Halacha and Morality: Are there moral imperatives in the Torah?
Good morning,
A post was posted on the “Young Rabbi” blog regarding whether there are moral imperatives in the Torah, and this is what it says:
The second part of the third book in Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham’s trilogy, “Walking Among the Standing”, deals with “Halacha and Morality: A Double Commitment”. In the fifth chapter, “Halacha and Morality”, he discusses cases in which there is a contradiction between Halacha and Morality. For example: not saving a Gentile on Shabbat. The questions he asks are (p. 79): “Is it possible that the Torah is not moral? What would someone who is committed to both Halacha and Morality do in these cases? Is it even possible to be seriously committed to both these systems?”
The believing Jew may relate to morality in one of three ways:
1. To see Halacha as the true representation of morality.
2. There is really no such thing as morality that we are committed to, we are only committed to Halacha.
3. “Normative duality.” That is, we are obligated to both morality and law, and both are God’s will.
According to the first approach, we will have to find explanations that explain how it is nevertheless moral not to save a Gentile on the Sabbath, or to wipe out the seed of Amalek, etc.
But beyond that, it is not clear how the Torah can command “and do what is good and right.” According to this approach, is there something good and right that is not part of the law and the Torah itself? Commandments of this type teach us that there is a “good and right” that is universal, and the religious commandment merely adds to it.
This question is also difficult for those who advocate the second method. Beyond that, how can God, the Holy One, complain to Cain about the murder of Abel, or how can one be a villain under the authority of the Torah?
According to the third approach, there are moral principles that all beings in the world are commanded to follow, and beyond them there are religious commandments whose existence has additional purposes.
According to this approach, when there is a mitzvah that is not moral, there is no difficulty here, but rather a religious principle that states that sometimes the moral principle must be rejected in favor of another principle.
But according to this approach, one must ask why the Torah commands commandments that are moral commandments? For example, the prohibition of murder is a moral obligation. If the commandments of the Torah are a system of laws parallel to the moral principles that all beings in the world are obligated to, what is the need for the Torah to also command moral principles?
You can read Rabbi Michael Avraham’s response in the attached image.
According to him, Halacha does not deal with the moral aspect of the commandment/prohibition, but rather with the Halacha aspect, which is added to the moral aspect.
In the chapter’s conclusion, the author writes as follows (p. 100):
“We have seen that the correct model for the relationship between halakha and morality is a picture of normative duality. In this picture, halakha of type A are also categorically distinguished from the moral commandments that correspond to them. I explained that the commandment not to murder is the addition of a religious dimension to the moral prohibition. It could be argued that this is a commandment that has other purposes, beyond the moral one. The moral prohibition of murder has a moral purpose, while the halakhic prohibition has some religious purposes. But it is very reasonable to say that the reason for the religious prohibition is also moral, except that the halakhic commandment comes to add a religious dimension to the moral prohibition itself. The religious dimension added in the commandment is the command itself and the demand for obedience. The Torah seeks to add a religious command to the moral prohibition of murder.”
This is a summary of Rabbi Michael Avraham’s words.
Things didn’t sit well with me.
First, why not simply say that the Torah does indeed command moral commandments as well (it does not determine what is moral, but rather commands moral commandments, such as you shall not murder or steal, and also religious commandments, such as Shabbat, kashrut, and ablution)? This is similar to the Book of Laws, which also determines moral prohibitions as illegal, but does not determine what is moral and what is not. On the other hand, the Book of Laws also does not determine everything immoral as legally prohibited.
Even in the law book, there is a difference between the moral and the limit that can be legally enforced. Again, I see no difference here between the discussion of halacha and the same discussion that can be held about the law.
Beyond that, the answer given by Rabbi Michael Avraham is not at all understandable. According to him, morality is the will of God, and a mitzvah is the command of God. But what is the practical meaning of the fact that I have violated both the will of God and the command of God? What is the meaning of that religious aspect that joins the universal moral aspect? Does it even have any meaning?
Source: http://ravtzair.blogspot.com/2021/01/blog-post.html?m=1
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=3712785235411486&id=237561492933895
Hello.
I divided the halakha into three categories: “moral” laws, “anti-moral” laws, and “immoral” laws. I argued that the three categories are not related to morality but rather serve to achieve religious goals. As far as I understand, he only disagrees with my statement regarding the first category. This is, in my opinion, the smaller innovation in my words, and I am glad that the rest is agreed upon. But on this point too, I think the author is wrong, as I will explain.
In my book, I presented two types of reasoning regarding this category: 1. There is no need to command moral laws if we know this even without the command, and especially if God expects it from us even without the command (cf. Cain and Abel). It is not for nothing that “and you shall do what is right and good” – the expectation that we should act morally – is not counted among the mitzvot of any of the mitzvot. 2. The boundaries of the “moral” mitzvot do not correspond to morality. For example, in discussions about murder, there is a narrower and closer approach to the matter in the case of fire and the end of the heat to come, and so on. In the case of harm, there is an exemption of grama, etc. All of these are irrelevant on the moral level. And is it true that someone who murdered with his left hand or grama is a lesser offender than someone who murdered with his hands? There is no difference. In both cases, he intended to murder and committed an act that took a life. The difference is only formal. My argument is that grama is only a halakhic exemption, but the moral evil is still present (meaning that there is no religious offense here, but only a moral one). Although a person who causes harm in a grama is exempt according to human law and obligated according to the laws of heaven, this is itself a distinction within the halakhic category. A person who causes harm in a grama is a moral evil just like a person who causes harm in his hands. It is not without reason that the Meiri wrote in the name of the author of the Shlomah that the obligation in the hands of heaven in the issue of a grama does not mean that there is a prohibition, but rather that there is an obligation to pay, but that it is in the hands of heaven and not in the law of God. According to my method, this is interpreted perfectly: it is a moral obligation, and therefore is not collected in the law of God.
And two comments on what the reviewer himself wrote:
- He claims that even in the law book there is a difference between the limit beyond which one must be obligated and the limit beyond which one is simply not desirable. But the differences in halacha do not coincide with each other. After all, no law book is exempted from a grama? It is no less problematic than a harm to the hands, and therefore I do not see why it should not be obligatory? What limit is not crossed here? Not to mention a murderer in a grama or in preventing one from leaving the water and the fire, etc.
- The author claims that the Torah itself has moral goals. But this is no different from what I wrote. I will translate: Immoral acts also have a problem from a religious perspective. What is the difference between these statements? In the end, you have violated God’s command beyond the moral problem in this. The author himself says that the Torah added a command, meaning that a moral principle without a command was not a command, and the command turned it into a command (do or not). This is exactly what I am saying.
Regarding the question at the end, is there a nefm between the two types of problems? I also answered this: In those situations where there is only a moral and not a religious problem (robbing a Gentile, murder, or damaging a grama) there is still a prohibition. As Rabbi Shkop wrote, robbing a Gentile is completely forbidden by all opinions on the moral level. Breaking a written oath (which was not a miracle) is completely forbidden without a command. And of course there is a nefm to the question of punishment (the punishment is given for the religious offense only, and is there evidence that we are not punished for situations where there is only a moral problem, as I demonstrated above). But beyond that, why should there be a nefm? The Torah tells us that this is the truth: that there is both a moral and a religious problem in these acts.
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