Induction and theory
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask for some clarification regarding the induction problem,
1) Why is it not allowed to say that physical theories that comply with the principle of refutation have solved the problem of induction?
After all, if we put the theory that the sun will rise every morning to the test against any other theory.
On the other hand, the probability that the principle of induction is incorrect is simply zero, and therefore, if the sun does indeed rise, it will significantly strengthen the theory and show that the principle of induction is confirmed.
It is true that there are countless other theories that would hold that the sun will rise tomorrow, just like the sun will rise only in X years, in X+1 years, etc. But the scientist is the one who decides to test the theory and he chooses the simplest one that will explain reality to him, and again, statistically speaking, it is a fact that he has been right so far.
2) Do you think branches of science that deal with the past, such as astrophysics or archaeology or evolution, are scientific?
Let’s take the Big Bang theory as an example – it seemingly does not stand up to the test of refutation because it deals with the past and not the future, but following this theory, we can think of implications that were indeed confirmed years in the future, such as the cosmic background radiation or observations of the expansion of the universe. The same thing in archaeology, there is a theory that can be used to predict future excavations.
So are theories about the past also called scientific? Because they have implications external to the theory.
3) Do you think there is a connection between the problem of induction and the existence of God, and not just on a miraculous level – how do we really have good intuitions, but a causal connection?
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1. Of course, my explanation assumes the principle of induction.
More precisely, the term “more likely” is Occam's razor, but for the sake of continuing the discussion, we will generalize all of these assumptions to the term scientific thinking.
And so, if the capabilities of scientific thinking are not correct, there is no reason to think that they will work, so given that these capabilities work, it is reasonable to trust them.
Why do you see this claim as wrong?
3. I meant, do you wonder why we have correct scientific thinking? Like the evidence from complexity, or do you believe that belief in God is a condition for scientific thinking. If so, why? In 1, we saw that it is possible to mathematically confirm scientific thinking or at least to give it a very high level of confidence.
Because relying on what works is induction. You are essentially asking why rely on what worked in the past, and answering: because it worked in the past. You are repeating the argument from the graph that I have used more than once (why do people choose the straight line). But it does not solve the problem of induction.
3. We did not see this in 1.
1/3.
I didn't understand why the argument from the graph doesn't solve the induction problem?? Would you agree that if certain basic assumptions were true, the chance that our understanding would reveal things about the world is zero, so an experiment proves in retrospect that the assumptions themselves are very reasonable even if not necessary.
???
The experiment proves that the understandings were correct in the past. The inference from this about the future is induction.
Rabbi, please tell me if I understood correctly,
Within the rules themselves – such as Occam's razor and induction, there is a good ability to choose a scientific theory.
Also, assuming that these principles were wrong, the chances that they would have succeeded so far are very unlikely at all.
But on the other hand, there is no reason to conclude that they are also correct for the future, because this is a circular assumption under faith in these principles.
The justification for why they work at all is the evidence from epistemology. That is, that God is not a condition for holding these conditions but a philosophical justification for the conditions.
But why wouldn't an atheist scientist treat the question of the correctness of these principles as a purely skeptical claim like the question of why you assume that your eyes see correctly or that your memory is valid?
Also, it should be remembered that an atheist scientist usually believes that we are close to understanding the laws of the universe. So from his point of view, this explains perfectly why the sun will rise tomorrow. This is because the very laws that we have formulated and believe in confirm the theory. It is a bit reminiscent of the believer who would replace the word laws with God in the previous explanation.
Indeed. The question is what is the justification for the rules (it is not really formal rules. Common sense). This is indeed the evidence from epistemology.
An atheist is really not bothered by these questions, as by the quality of the image of the eyes. Therefore, despite the evidence from epistemology, he remains an atheist. But he is wrong. He just got used to it.
Even if we come to understand all the laws, the question of why these are the laws and who “legislated” them will remain.
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