Is there goodness in the act of creating something from nothing?

S”d
Good week,
I preferred not to write on the site because it is difficult for me to read and write through it, the position of the writing is very narrow, unlike in email, where you can write complete sentences, and the reading is in a narrow rectangle, unlike in email.
I read the article you mentioned, but I did not see an explicit statement that on the part of the Creator there may be a bad deed, but it does seem that you hinted at this.
But even though the act of creation is not necessarily good, it does not mean that it cannot be good. Therefore, it is possible that the method of Nehma Dachisupa is indeed excusable.
So I am not clear about the rabbi's words.
If the rabbi wants, can the site continue? Just ask him/I will ask the original question?

Post the original question there.
To your point here, I just mean that I disagree that the purpose of creation is benefit. It doesn't say whether it is good or bad, and whether it can be this or that.

Continued discussion:

Thanks, I brought it up.
I think it's a bit presumptuous to make a certain claim in these matters.
In any case, since we know that to create something requires intention and desire, the desire is usually provoked and comes after a disadvantage (although it is not deterministic). So in the case that there is a perfect entity before us that does not need anything, why assume that it would create something? (Of course, from this conclusion we can reach two additional insights, either that God is not perfect or that there is no God).
Therefore, the claim that the nature of the good to be good gives us a wonderful bridge to the reason for the will of the easy in creating something. [Question 1 that I asked]
Of course, the next question would be why God does not create angels-gods/creatures with maximum pleasure [I asked 2].
Here we can answer by question 3; everything is good because the existence of something [even a broken one] is better than its absence. And certainly 32 to the extent that it is true. But it seems that the Rabbi does not agree with this.
Moreover, and the main point is that when God creates some reality, then this creature is His (like the creator's rights). But as soon as this creature advances from his personal power, he increases his "ownership percentage" over his creator. So when God gives him a reward, he gives it to a real entity and not to himself, so to speak. (Or in different ways to the essence of this idea, for example, because when God benefits, it is from grace, but as soon as a person works on it, then he must benefit from justice in the sense of descending into his neighbor's field)
Or it can be argued that a complete entity lacks something from its completeness and wants to complete it, such as:
Completion and completion, but these are words of Tima A. Is further education really a disadvantage?! The opposite is an advantage that should not be compensated for by a disadvantage… B. How does further education that is not in you complement another entity. [It is true that it is possible here to claim that the Creator has a percentage, so to speak, in the creature].
Or all sorts of egoistic claims in the style, such as there is no king without a people. [This is how to complement titles for her’], moreover, someone needs to know him, etc., etc.

If the rabbi has any innovations, as seen in his words, I would be happy to hear.

Who here made a certain claim? I don't agree that every desire is the result of a disadvantage, but even if it was, then it had a disadvantage. The nature of goodness to do good is a wonderful solution just like the nature of X to do X, put in place of X what you want. If you want, say that it is God's nature to create worlds.

Indeed, the Rabbi can truly claim that the nature of God is to create humans.
But the price for the claim is heavy, you turn the concept of ‘God’ into a complex concept. Just as you would not assume that the laws of nature are a brute fact because they are complex.
And after all, our goal is to claim for the simplest entity (otherwise the aforementioned God would also need God, and the regression would stop at the simplest entity due to a cosmological-Leibnizian view).

But, when we claim that God is an extremely good entity. This attribute is derived from the ”properties” of the foundation of God.
Let us define – any claim about a divine entity will stem from ’ simple assumptions:
Existence, power, intelligence (omniscient), and will.
And one simple fact: before God created anything, He was completely free. (Which can also be deduced from the fact that God has infinite power).
In our parable, it is that just as the Son of Man has power, so God has infinite power. Just as humans have some intelligence, God has infinite intelligence. Etc. etc. Thus, the concept of God is a very simple concept.

The claim that God is good and does good is derived from the two assumptions above - intelligence and power.
And because God has infinite intelligence and knows everything on the one hand.
And on the other hand, moral values are values of truth and falsehood. (As the Rabbi wrote in the fourth notebook) For example, the statement that killing an old woman without reason is a bad deed. Such a statement is *truly* true.
And therefore,
1) It stems from the understanding that God has complete knowledge that He knows what is good and what is bad.
2) Because He is completely free and has all the powers, then He will only do the best thing. (Or equal to the best)
Prov.

