Halacha and Morality: Following the Discussion with Yaron Yadan
Hello Rabbi Michael.
Following the discussion, I thought I would ask you about the categorical division you make between halakha and morality. For this purpose, I think it is necessary to divide the discussion into two components:
1. The theory itself regarding the categorical division – that is, the very claim that it is possible for God to command religious values, separate from the moral values learned from conscience, and to ask for two separate normative categories.
2. The question of whether the Torah indeed constitutes a case of a separate normative category that is not morality.
That is, it is certainly possible to agree with 1 (which is possible and coherent) but still not the case with the Torah (i.e., not agree with 2). In my opinion, most of the questions directed at you concern the first level of the discussion. Questions like: Why didn’t he also command morality? What will you do when there is a contradiction? And so on and so forth. In my opinion, you answer them satisfactorily, and show convincingly how this conceptual structure is indeed coherent and logical.
However, in my opinion, the central question is not only whether it is possible for a Torah to be given that does not convey moral values, but whether this is the case in the Torah before us. And in my humble opinion, it is very difficult to read the Torah and understand it in this way. I believe that a straightforward reading of the Torah shows that these are commandments that come to effect a moral correction (or moral advancement) of society.
There are two reasons for this:
1. Style – The language of the Torah often describes the commandments in a figurative, emotional, and moral way. There are many expressions that justify the commandments in this way: “Is man a tree of the field, that he should come before you in a siege?”, “For he is his covering alone, his garment for his skin, wherewith he shall lie down, and it shall come to pass, that he cry unto me, and I have heard that I am gracious,” “And thou shalt not oppress a stranger: and ye knew the soul of a stranger, because ye were strangers in the land of Egypt,” “Her first husband, which sent her away, shall not be able to take her again to be his wife after she is defiled: for that is an abomination before the Lord, and ye shall not make the land sin…”, “And unto a boy [or to a girl] thou shalt do nothing: for a boy [or to a girl] shall not sin by death: for when a man riseth up against his neighbor, and slayeth a soul, so is this matter,” and so on. A straightforward reading of the Torah seems to show that it constitutes a moral manifesto. If it were a question of detached and abstract laws that stand on their own, I would expect a completely different style.
2. Correspondence with present-day customs – The disconnection of the Torah from morality (and indeed from any realistic and human context) leads to the expectation that the halakha will constitute timeless laws that are disconnected from cultural norms of a particular time. For example, if there is a religious value in wearing a red garment every Monday, this value should not be related to this or that current fashion. In other words, I expect that it was true even before the creation of the world. But if by chance this value was given in a period when this was the accepted color (or alternatively, it was accepted among infidels to wear the “enemy” of red – blue) this makes this perception very difficult.
And indeed, the Torah often comes as a response to the customs of the period in which it was given. That is, there is a custom X, and the Torah commands to do X in a modified manner or alternatively Y, which is exactly what X became as a response to it. The archaeological knowledge we have today powerfully reveals this matter to us and shows that there is clearly a counterpoint to the existing culture here (Prof. Yehoshua Berman’s book “I Believe” illustrates this, among other things).
Another point is that in some of the Torah’s commandments, it is actually based on existing practice. For example, in the verses describing divorces, it is stated: “If a man takes a wife and her husband, and it happens that she does not please him because he finds some kind of sexual misconduct in her, then he writes her a certificate of divorce and gives it in her hand and sends her out of the house,” while the Torah mentions the institution of marriage along the way as something that is self-evident. How do those marriages exist? – It is clear that there was an accepted practice for this in that generation, and the Torah takes it for granted. It only renews the law regarding divorce from such a relationship (and in fact, not even regarding the divorce itself, but only regarding the restriction on returning to the first husband after marrying a second one). In these cases, the Torah is merely an extension of existing practice and does not command a “tabula rasa.”
In light of these facts, it is clear that the Torah comes against the backdrop of a particular culture – which it attempts to shape and change. But if the Torah presented detached halachic principles, we would not expect to find such cases.
Here is an example of this: Let’s assume that there is an abstract religious principle in the existence of a tabernacle, in its details, and that it precedes the act of Genesis. Is it likely that that tabernacle – even before the creation of the world – would have the same proportions as the battle camp of Ramesses II? Of course not. But what, that is what happens. In other words, it turns out that all the verses of the details of the tabernacle do not constitute abstract halakhic principles that preceded the world, but rather are in full correspondence with the reality of ancient Egypt.
