Humra and Kola – the arrangement between them
Hello Rabbi,
In the conceptual analysis lessons and in the article “On Kola and Chumara,” the Rabbi brings the question of the question of blessings as an example of the application of the rule (Kola in the law of blessings, Chumara in the law of not carrying). Doesn’t the order of applying the laws affect the final result? Apparently, I could in the question of blessings decide on the question of blessings in the law of not carrying and not recite the blessing, and then the question of the question of blessings is simply irrelevant. For example, the question of the question of food blessings, in which the question of the question of food is also decided on the question of blessing – if I first apply the law of not carrying, there is no reason to ask what the second law says because I have already decided not to recite the blessing (the general case – two laws of Chumara with different conclusions).
Are there any references/rules regarding the order in which decision-making considerations are required in situations of doubt?
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I agree that there is a logical and necessary order in question, but what do we do in a case where there is no such order? Let's assume that in the dispute that the Rabbi brought between Toss and Toss, the first one is about the obligation to recite the berecht ha-Gomel on the tenth and second days of the month, which apparently depends precisely on this question - each sees a different logical order and the conclusions are contradictory.
The discussion of whether a ruling is a homrah or a kola is not related to the order of application of the rules, but to the question of which of the two rules you are referring to. Whoever writes that the ruling not to bless is a homrah is referring to ”La Tisha”, and whoever writes that it is a kola is referring to the laws of blessings.
The halachic dispute in the Rishonim there is not related to the order of application of the rules. It is a dispute in the rules of the laws of doubtful blessings (and not in ”La Tisha”, or in the order of application of the rules). The question is whether the rule of doubtful blessings applies to kola as well or not. The implication regarding “La Tisha” is just a consequence anyway. And the reason is very simple: There is a clear logic regarding the order of application of the rules (which you also agreed to). Therefore, it is clear that it is agreed upon by the Rishonim, or at least there is no reason to assume otherwise.
I'm not sure I understand – Does every discussion have to have only one doubt that is relevant to the one chosen? The arrangement makes sense in my opinion because in one direction it is possible to consider both doubts (a doubt of blessings and then a doubt of not carrying) and the other direction contains one doubt.
What does a poske do who wants to consider both doubts? Are there no cases of a categorical doubt, or two doubts? I didn't understand how the rabbi defines a “doubt that applies” or a “implication that is a result anyway”?
Another side to the doubt – The Rabbi brought, for example, the story about R’ Chaim regarding a homrah in pikuach nefesh versus a kola in the laws of Shabbat. What do you do when there is a homrah against a homrah? Let's say two laws of the Torah are contradictory? Apparently there are all kinds of rules that can be applied here to reach a “logical” order (for example, sit and do not do is better, what do you do if there was no doubt in one of the laws, and a few other ways), but isn't there necessarily a case in which there is only the discretion of the posk regarding which doubt will come first?
I don't know what happens in every discussion. Give a counterexample and we'll talk.
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