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Hello Rabbi Mikhi, a few days ago I asked you about the possibility of basing conservatism on the principle of the decree that something that is accepted by the public must be accepted (which is why it is strictly forbidden to disagree about the Gemara of the Day of Judgment) and you wrote that you had not heard of such a decree. I found Rambam in his introduction to the books of the strong hand, who writes that the reason the Amoraim did not disagree about the Tannaim is because “the majority of the sages of Israel agreed to it.” The Rivash explains the matter in the name of the Ramban (6:39) “that the acceptance of the rabbis to make a reservation and a boundary for the Torah is like accepting the Torah and applies to them and their descendants after them, even though they did not accept it by consent, only that they acted in such a way as a reservation for the Torah.” And some of the first ones touch on this matter. If so, I am trying to propose this principle as a binding foundation for conservatism, that something that is accepted by the public must be acted in this way, and this is also true in matters of current opinion, such as if the majority of the public accepts a certain custom, it must be observed.

שו”תCategory: generalHello Rabbi Mikhi, a few days ago I asked you about the possibility of basing conservatism on the principle of the decree that something that is accepted by the public must be accepted (which is why it is strictly forbidden to disagree about the Gemara of the Day of Judgment) and you wrote that you had not heard of such a decree. I found Rambam in his introduction to the books of the strong hand, who writes that the reason the Amoraim did not disagree about the Tannaim is because “the majority of the sages of Israel agreed to it.” The Rivash explains the matter in the name of the Ramban (6:39) “that the acceptance of the rabbis to make a reservation and a boundary for the Torah is like accepting the Torah and applies to them and their descendants after them, even though they did not accept it by consent, only that they acted in such a way as a reservation for the Torah.” And some of the first ones touch on this matter. If so, I am trying to propose this principle as a binding foundation for conservatism, that something that is accepted by the public must be acted in this way, and this is also true in matters of current opinion, such as if the majority of the public accepts a certain custom, it must be observed.
asked 2 years ago

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מיכי Staff answered 2 years ago

First, it would be better to put the wording of the question in the question section and not in the title. There’s a complete mess here.
Second, public acceptance is obligatory, as at Sinai and as with the Talmud. Beit Yishai extended this to Sermons 6:15. But this is when the public has accepted some authority or some text. The fact that the public practices in a certain way without there being acceptance is not obligatory except because of custom. Otherwise, arakta damsana would be an obligation from the Torah and not a custom.
By the way, Maimonides himself deviated from what was accepted in several things. From his list of commandments, the status of laws that emerge from midrashim and the LBM, his attitude towards demons and mysticism, and more. So where did you come from…
I don’t know what you mean by questions of view, but there’s no way to talk about obligation there. My view is what I believe in. There’s no such thing as a ‘binding view.’ It’s an oxymoron.

מנסה להבין replied 2 years ago

Beautiful, thank you very much.

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