(In contrast, the Rabbi adds a description of X to God – X for example is equal to the Creator of worlds. Without any basis from previous assumptions.)
———
I have three additional questions about the Rabbi's words here:
1. If the Rabbi saw a messy world and without any order. Would he assume that it had a Creator? Why not? After all, it is possible that there is a Creator with a will to create messy worlds…
2. The Rabbi writes that he does not agree that all will is the result of a disadvantage, so of course it comes from a certain understanding of reality. For example, that it is *good*/*right* to create in the first place. Can the Rabbi show a Doja in the fact that it does not come from the category of a good deed to create something. And on the other hand, it does not come from a disadvantage?! And can this deed be connected to the creation of a being in an environment full of trials and difficulties?
3. Does the Rabbi see the Nehma Dachisupa as a bad solution, for example due to an inherent problem? Or does he simply see no point in providing an explanation for the Creator's actions?

Thanks for the answer and with great respect,
Koby

What you describe is a decision to do good, not a benefit from its nature. But that's exactly what you wanted to avoid.

1. It may or may not. On the other hand, an ordered world is impossible (i.e., very low probability) to have come about by chance.
2. I don't understand. I don't see a logical necessity to link desire to disadvantage. Why do we need examples? I also don't know of an example of a creature that creates worlds. Beyond that, every moral action of man is the result of desire, not disadvantage.
3. This is one possible speculation among several others. I don't see anything beyond that in it. And of course it's also unnecessary, because there's no point in addressing the motives of a creature that we don't understand and know.

Indeed, it is certainly a decision to do good, so we accepted it only **after** his desire to do good arose. In any case, such a decision is precisely a decision that does not come after a disadvantage.

1.A. In fact, according to your words, when we see a reality in the making, we assume that a voluntary factor is at its core. (We have no idea who he is and whether he has perfection or a disadvantage, and what his goals are, but someone certainly exists). For this reason, I assume that the Rabbi was light on the trigger in assuming that he is not perfect - ” but even if so, then he had a disadvantage”…
But there is a serious problem with this argument, which is also woven throughout the other answers. We must remember that when we claim that a complex/special world exists, there is another large sequence of possible worlds that are not complex. [The entropy proverb at the beginning of the notebook]
Therefore, when we come to determine what the chances are that the same “Creator” will create the complex world, we must assess what kind of worlds the “Creator” would want to achieve. As long as we do not know which worlds the Creator would want to create, we will not be able to know whether our hypothesis about a Creator has a basis!
For some reason, it seems from your words that when we see a complex world, any Creator would want to achieve this. Things are puzzling. I would be happy to explain. (Then our explanatory power for your hypothesis is really very good)

B. The Rabbi ignores the plausibility of that hypothesis about a Creator. I will try to refine my first question. When we see a messy world, we can define this world as very special.
What is the chance that star A will be in position X,Y,Z and star B will be in position X’Y’Z’ etc’ etc’
Of course, zero. Perhaps we assume that there is a creator of the world whose only desire is to create worlds in the above locations. I assume that the rabbi will not accept this hypothesis as correct… Why? Although the hypothesis claims that a world would almost certainly have come into being in these locations. But its **likelihood** is zero. It does not seem to me that such a strange creator exists.
The same is true here, when the rabbi adds unfounded assumptions about the creator who wants to create complex worlds but is so different, it is really unlikely that such a @ exists!!

2. Indeed, I agree that there is no logical necessity between lack and desire. But not everything is logic (according to Kant). It is a fact that to this day I have not encountered a single case where someone did an action not due to a deficiency (even from dangling their leg during a lack of concentration) but rather a desire (to do a good deed).
Doesn't the Rabbi think that the hypothesis about that unknown creator who does his actions for no reason of the kind we can imagine (we have never seen an act that was done not due to a deficiency or a good deed) seems a rather weak hypothesis? And who said that that creator, whose entire consciousness is structured completely differently, has an interest in creating complex things?!
(So that question 1a is even more strongly repeated: – “As long as we do not know which worlds the Creator would want to create, we will not be able to know whether our hypothesis about a Creator has a basis, and again the improbability in question 1b increases.)
3. The rabbi writes that there is no point in referring to the motives of a being that we do not understand and know, the question of whether this does not once again strengthen question number 1.
If there is an entity so different from us, how can we assume that the result it wants is the creation of a complex thing? Only when we can assume what that hypothesis probably wants can we talk about whether it will ever be verified.

It is strange to me that the rabbi does not see these questions as violent questions.

PS
It is worth emphasizing to those who see in my words here a great fulfillment of the Creator's way of thinking, that it can of course be argued that because God wanted to create a world *for His own good* so that *we* would understand His Creator from within and be able to get along in it. But we really are not talking about the selfhood of His mind at all. And this is why the laws of nature are uniform, for example.

