Incest, human flesh, and moral suicide

The rabbi does not see a moral problem with cannibalism? After all, some of the Rishonim even have no prohibition from the Torah on the matter.
And about incest, the Yoma says that if the Torah had not been given, it would have been said.
Or does the rabbi mean that it is moral only in terms of between one person and another, but there are other values, such as the values of holiness, which are values that are required by reason (human dignity), just as morality itself is required by reason, but this does not mean that incest is a purely halachic crime like desecration of the Sabbath, but rather a moral crime. (Tomer Persico explains very well the value of holiness – here https://tomerpersico.com/?s=%D7%A9%D7%A9+%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA)

Is there necessarily a moral problem when there is no halakhic prohibition? I don't understand this strange argument.
What is the connection between incest and cannibalism?
I wrote that in my opinion there is no moral problem with cannibalism and incest because it does not harm anyone. What is not clear here? Indeed, there are values that are not related to harming others. For example, religious values, but not only them. Some will see value in self-realization, and my little ego also sees value in autonomous thought and action and in education.
But cannibalism or incest is just something that disgusts us, and I assume that this is a cultural matter and nothing more.
I am familiar with Persico's article (I assume you meant the first one, because there are a series of links there), but I disagree with Haight's analysis for several reasons. Mainly because he talks about emotions and I talk about values. We are not close to each other. And so on for other points there.

I didn't mean to respond that if there is no halakhic prohibition, then there is a moral problem, but rather that if there is no moral problem and there is no halakhic problem, it can be permitted in practice (I meant that you wouldn't say that there is indeed no moral problem, but there is a halakhic problem).
The question is whether the rabbi is unwilling to accept the values of holiness, if the sages say that incest is a law even if the Torah had not been given, then this is a teacher who understood from the context that it is appropriate to prohibit such a thing not from a religious perspective but from a moral perspective.

Indeed, if there is no halakhic or moral problem, it is permissible. At most, it would be because of the “You shall not detest” (prohibition of doing abominable things).
There are values of holiness, but these are not moral values. Even with regard to fornication, it is possible that we are talking about values of holiness and not about morality. In any case, even if the sages thought that this was a moral value, I do not feel obligated to their value determinations.

If the rabbi recognizes the values of holiness as binding values, why does the rabbi say that if there is no halachic or moral problem, it is permissible? Maybe there is no halachic problem and no moral problem, but there is a moral problem with the values of holiness.

I can understand that there are such values, but I don't renew them from my mind. If the Torah renewed it, I will accept it.