Intuition and logic
Hello Rabbi. I listened to your lessons on intuition, and two questions arose in my mind:
A. Regarding David Hume’s question about experimental investigation, as far as I understand, the only thing he challenged was the inferences such as generalizations or the analogy straw, but observation itself, pointwise, remained as reliable information about the world. If so, Kant’s theory does not include the observation of the mirror, but generalizations and the like.. And if I’m right, then I didn’t understand your question about Kant, because while there are things that are only in my mind, there are visual observations that do see the world, and Kant might admit to them.?
B. Regarding intuition in halacha. I fully understand the justification for a posek to use intuition and that it will also lead him (perhaps against his will) to a ruling. But I did not understand the context that the rabbi made for using emotions such as the poor woman. There, it is not about intuition regarding the truth, but about the posek’s desire for what he wants the truth to be, and I do not understand the justification for that. It is true that perhaps all of this happens against his will, but this is something that must be fought against when seeking the truth. “You shall not pervert a judgment.”
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I mean that the Rabbi challenged Kant that if I see the same phenomenon in reality, which supposedly exists only in my head, then what do we say that it is a peta morgana? That's what I'm asking: If I see the same phenomenon, it means that it is no longer a generalization because I see the whole thing and that's not what Kant was talking about..
In other words: Kant's theory is immune to difficulties from reality because if I saw it, it is no longer a generalization and if so, it is no longer in my head but in reality..
As mentioned, I don't know which lesson it is and I don't remember the lesson, but I don't assume that I made it difficult for Kant because he is not skeptical about vision. At most, I claim that it is not clear why he does not doubt vision and extends Hume's difficulty to direct observations as well. This is the evidence from epistemology, which is described in the fourth book, Ch.
I also agree with Nadav. The rabbi brought up Gilat's book on the seventh at this time, rabbinic, that the trigger for Chazal was the financial hardship, and as an example of this, the unfortunate widow. Ostensibly, these are emotional motivations, not intuitions.
So when a vote is made, you will prevail over me. This is completely not an emotional motive, and there I also explained that it is not a motive in the sense of a reason but a trigger for searching for halakhic income. This is evidence to the contrary.
Hahaha I didn't mean to form a coalition against the rabbi. God forbid. I'm just asking what the justification is for such a trigger? Wouldn't it be better to avoid triggers? I mean, is it rape or is there a point in it?
When there's intuition, I understand that there's a point in intuition. But is there a point in an emotional trigger? On the surface, it's just rape. Isn't that so?
I repeat again that this is not about emotion but about a halakhic consideration. When there is a time of urgency, one leniently grants relief not because of emotion but because the halakhic says to grant relief in times of urgency. When there is a time of urgency, one seeks permits and sermons and new interpretations, but the time of urgency is not the permit but the reason to seek a permit (when the time is not urgent, we do not seek permits). What is unclear here? What does this have to do with emotion?
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