There can be countless other decisions that are not due to a disadvantage. The decision to pump or zap or do millions of other things is unfamiliar to us. If benefit for you is synonymous with a decision without a disadvantage, then fine, but then it is a matter of definition. All of this assuming that it did not really have a disadvantage.
I am not going to go to the bottom of your mind. The questions that I understand here I have explained very well in the notebook and in other places here on the site.
1. A. Here you raise the anthropic argument and I have already answered it in the book, in the article, in the notebook and in various questions on the site.
B. According to this, even a hundred times a result of 6 on the die is not special compared to any random result. There is a thread here on the site with a never-ending debate on this topic (which I will not intervene in because I am a little tired of this question).

2-3. Have you ever encountered any God? No one has said that he has a desire to do complex things except that I see him doing it. This is not an a priori claim but a fact that we have observed.

I must say that not only do I not see these questions as an impossible problem, but in my opinion these are rather trivial questions that have already been answered well and truly in all the above places.
Therefore, I suggest that we end here.

I still think that we do not know any action that is not done following a need for disadvantage. Except for the benefit. (Lezpazpa comes to calm the nervousness in the sense of ‘the crisis is all in his anger’, and so is the matter of the pump to relieve boredom) Maybe the rabbi has another explanation I did not understand unfortunately…

1a,b,3,2. I think my words here are very simple, it seems that there is a communication gap between us and therefore, I will present it in a more formal way.
It is only important that I go ahead and say that my argument is completely not the anthropic argument. The anthropic argument claims that there are probably an infinite number of worlds and therefore we should not be surprised that a special world was created here. But my argument is only about measuring complexity and the strength of the explanation.

According to Bayes' theorem:
Pr(h|e&k) = [Pr(e|h&k)*Pr(h|k)]/Pr(e|k)
And in a more convenient form for our purposes:
Pr(h|e&k) = [Pr(e|h&k)/Pr(e|k)]*Pr(h|k)

h – the hypothesis that there is a God
e – the combination of evidence that God exists – an ordered world with no beings and free choice
K- logical truths, simplicity of the hypothesis, current understandings of how the world works, etc.

The strength of the explanation is how likely it is that given the case, the hypothesis will probably cause this:
Pr(e|h&k)/Pr(e|k)
The higher the probability, of course, this is a sign that the hypothesis is more likely

The probability multiple of the hypothesis is how likely it is that there is a priori God
Pr(h|k)

My argument is that it is not enough to throw in an entity called ‘God’ without assuming how likely it is that it will create such a world on the one hand and on the other hand without paying a price (usually) for the possibility of the hypothesis.
For example, if we are playing cards and the cards were arranged in a certain order (evidence – e) by X, according to the order of these cards we estimate whether X is a cheater (hypothesis – h) and the shuffle was fake.
In this bank, I argue [question 1a] that one should estimate a priori what the series of cards the cheater would like to take out of the pack is, in part, the total series of possible cards.
A. But the moment you claim that his way of thinking is *essentially* different not only in strength but also in quality from your way of thinking, you eliminate our ability to claim anything against him - even to claim what he wants to take out.
On the other hand, from your words it seems that when we see a complex world, then certainly *any* type of intelligence would want to achieve this, however strange it may be, even if it thinks in a fundamentally different way. (As if the desire to create something complex is included in your view in K) Things are puzzling. I would be happy to explain.
B. (Questions 2,3) The moment you claim that his way of thinking is structured in a *essentially* different way from ours, you also discount the possibility of the hypothesis of its existence. As you posit a source of a phenomenon by something increasingly complex and increasingly strange, this greatly weakens the feasibility of the hypothesis Pr(h|k).
Here too, it seems that you are not afraid and even willing to give the creator hypothesis the attribute of “creating worlds” as you mentioned. Just to save the strength of the explanation [Pr(e|h&k)/Pr(e|k)],
while the opponent does not take into account the crushing damage to Pr(h|k)….

And if we examine your methods in relation to Nehemiah Daksupa, we see:
@The Nehemiah Daksupa method (increases the strength of the explanation for the creation of the universe with free choice in a world where there are many trials and difficulties on the one hand, and on the other hand without harming *at all* the programmability of the hypothesis.)
@ In contrast to the Rabbi's lame explanation (which increases G-d's desire to create worlds but on the other hand suffers a fatal blow to the programmability of the hypothesis)
@ And in contrast to the Rabbi's destructive explanation (which says that we have no understanding of G-d and therefore there is simply no way at all to assess the strength of the explanation of the Rabbi's hypothesis on the one hand, and on the other hand also reduces the feasibility of the hypothesis)

P.S.1
You mentioned whether complexity is objective. I wanted to comment on the matter that I agree that in the 6666 cube there is indeed objective uniqueness, since instead of a uniform distribution of the results, there is a result that repeats itself. Compared to something like 123456 in complexity, I am honestly more hesitant, but my heart also tends to say that it is objective uniqueness. Compared to the dogma I gave that star A will be in position X,Y,Z and star B will be in position X’Y’Z’.
But still, however high the uniqueness, it does not help us assume that there is someone behind it who caused this, unless it is the assumption that that person behind it did indeed want to bring about the above result.

