Halachic embarrassment
Hello Rabbi. I am completely discouraged. Recently I have come across many different halachic rulings and it feels to me that the halachic is simply inconsistent. In contrast to the period of the Tannaim, when the Torah was quite small and each Tanna had a fairly reasonable possibility of developing a consistent set of rules of demand across the entire Torah, today about half of the answers (mainly those from the “Second Order”) feel to me like a reliance on the judge’s gut – I have not come across any indicator that holds water (in terms of consistency with sources + consistency) for when it is appropriate to be strict and when it is possible to be lenient.
After all, if the halachic rules of spikit between poskim create a halachic reality (which many rabbis think, although it is puzzling. After all, in the rulings we see that even the Sanhedrin does not do this), there is no reason to ever be strict about the question of spikit darbanan or the question of spikit spikit, and anyone who has opened a clear mishna sees that this is not how the decision looks. Although the Gemara seems to say quite definitively that one follows the great wisdom and the question of spikit darbanan and the question of spikit kolala, etc., it seems that most poskim in most generations see this as a general recommendation and not as something too exaggerated. As the rabbi certainly knows, there is no reasonable source for there to be any exemption from guilt resulting from obeying any halachic authority in a blanket manner, let alone questionable rules of spikit.
On the other hand, if the rules of sufficiency are not decisive – then no one has any way of really knowing how terrible it is to commit an offense inadvertently. How do I know when I can trust the mikel? And this is where the matter feels clearly inconsistent to me. I don’t find any clear legality in it.
This inconsistency creates a general halakhic picture that, in my opinion, is completely ridiculous, and you can probably identify with this criticism that second-order ruling is one of the main causes of it. Since there is no fixed formula for concocting this potion called “ruling” from all the tangle of methods and weights that need to be given to everything, it becomes completely arbitrary and leads to futile arguments between second-rate rabbis.
The alternative to all this is to know all the Shas and rule on my own (perhaps even to be wary of the Shas for the sake of clarity sometimes, lest I err in the mitzvah of listening to the words of the sages). But even in the Shas itself, there are plenty of shortcomings, and it is usually not possible to easily decide a major Rishonim dispute – simply because many times it is possible to understand the Gemara in two quite reasonable ways.
What am I supposed to do?
Thank you very much.
Hello.
I understand your feelings, but I think you have a fundamental mistake. You claim that in the absence of a formula, everyone does what they want. This is not true. There is no formula, and there is still a general (non-algorithmic) form of halakhic thinking. The disputes are resolved within this framework, and the anarchy is not as great as you describe. This is similar to the widespread criticisms of what is happening in the world of law. And yet, jurists will tell you that the anarchy is not so great and not everyone does what they want.
Ultimately, once you reach the point of teaching, you must rule as you understand, and there is no need to be alarmed by the fact that there are judges who think differently than you. A judge can only see what his eyes see. But a condition for this is that you reach the point of teaching. See my article on autonomy in ruling.
Forgive me, Rabbi, but I have a hard time agreeing with the first part of your statement. It comes out very significant, and while the anarchy on agreed-upon issues is not that great (everyone agrees that Shabbat should be observed), unfortunately many issues that are very critical to everyday life or in general are borderline issues (laws that are provided for family purity, pregnancy postponement, kosher (meat or not, shaking in a mixture, etc.). And on these borderline issues, the situation is really quite a jungle, to my impression. No one has a formula for when it is appropriate to be strict or when it is possible to be lenient, and what is called a time of stress sufficient to permit X. And on issues such as these, there is simply nothing to be done.
I am familiar with the article in question, and it is indeed successful in my opinion, but it does not solve everything. As I said, in many uncertain issues, the bitter truth is that there really is more than one way to read parts of the Talmud, and even if it seems a little more clear to me to read one way, I know that in the end there is a considerable chance that the intention of Rabin and Rav Ashi could actually be the slightly less good way (after all, everyone admits that there are some places where not-so-simple interpretations of the Talmud are required, so it can be assumed that even in some unknown places the interpretation is not the simplest interpretation, {as long as it is clear}).
You are again repeating the need for a formula. There is no formula. So what?! If you have several ways to interpret or read, there is the law of sufficiency and there is room to consider custom. What is the problem here?
But that's the body of the complaint, there really are no laws of spikot. I'm not clear about them - you see that the doubt of the rabbinic text and the doubt of the Torah to the detail are not blanket rules. What are the rules of spikot? That's what I'm looking for.
If so, then I probably didn't understand the problem at all. Why aren't there laws of spikot? There certainly are. These rules are sweeping, unlike many other rules. The rule is very simple: doubt the Torah in detail and the rabbinic in tone. That's all. If you're in doubt, that's what you should do. If there's a disagreement between the poskim, it still depends on what you think. If you have a position, go with it. If you don't have one, follow the laws of spikot. It's true that there are poskim who have written that one should follow the majority among the poskim, but that's a meaningless rule because you can never know what the majority of poskim say (because they wrote to everyone and you don't know them all), and therefore follow the rules of doubt.
If you want to bring a specific example to discuss, you're welcome. I don't understand the general problem you're raising.
The point is that within the laws of spikot themselves there are disagreements about how to proceed. How do I approach the question “Is the doubt of a rabbi regarding a kollel a sweeping rule or should it be preferable to be stricter against it as well?” After all, this is a reflective question regarding the laws of spikot themselves. (And don’t say that it’s not a question because it is written in the commentary to the kollel. After all, we can see that many poskim approach it this way.)
I think we've exhausted it. I don't understand these questions. I think I've answered everything. If you have a specific example among the thousands of examples that embarrasses you, you're welcome to bring it up for discussion here.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
