God’s titles

When you claim that there is a division between the phenomenon, the question is whether when I say this borrowed word is a statement that says something about the cause/substances or is it a statement that says something consequentially, and I will illustrate: For the sake of the matter, when I say about a shining moon and a shining sun, I said two different things, because if I used the same concept causally, I did not talk about how they shine, but consequentially, before my eyes there is light. My question is whether when you say positive content, you mean also at the substance level or at the result level. This seems to me to be the distinction of Maimonides, since he says he knows but not in opinion, can and not in ability. In other words, a categorical distinction between cause and effect. At the substance level, there is no knowledge.
Second point, according to your claim that it is possible to say positive content about God, even if I claim that the relationship between sweetness and light is different because of the positive content that exists for us in both. When I speak of a completely different dimension, a supreme being who does not depend on causes, as opposed to the universe which depends on cause, is the reality of God categorically different from ours, since He is the cause of Himself and is the source of every idea we try to conceive of? Isn't it a mistake to speak in positive terms?

I can't define a self-evident statement. When you say about someone that they are good, is that a self-evident statement? What is there in it beyond the fact that there is something in them that makes them behave well? I think that can also be said about the Almighty.
Regarding the second question, I have already answered it. Are you asking if I meant what I wrote? Surprisingly, yes.

In light of the above, even the Maimonides agrees that positive adjectives can be used, since he himself says, “knows and not in opinion, can and not in ability.”* In other words, he also makes a distinction between the noumena and the phenomenon.
And it seems that the only reason he objects to this is because of the error that may arise from not distinguishing between the substance and the phenomenon. If so, there is no concrete argument between the Rabbi and the Maimonides.
Do you agree?
*Moreh Nevuchim, Part 1, Chapter 57.

I am not engaged in interpreting the words of Maimonides, and in order to offer such an interpretation, one must examine all of his words there, which I have not studied. I have briefly explained my position here.

1. According to Kant, is there a connection between the noumena and the phenomenon?
2. What adjectives can be said about it, is it any adjective?

1. Obviously. The noumena generates the phenomenon. The properties of the table itself, when they meet in my consciousness, receive a cognitive representation (visual and/or other). A different noumena would generate a different phenomenon (in the same consciousness, of course).
2. I did not make an organized list, but its titles are written in the Torah: God is merciful and gracious, in particular good, wise, etc. I cannot think of any title that cannot be attributed to it and for which the doctrine of negations is needed. There are titles that are not correct for it (such as not omnipotent, finite, evil, etc.). But it is difficult for me to think of titles that are correct for it in the negative sense only.

There is clearly a division between the phenomenon and the noun, the question
Is it still possible to perceive something in essence or not?
In your lessons (negation of the attributes) you try to argue that when I negate the attributes from the divine entity I receive something and I ask in which part? Is it in the phenomenon or in the noun? If in the noun, I would be happy to explain.
And as for you claiming that from the beginning God can be characterized with positive attributes, am I able to perceive something in essence?
If so, how? After all, will not all abstraction be sufficient to perceive something that is outside the definitions?

Introduction.
There is a misunderstanding of the Kantian distinction here (common among Kant's interpreters, but in my opinion they are wrong). It is not correct to say that it is impossible to perceive the object itself. Of course it is possible, but this perception is formulated in terms of properties (the phenomenon). When you see a red object, you have perceived something in it itself, but this something appears to you as the color red. This is not an inability to perceive the noumena. This is what is called perceiving the noumena. There is no perception without a drawing of it in terms of properties. On the other hand, asking you to tell me what you perceived in the noumena in terms of words is actually asking for a phenomenal description of this perception. There is no description of what I perceived in the noumena per se. Not because it is impossible but because it is not defined. A description of a thing always refers to its phenomenon.

And now for Maimonides.
As I understand it, Maimonides wants to argue that even if you negate attributes from the phenomenon of something, sometimes some perception still arises in its noumena. But asking to put it into words is essentially asking to give us a phenomenal description of it, which is of course an oxymoron. After all, we are dealing with a perception of the noumena that has no phenomenal translation, otherwise there would be no need for the doctrine of negation of adjectives.
I will state again that I tend to think that there is nothing real in this. I do not think that negation of adjectives leaves a perception in the noumena for all sorts of reasons, but here you asked for an explanation of what Maimonides is aiming at. I think that is what he is aiming at.