He thought about doing a mitzvah.
In the Talmud it is said that if someone thought of performing a mitzvah and was raped and did not perform it, the scripture is written against him as if he had performed it.
So how does a court of law enforce positive commandments?
It is possible that he is just thinking about doing some mitzvah that he is unable to do, meaning that he is forced not to do it, but he does think about doing it, and therefore it is as if he is doing it, and in any case he is exempt from the other act that the court is trying to force on him. Anyone who knows how to justify this is a true genius.
I didn’t understand the question (maybe I’m not a real genius enough). This is nonsense that doesn’t take a genius, and certainly not a real one, to solve. And here are a few options for you to choose from:
- The Bible imposes positive commandments because the assumption is that at the moment he was not thinking about another mitzvah. Why assume that right now he is thinking about it? And if he is, let him say so.
- Even if he thinks, why does that prevent coercion? Someone who engages in a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah, not someone who thinks about the mitzvah.
- And finally, whoever thinks of performing a mitzvah and does not do it – the scripture states that he did it, but this does not mean that there is an existence of doing it here. It is “as if.”
A true genius knows how to understand that the answers are not enough. Unless he has been thrown heresy to take the words of the sages out of context in the way of the rabbis, and God forbid, I am not one of them and not one of them.
1. And if he says that he wants to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring his parents right now but, to his great regret, his father is not in the area and therefore he is forced not to fulfill it, then won't a court of law force him to fulfill a deed? We certainly haven't heard of such a thing. By the way, he can also transgress against the rabbis because the deed (which he is actually doing now because he is forced) rejects the rabbis.
2. He who thinks about the mitzvah is like a practitioner, that's exactly the point. Unless we decide that the sages were just throwing words into the air without meaning.
3. This is answer 2 in different words. The interpretation is that in actual practice he did not do it because the tangible cannot be denied, but from the point of view of the halakhah he did.
I would like to write to Pom Harifuta Shebshta, but unfortunately I only see Shebshta here.
I will add a fourth option for you, and I will try to explain it to you:
4. For most of the first ones, it is possible to fulfill both, there is no exemption.
The whole permission for a mitzvah to be considered is only because he is concerned with how to fulfill it in a practical way, like a groom and travelers on Sukkot, but here there is no practical thing, so anyway there is no exemption for a practitioner.
And by the way, the Rabbi already wrote to you that most Rishonim believe that a practitioner is not a practitioner in the Ka’bah that can do both.
And by the way, the Ka’ilu
The supervisor in my yeshiva used to say in a clear way that all the mitzvahs of the Ka’ilu atone for all the transgressions of the Ka’ilu
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