I have a question about a lesson I heard on Shavuot night and I’m interested in your opinion on it.
On Shavuot night, I heard a lesson from an important and well-known rabbi that made me wonder about things.
The lesson was about the story of David and Bathsheba, and it brought out the well-known arguments from the Gemara regarding anyone who goes to war with the House of David, giving a divorce, a severance pay, and so on. However, the rabbi who transmits the opinion explained that Shabbat Sheba, even as a man’s wife and without a divorce, was permissible for David, a complete permission according to the halakhah from the law of kingdom, according to which, just as a king can and perhaps even must kill rebels in the kingdom in order to preserve the kingdom and public order, and he is permitted to expropriate lands and property for the kingdom [a king breaks through to build a fence for himself, etc.], so too is it permissible for him to take a man’s wife if he is certain that the kingdom and the dynasty will be built from her, and that this is for the benefit of the future of the kingdom and all of Israel.
According to the opinion of the rabbi who transmitted it and as he expressed it, apart from the prohibition of idolatry, which constitutes a red line, the law of the kingdom rejects almost every prohibition in the Torah for the benefit of public order and all of Israel, including the prohibition of a man’s wife [again, not for personal purposes but for the purposes of building a dynasty, etc.]
What does the Rabbi think about these things? I was very surprised to hear these things, and even more so from an important and serious scholar, and I think he took the boundaries of the kingdom’s laws to a very far-fetched place.
With thanks
On the surface, it sounds completely absurd. First, the poskim take the view that Dina Demalchuta does not permit prohibitions. Second, it was not done for the sake of the dynasty (and the quality of the woman really does not justify such an offense). Third, why did the prophet Nathan rebuke him if he acted lawfully? Fourth, the Sages took the view that David relied on a get of termination and apparently did not agree that a king could take a man’s wife. Fifth, the king can always make the husband give a get until he says “I want to,” and as we know, if it is for the sake of a mitzvah, a made-up get is valid. So why take a man’s wife?
Although I too once argued that if there is public agreement that there is no longer a definition of kiddushin in society, it would be like confiscating property (because Abbaaz and other legal provisions are the legal part of Halacha and depend on public agreement). But that may be the case in extreme cases like the Holocaust (I wrote this in the context of property laws in the Kovno ghetto). I am also not sure that this is the authority of a king and not of a judge. In any case, in relation to David, it is certainly not necessary and not reasonable.
Good morning – Regarding the question of why David was punished, according to the rabbi who gave the lesson, it was because even though he acted according to the law according to his system, he was forbidden to publish it because it is the kind of thing that is only revealed to the humble and such excessive publication in public could cause harm.
Well, here we have reached the realm of delusional chatter. The act is fine, only its publication is problematic, and that is why the claim and punishment. This is also what Nathan the prophet rebuked him for, who published the permission to steal the sheep of Haresh. And all my other questions, such as why did the sages need the divorce granted by those going to war? Beyond that, what is wrong with publication? Will the public allow themselves to take a man's wife because the king is allowed? I really don't think it is worth discussing.
Support for the fact that no king can confiscate a wife – Samuel in his speech to the sons of Israel who requested a king threatened ”he will take your daughters… ” but it never occurred to him to threaten to confiscate their wives
If the act of consecration was in money, the king could apparently confiscate the money for the consecration and thus allow it to be sold, but it is not clear that this was the case with Batsheva (it seems to me that even at the time of the Gemara there were bea kiddush).
Does the confiscation of the property of the bill also confiscate the consecration retroactively (it seems to me that at the time I saw that in money the Gemara explicitly writes that the confiscation of the money permits the consecration retroactively, in bea certainly not, and in the case of a bill it is not clear to me)?
The fourteen sages can confiscate both the kiddush of the wedding and the sher, and in the Gemara's Peshat and most of the Rishonim, everything is ex post facto. See, for example, Ketubot 3:1 and in the commentators there and much more. Although I have a different take on the matter, and I agree.
With Batsheva, this was not the case, because the Sages explain this in the divorce of one who goes to war.
