Good morning, ten two.

Hello Rabbi!
I had a few thoughts that I would be happy if the rabbi could go over in his spare time, but due to the length of the matter, if the rabbi doesn’t have time, then no big deal.
 
I thought that on the surface, the analytical division the rabbi makes between substantive authority and formal authority is a bit misleading, and I will explain with four examples:
 
There is a mitzvah to judge fairly. And seemingly incomprehensible, do we have to deceive ourselves? The simple answer is that the mitzvah includes two parts:
A) Stop, and bring up options that present the act in a different light, just as we would be happy for them to do to us. (=seek justice)
b) If there is one, act as if the interpretation is correct (or at least, as if it is perhaps the correct interpretation). Do not respond angrily: “What do you mean you don’t have pillows and blankets?! I worked for you for seven years!” But rather roll up your sleeves and walk away. (= to judge fairly)
It is likely that this will also determine our internal relationship to the other, because usually after actions, hearts are drawn . If we were right – great. And if not? It is better than making a mistake in the other direction.
 
The same goes for the prohibition of slander. If the Jewish Court declared a person to be wicked, it is permissible to treat him as such. But even the Jewish Court can make mistakes?! (Sanhedrin 33: Horiyot 2.) And then maybe we will just cause injustice to an honest person? But because we are in doubt, we are permitted to act as if it is true.
 
If all of this is true, one can understand a serious issue in the second page of the fifth chapter. Rabbi Abel disagreed with Abaye and Rava whether or not “it is certain that no one breaks his promise within his time” and the halakha was ruled by Rabbi Abel. And the latter questioned, what is the point of establishing a halakha on a realistic question? (And how did the Gemara try to simplify it from the tenets?)
Indeed, some of the latter (I think their faces light up and more) will argue that the dispute is a matter of presumption – what majority is needed to establish a presumption, and link it to the issue of their feelings for the minority.
But in my opinion, the simple excuse is that there is a doubt here that is very difficult to clarify, given how common it is for a person to break his own rules. Therefore, according to the law, the BID acts as if this is truly very rare, since accepting the Talmud includes accepting that we should act (as long as we do not know otherwise) as if the Rabbis were right.
 
In other words, in situations of doubt, although on a philosophical level the Sages do not (and as the Rabbi says, “cannot”) have authority in matters of fact, from a practical point of view they do.
 
This whole process leads us to the issue of “Tev Lemitev Ten Do.” Clearly, this assumption was made based on observation. It is difficult to assume that Ral would have said it without knowing any women. But here we have two possibilities:
1) This is a psychological-behavioral diagnosis that is quite powerful for its time and place.
2) Perhaps the Sages also learned this from the Bible itself – as Rabbi Soloveitchik believes (“Adam and His House,” page 130, and also a bit at the end of the article “Marriage.” In “This Is Sinai,” it is a bit too concise…) – and they linked this distinction to the verse “And your desire shall be for your husband,” and to the ontological difference between man and woman that is reflected in the story of creation, from Kabbalah, and from other places in Halacha.
According to the second approach, if one day gender science becomes as precise as natural science and it turns out that there are no innate mental differences between men and women (except for linguistic skills – in which women have a statistical advantage), then we can say that the sages were probably wrong in assuming that this is an ontological difference, and also in their interpretation of the Bible. But as long as we are in doubt, we act as if the sages were right.
 
Again I thought it all depends on what a person is.
The rabbi is a doctor of physics with knowledge in extensive fields and also knows the Torah straight and upside down, so many things are clear to him.
If someone comes and claims that he knows almost nothing about reality-as-it-is, but only about the way-he-perceives-it; but he has taken upon himself the Talmud (as he perceives it), and therefore even if the rabbi says that the right is the left, he acts as if she is right – then we probably won’t be able to convince him otherwise, but at most help him discover that he himself doesn’t believe it.
And most of us are somewhere in between. “God said to dwell in the mist” – as the Hasidim say, in this world that resembles a mist. We devote ourselves to our beloved and do not ask ourselves whether she exists, we honor our parents and do not wonder if we were switched at birth. But there are many things we do not know – is there or is not a guardian of the naked? Who is right, the kashrut bodies that do not grant kosher to wraps on Passover even to those who eat legumes (because wheat always gets mixed in along the way), or the kashruts that allow even those who abstain from legumes (because the means of choice are good enough)? Is the poor person who asks me for charity a fraud, and should I donate only to “Bells” or “The Rabbinical Committee for Charity Affairs”? Etc., etc.
 
Note: Throughout the discussion, I ignored the possibility that the Chazal have substantial authority in assessing reality on the part of “the secret of the Lord to those who fear Him and His covenant to make known to them” (Sotah 4), because I assume that the Rabbi himself disagrees with this factual determination, and Rabbi Soloveitchik himself (to the best of my knowledge) does not use this argument.
 
I would be very happy to know whether the Rabbi agrees with some of the things.
All the best and thank you.