choice, but whether there is a binding value here. What you are proposing is what is called a “naturalistic explanation” of morality, that is, basing it on facts. But the entire position of morality on facts (in your case: its contribution to the survival of society is a fact) is a fallacy, which is commonly called the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ A naturalistic explanation explains how a certain tendency came to be in us (evolution created in us a tendency to do good), but it does not explain why it is binding. Think of a person who acts immorally. What can you argue against him? That he does not obey the tendencies that exist within him. That he does not contribute to the survival of society? So what? There are many tendencies within me and I do not obey all of them. Why does the fact that there is a tendency within me oblige me to act according to it? This is again a naturalistic fallacy, because the existence of the tendency is a fact, and a fact does not create a norm. And if you argue to him that he does not contribute to the survival of society, he will ask you why there is an obligation to contribute to the survival of society (especially if it is against my survival, or at my expense)? You are introducing some value here through the back door, and you have no justification for it (not even a naturalistic justification). I explained the connection to God in a debate with Prof. David Enoch, which is described in columns 456-457 , on the website. There you can also find a link to the frontal discussion between us.