Investigation without a police report
Hello Rabbi.
I have heard several times that rabbis say, “If there is no NPFKM – we do not investigate.” What does the rabbi think about this rule?
This rule can be understood in several ways:
- There is no value in an investigation when there is no NPF. I disagree with that.
- There is no meaning to an investigation when there is no NPM (the two sides are different formulations of the same thing. This is positivism in relation to the empirical meaning of claims). I do not agree with this either in a blanket way. But it is true that such an investigation requires caution and vigilance, since sometimes there really are two different formulations of the same thing. And if not – then there will still be some NPM, even if it is theoretical and esoteric.
- There is no possibility of investigation because the way to find out which side is right is through the NPM. I quite agree with this, although sometimes a priori beliefs can also advance us (like a thought experiment in science).
See Rabbi Sanhedrin 15 on the Gemara that discusses the Sinai bull in terms of how much. Rabbi there asks May 10, and in the second answer he writes to the Nazir (one who vows to be a nun in order to obtain Sinai bull in 23, whether he is a nun or not). This is the source of the Yeshivah Mimra “Nafm for the Kiddushi of a Woman.”
Shalom Rabbi,
I will just comment that it seems that the Ritva has already preceded him in this. See Ritva Sukkah 2:17, in his commentary on the Mishnah, where he refers to the difficulty of the Rishonim in 2:17, why the Mishnah there explained what a new sukkah is, and after all, according to Beit Hillel, an old sukkah is kosher. In one of the excuses, you explained that according to their system, there is a nefek, when a person excludes himself from an old sukkah.
Thank you very much. I will just point out that there are a few differences:
First, even clarifying the B”S method is a matter of nef”m. But this is really what the Ritva”a is making excuses for in his previous excuses.
Second, here we are not talking about the law of an old sukkah but about the concept of an old sukkah. The Ram”n's nef”m is from the law of a Sinai bull, but the Ritva”a's nef”m is about the concept of an old sukkah.
And third, the hanging here is direct. The Ritva”a's nef”m is in the vow of an old sukkah and not in the consecration of a woman or the vow of a nun, provided that the old sukkah is so-and-so.
In fact, a person can vow to have an old sukkah, that is, to be stricter than the law (assuming that here we are not saying that the commandments are not to be enjoyed, and now). If so, there is a halachic interest in clarifying the meaning of an old sukkah according to the law.
But the principle is still somewhat similar.
I will tell the truth, I have never understood the answer “nefqm for the consecration of a woman”, because “
If truly all nefqm is the consecration of a woman, then it is not nefqm, because whether the husband consecrates for this side or for that side, they are the same thing! This is the same content! And either way, the woman is sanctified!”
And therefore I always explain that nefqm for the consecration of a woman is a statement that certainly there is such a nefqm, but now we do not find it.
Yes, it seems to me.
I disagree. There may be situations where the content is different and yet there is no nef”m. For example, the prohibition of biting and the prohibition of turbans are two different ideas even though there is probably no nef”m between them. Your view is similar to what is called logical positivism in philosophy (what has no empirical content has no content at all).
I meant differently.
Of course, and there are different ideas, so it is actually a נפקעמ, meaning a conceptual נפקעמ and not a practical נפקעמ (and it of course reflects on a נפקעמ for the consecration of a woman). But I understood that the statement is a נפקעמ for the consecration of a woman, its content is that even though the content is completely identical, except that the terminology of the words is different, so it is a נפקעמ (for the consecration of a woman), that's why I wrote that in my opinion it is not true, if the content is the same (and not just that there is no practical נפקעמ) then there really will be no נפקעמ for the consecration of a woman. It's the same thing.
You seem to agree with that, don't you?
How can you disagree? Well, if there is no conceptual difference then there is no difference in content. It's a trivial tautology.
It can be summarized that the content of the statement "nefqm for the consecration of a woman" is that there is a nefqm in the content of the things, so that although it now seems that the things are completely equal, there is actually a difference in the content (and therefore there is a nefqm for the consecration of a woman), but the intention was never that even if the content is equal then there is a nefqm for the consecration of a woman, because the language is different.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
