Initially, retrospectively
How do we understand this phenomenon that there is a distinction between the law from the outset and the law retrospectively in the halakhic system? It does not appear in any other normative system!
I understand if they told me that the law is X to begin with, but in a certain situation where you can’t fulfill X, then the law is Y. But that’s what’s called rape.
Here the halakha tells me from the outset that the law from the outset is X and in retrospect it is Y. How can that be? This is a lack of frontal incoherence? For example, when they tell me it is forbidden but exempt. Here I can understand that the law remains forbidden even in retrospect, but you have no sanction for it. But when they tell me from the outset it is forbidden and in retrospect it is permitted (such as a woman whose husband drowned in bottomless waters), how can that be?
In no other system will you find a law without punishment. Halacha assumes that there are divine laws. When they tell you that it is forbidden from the outset, they mean that you should not do it, but if you did it, it is not forbidden retroactively. If you did something that was forbidden from the outset, you will be punished. What is the problem you see here?
Beyond that, in the cases I recall, the prohibition initially concerns the act and the permission retrospectively concerns the result. Therefore, there is no connection and no contradiction between the two. For example, it is forbidden to make a fruit hybrid, but the product is not prohibited. Why do you think there is a contradiction here?
I didn’t understand what you wanted from the example of a woman whose husband drowned in bottomless waters.
From the example, I wanted to reject your claim in "beyond this" from the very beginning. Indeed, there are cases in which the act is initially prohibited and retrospectively permitted (such as a priest's marriage to a divorced woman, which is forbidden but the kiddushin applies, and therefore he must give her a get in order to divorce because they are still living under the prohibition). But I am asking about cases in which the act is initially prohibited and retrospectively permitted, such as a woman whose husband drowned in bottomless waters, who is initially prohibited from marrying and retrospectively permitted to marry (that is, in addition to the kiddushin applying, she also does not need to divorce later because she and her current husband do not live under the prohibition because retrospectively permitted).
The problem I see is simple and straightforward. Either an act is prohibited or it is permitted. Logically, it cannot be both. You can say that X is prohibited but you were raped, so that's fine. But that's called rape. The concept retrospectively means more than that. It says that initially it is prohibited, but retrospectively permitted. But it's difficult. Decide. Either it is forbidden (and there are extenuating circumstances) or it is permitted (and there is some legal precedent). But not both.
Yes, but there are exceptions “in times of need”, or “from the beginning one must warn”, and ”the stricter will receive a blessing”.
The Rema writes (I don't remember where) that wherever they permitted in place of necessity, the intention is that according to the principle of the law it is permitted, but that they made it stricter because of the opinions of some poskim, and in places of difficulty they return to the principle of the law. But it seems to me that today the poskim do not really treat it that way, but that instead of difficulties “it is better to trust in times of need”. This is behavior that is impossible for someone who knows the law itself. But it seems to me that it arises in a reality where a person does not see himself as qualified to rule but rather relies on the opinions of others ("follow the stricter, follow the lenient", etc.), and therefore a reality is created in which it is possible to assess the price versus the risk. And yet, things still require explanation, and at least there is a need to distinguish to what extent the opinion that was not ruled upon was rejected due to difficulty in clarifying the Talmudic issues or not.
I don't see the difficulty. This is not absolute evidence, so you won't get married on it to begin with, but it's not enough to get her out if she's already married. Similarly, a witness is useful for holding money but not spending it. And one witness is also useful for requiring an oath but not spending money.
See a brief overview here: https://www.etzion.org.il/he/talmud/seder-nashim/massekhet-yevamot/%D7%99%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%93%D7%A3-%D7%A7%D7%9B%D7%90-%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%9D-%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A3
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