Thank you very much.
Regarding the confiscation of a child, were only the Talmudic sages able to confiscate? Or are modern-day sages also able to confiscate? Can a modern-day rabbi confiscate the child of a woman who refused a get, for example?
Ostensibly, if we compare the act of confiscation to a taxing act, and the confiscation of a rabbi is still the case today, then confiscation of a rabbi is still the case today. The question is whether a rabbi is needed who is appointed with the consent of the majority of the Jewish people, and if so, this is apparently impossible today, and only when there is a religious representation with broad agreement, only then will they be able to confiscate the rabbi's property and confiscate the child.
Both with regard to the Peker and with regard to the Apkeinah, for most of the Rishonim it is only the greatest of the generations, but not necessarily the closest. Some have written, such as the generations of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, that is, in their ranks, and then according to the accepted concepts (of the descent of generations), it is impossible to do this in our day at all.
According to Shmuel Shimoni, a bill has the right to be money:
https://www.google.co.il/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://asif.co.il/%3Fwpfb_dl%3D1490&ved=2ahUKEwiZmuf86JnbAhVGGZoKHU72DqsQFjADegQIBRAB&usg=AOvVaw0KoBVJieYMEH_Mz_J0gTNB
The state also has the power to confiscate money…
(In fact, according to the simplest of the issues, the permission of the sages to confiscate money stems from the state)
Regarding the great rabbi of the generation who renounced rabbi, I came across a Ramah that implies that within the framework of the community's regulations, they could renounce wealth:
Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer Laws of Kiddushin, Section 21
Haga: The community was silent and made an agreement among themselves that whoever sanctifies without ten or something like that, and passed one and sanctified, they were considered to be sanctified and required a divorce. Even though the community expressly stipulated that their sanctified ones would not be sanctified and renounced their wealth, one should still be stricter in terms of the act.
Or perhaps we should excuse the renunciation of wealth because the Jewish community in Ashkenaz at the time of the Ramah had autonomy that was similar to a Jewish monarchy, and the law of the kingdom is a law?
14, I didn't understand. What does it mean for a bill to have a law of money? As I wrote in both (and also in the introduction), the sages have the authority to confiscate. This is not according to Shimoni but according to the Gemara.
I don't know where you saw that the authority of the sages is by virtue of the authority of the state.
Oren, indeed there are disputes about this. In any case, it seems that he is talking there only about the confiscation of money and not about the introduction and bill. It seems that the rule that every temple is known to the rabbis of the temple does not belong there, but rather they are only concerned with the rule of the uninitiated in the uninitiated (on the side that it is given to every temple over the people of its place. As stated, there is a dispute about this).
See Anzi't Ezra They mainly criticized the section on confiscation after the Talmud (he cites there that the Rabbis believe it is reasonable that community elders can also confiscate kiddushes and bills of lading, and this is probably what the Rema feared).
On the 12th of Elul, 5751
No, – Shalom Rav,
A similar explanation is given by the Radb”7 (Part 7, Section 29) as to David's mistaken view that Abigail is permissible to him because Nabal's sentence of death as a rebel in the kingdom has expired – since his wife also passes to the king according to the law of ‘properties of a rebel in the kingdom‘, and David was mistaken in learning from the wealth that the prohibition of a man's wife is prohibited. Another explanation that the Radb”7 offers for David's mistake regarding Abigail is that there is room to confiscate Nabal's kiddush since he is ‘a rebel in the kingdom‘.
However, this is a mistaken explanation of David, and not an explanation that is in accordance with halakhic law, and perhaps in the lesson you heard, the words were only said as an explanation of the mistaken Ha-Yahweh-Amina that David had, and not as a halakhic justification.
With the best wishes for a happy and blessed New Year, Sh”ts
And to thank Mr. Shweik, who, thanks to the discussion with him about Abigail (in column 329), I came to the words of the Radb”z quoted in the article by Prof. Yehuda Eisenberg, ‘David and Abigail’, in the virtual journal for education and teaching ‘Limivi’, on the ‘Daat’ website)
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