In my opinion, from these two arguments, the simple understanding is that the Torah came against a certain cultural background that it is trying to improve/change, etc. It does not seem to have come to posit a set of abstract, new, and independent principles. It is unlikely that those very principles happen to be such an accurate reflection of cultural customs that existed at that time.
In conclusion, I would like to add thanks for the anticipated and instructive debate (is it perhaps possible to transcribe the arguments that arose in the last 10 minutes?).
I would love to hear your opinion on what was said.
Thank you and have a good day.
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- All such reasoning should be examined on its merits. It has already been noted, and I have also noted, that there is a good fit between morality and halacha, even though these are independent categories. God created His world in such a way that the provisions of halacha would correspond to moral goals. But this cannot always be done. And yet these are two different categories. Now, people can be encouraged to act by virtue of moral motivations even if the purpose of the act is religious. Like telling a child that if he does something he will receive a candy, but the purpose of the command is not the candy, of course. Language such as “abomination” or “thou shalt make the land sin” are not necessarily moral. I have argued this several times in the context of homosexuality (the term “abomination” is discussed in the Vows, and receives an immoral explanation). As mentioned above, an exemption from rape is not necessarily based on a moral consideration. When a person who is raped is not the one who acted, he does not deserve punishment anyway. This is as true in halacha as it is in morality. And sometimes the Torah speaks about something that is not halakhic, and there, of course, moral considerations and claims will appear. And so it is with this path.
- The application of Halacha is a function of circumstances. Therefore, the applications of eternal instructions can be different. Look here for the parable of the swimsuits and I expanded on it in the series of columns on modern Orthodoxy. For you, even if the Torah speaks in the language of its contemporaries, it can be interpreted and applied differently in our day. Beyond that, I have often argued that when there are several interpretive options, the choice between them can be made based on moral considerations. I also explained that this is not necessarily because the moral direction is the right one, but also because, all things being equal, why not choose the moral solution even if it is not necessarily the right one.
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Thank you very much for your answer.
1. Note that there is a difference between a justification for an action from the perspective of the reward or result of the action (“sweets”) and a justification from the perspective of its own value. The Torah can bring motivations of reward and punishment, but this does not say anything about the type of value (but only constitutes a motivation to perform it). But in cases of the type I have presented, the justification is simply the explanation of the value itself – from a moral point of view (i.e. why it is appropriate or inappropriate to behave in this or that way).
Regarding this, you explain that there may be an overlap between the two types of values, and that in such a situation the Torah uses moral motivation to cause the action to be performed. This raises the question of what the point of moral motivation is in general.
After all, if the moral attitude towards the action is clear and known, then why is this motivation needed? (One could make it more difficult and ask why even mention a halakhic mitzvah that overlaps with a moral commandment, since I know about it only from the moral aspect. But here one could also excuse it by adding to my knowledge that it is also halakhic, and that halakhic may differ from morality in certain aspects. But as for the motivation, it is not clear what the innovation is.) On the other hand: If it was not clear to the people of that generation, for example, that there is a moral problem with a certain act, then what is the motivation here? They do not recognize this value at all.
Rather, the reasonable explanation seems to be that the Torah came to teach them that there is a moral issue in this, and therefore it uses such language. And we do know, according to knowledge of the ancient world, that the mitzvot did constitute a huge moral leap in relation to what was accepted at the time. In other words, it is clear that there was a renewal of values for the Jewish people (and the entire world) here, and therefore it is impossible to say that these values came only to provide motivation - after all, they were not known and recognized.
2. Note that I am not talking about the application or the language, but rather the body of the law. I will mention again the example I gave from the Tabernacle. It is clear that its dimensions are a direct counterpoint to Ramesses II. That is, all the verses that deal with the dimensions of the Tabernacle are only in this context (and apparently in another context they would be different, if there was a Tabernacle at all). Therefore, it is impossible to say that all the laws of the Tabernacle uphold abstract and independent religious values in the world. They came to combat an existing cultural phenomenon, and this was clear to the people of that generation who saw the culture of ancient Egypt as their enemy. Here it is very difficult to say that ”by chance” it turned out that the proportions were the same.
You are right that these insights raise questions about the eternity of the Torah, and you are right that the disconnect strengthens eternity. But this does not concern the discussion itself. I claim that both from the language and from archaeological knowledge it is seen that the Torah is relative to the period / constitutes a moral improvement, etc. This is a factual claim. Maybe it means that it is not eternal and maybe not, but the data cannot be ignored because they constitute one question or another. In other words, I am not asking what is more elegant and coherent, but what is more evident.
I feel like I've answered everything. I don't really know what to add here.
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