Homosexuals
I read the rabbi’s words in an interview for the “Shabbat” supplement in the “Makor Rishon” newspaper published on Shabbat. The rabbi says there that one should learn that homosexuality is forbidden only for those who are attracted to women. In contrast, I remember that in an interview some time ago (I don’t remember how long ago) the rabbi suggested this possibility but rejected it outright, saying that it was a very far-fetched interpretation that didn’t sound reasonable at all. Furthermore, the rabbi speaks in the third book of the trilogy about not learning “Tema Dekra,” but learning the “gader” of the halakhah, as Rabbi Shilat quotes from Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel. So, when the Torah writes about male intercourse, “it is an abomination,” I don’t see the “gader” being any clearer intuitively than it is clear that it goes far beyond just halakhah that can be rejected due to moral considerations.
If the rabbi could explain his opinion on the matter, I would be happy.
First, I don’t remember writing that it was tight. Indeed, I don’t think I’m confident enough to actually say so.
When the Torah writes “abomination,” to the best of my understanding, it doesn’t mean anything about the subject under discussion…as I’ve written here more than once, it doesn’t even mean that there is a moral problem here (this term also appears in the Torah in immoral contexts).
Haim, see the corrections published to the article here on the website.
I'm not exactly claiming a moral problem (which I'm not entirely sure if there really isn't one), I'm claiming that God defines the matter as a spiritual abomination and an act that should not be done, and it sounds (to me at least) from the word "abomination" that it should not be done in a sweeping manner.
Beyond that, even if there is a moral difficulty regarding such people because they cannot start a family, is the halakha supposed to subordinate itself to the benefit of morality? After all, the rabbi himself says that the halakha came to add commandments of spiritual value that may contradict morality, which is "overall" intended to bring order to this world. If that were the case, then we would be supposed to interpret every halakhic commandment as being in harmony with morality, and then morality and halakha would truly coincide, but it seems clear that this is not the case.
We could say the same thing about a priest's wife who was raped and make a very narrow-minded statement that "she should only leave her husband if she doesn't love him" and other narrow-minded things that take all of its value out of the halakha.
All of this without even considering the fact that it is clear to any reasonable person that there are many problems (social, moral, etc.) with this phenomenon. It is true that there is a moral difficulty because those people want to start families, but there are many other "human" values that also oppose allowing such a thing (i.e., considerations that do not stem from Torah values).
It doesn't sound like that to me. Of course there is no necessity for it.
He made this point correctly in the interview (unlike other points). I said that if there are two possible halakhic interpretations and one of them is more moral, there is no reason not to choose it. Not because the halakhic is necessarily moral but because there is no reason to create conflicts where there is no necessity for it. Like a rabbi should be trusted in a time of need. The fact that it is a time of need does not mean that the halakhic is rabbi. But if halakhically it is possible to act rabbi, then a time of need is a reason to do so.
So basically, according to the rabbi, when a Sanhedrin is established, it should always find a way to subordinate halacha to morality by means of an interpretation that will sort out the moral problematics in halacha. Sounds very problematic to me and essentially empties the entire distinction between halacha and morality that the rabbi makes.
That's not what I wrote. Read again.
“I said that if there are two possible halakhic interpretations and one of them is more moral, there is no reason not to choose it.” (Quote from the rabbi).
In the case of homosexuals, the rabbi offers a different interpretation in order to avoid the moral problem that arises from the case.
It is possible in principle to offer an anti-moral interpretation on any issue of halakhic law, and then I will again fall into the case of preferring the moral interpretation over the immoral interpretation.
You can suggest whatever you want. The question is how reasonable it is. I'm not talking about playing pretend, but about a reasonable interpretation on its own part. If there is a reasonable suggestion, then there is indeed room to consider it.
What is meant by reasonable? Reasonable in terms of learning from the Torah's plain meaning? Reasonable in terms of conformity to morality and common sense?
Reasonable as an interpretation of the verses and laws of the Sages. Criteria for reasonableness include both considerations of explanation and considerations of interpretation (language, etc.).
Well, this is a far-fetched interpretation.
After all, the Torah could not impose punishments only on those who are also attracted to women, because these are things in the human heart, and the court cannot punish on this basis.
If the sages believed so, we would not have to reach the point of saying that so-and-so is attracted to his desires (because perhaps I am not attracted to women, while so-and-so is).
Even if one is mistaken or does not intend or is mistaken, they are in the things in a person's heart. And so is the intention to receive commandments in conversion, or the intentions that accompany a contract (things in his heart and in the heart of every person). In various contexts, the halakha sees the role of the bi'd as assessing what is in a person's heart. If it is an openly gay person who has lived like this his entire life, then it is probably not an urge to sin but a different inclination. There is no need for a long day of study for this or for examining the kidneys and heart.
It seems that Shalev spoke about the B”d, and therefore he does not intend to do so by mistake, and the work that I have done is indeed not subject to the court to kill on its basis, but it is proven that in a case such as the one who extinguished the candle for the sake of the oil, which indeed his intention was for the sake of the oil, and by the way, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is forbidden by God.
Regarding homosexuality, the evidence of Lev from the faction of the rabbi in the case of a certain rabbi seems to be strong evidence, since it was possible to present the rabbi as someone who is only attracted to men because he is an avowed homosexual who has lived like this his entire life, and in any case we will not reach the terrible innovation of the faction of the rabbi.
I also talked about the bi”d. They have to decide whether to kill or not, and to accept a ger or not.
The evidence there is weak. A. It is possible that the sages did not realize that there are those for whom it is nature and not instinct. B. They did not think that it was an okimta like that, nor was it necessary. There is a convincing explanation there and everything is fine. The flagellation is not an innovation by virtue of a difficulty. It is the same principle that appears in other places (such as Bar Benito on page 25 and more).
It is permissible because of rape, may God have mercy on him.
And to a virgin you shall not do anything. There is no sin worthy of death for a virgin. For as if a man rises up against his neighbor and kills a soul, so is this matter.
And the sexual desire that is drawn to the same sex kills the sexual desire that is drawn to the other sex, and it is rape, and may God have mercy on him.
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