In any case, if the Rabbi does not want to continue discussing this matter, I accept it.
I would just be happy for the Rabbi to answer the original questions, which did not touch on these matters at all. But on the subject of what is called a good and bad deed in creation.

It is clear that he wanted to bring about this, but this is not an assumption but a conclusion. I do not assume that this is his will but conclude that it must have been his will.
I did not understand the question.

I had two questions here in general and one request. In the rest of my words I explained the questions.
To the extent that you assume that God is perfect, then you need to give a reason for why He created the world, because it is not understandable that a perfect thing would create a world. All the reasons we know for action come following the awakening of a prior external cause that the will came to complete. Or for the sake of a future good goal. The Rabbi wants to claim that there is another category, let's call it Z. (I agree that it is logically valid) that claims that there is a possibility of will but not due to a defect or a desire to do good.

1) Now, because we have no idea what that Z is, we cannot assess the likelihood that Z will create the world from the multitude of other possibilities that God faces.
2) As soon as you add an unknown tendency Z to creation, then it greatly weakens the power of the explanation of the matter.
This is my question: why does the Rabbi not think so.

And the request is whether the Rabbi can answer the original questions because we have drifted into a topic not so related to the original.

I will answer one more time. There is no trace of importance to his purpose in creating the world. The fact that there is a complex world means that someone created it (and he probably had a purpose, and for that matter it doesn't matter what it is). That's all.

I asked what the original questions are that you are seeking answers to.

It is clear that the purpose is irrelevant, for example, what the thing resembles. If we see a bottle of Coke on Mars, let's assume that there was an alien who created it, even though I don't know what its exact purpose was.
But the answer that would satisfy me about the alien cannot satisfy me about God.
Because of a very simple division. While with the alien, I assume that even if I don't know the *exact* explanation for which he created the bottle of Coke.
I assume that he has the same *pattern* of explanation in fact, of the same *type* that I know, i.e., filling a deficiency/future completion or for a good purpose.

But with God, the most complete being, it is difficult for us because the pattern we know for voluntary action does not fit what can be with the Creator.
After all, making up for a deficiency does not belong to the one who is being compensated. And to do good with a complete benefit is evidence that is hidden before our eyes - as we know, we are not similar to God, so apparently He was not good either. Conclusion The Creator thinks in a fundamentally different way than we do. But once we reach this conclusion, my argument is that we cannot assume anything about Him, and what's more, it is a terrible explanation.
And so, the Nehemiah Daksupa method comes to the rescue. Does it do this? This is my original question and for this reason I asked all the preparatory questions.
Well, the original questions are: (a-c) Question D’ We have already corresponded more than enough regarding the general position in it.:

A. But it is not clear whether a good action really occurs in the creation of something out of nothing, or only in 'correcting /helping/ and improving' an existing thing? After all, as long as there was no Creator, we had no needs, and in any case the difficulties or benefits we received from Him had no meaning.
B. It is not clear to me at all what it means to create something out of nothing that is called good? Is it meant to be a creature with *maximum pleasure*? Or is it to be the *most complete* being [I do not assume that perfection is pleasure]? Or is the mere existence of something already a good thing?
C. (Related to the end of 2 but from a different angle) Assuming that a good act indeed occurs in the creation of something from nothing, when God creates a suffering/defective creature, does He create a creation that is less good than a happy/complete angel? After all, it is not possible to establish the relationship between non-existence and any existence whatsoever – between a perfect creature and a suffering and defective creature…
C1. Even to the extent that it is true, it is still possible that there is a fundamental difference between a happy angel and a suffering human being. They are not the same entity at all! A happy angel is fundamentally different from a suffering human being [he is not the same “I” as him]. What does the Rabbi think about this? Then K. W. that the creation cannot be put.
C2. And to the extent that the answer to C is that there is indeed a less good act in creating a flawed creature, is the creation of a flawed creature an evil act? Or is it not just an act of maximal good? [After all, that evil would not otherwise exist at all]
C2. If the answer to A is no (there is nothing good in creating something out of nothing), is it in conjunction with C indeed the best thing for God to create a screwed-up reality and then help it? For example, for a doctor to create a sick person in order to cure him?

With blessings, and thanks for the response so far.
Koby.

I've already answered that. The work is not necessarily good, so all your questions are based on an assumption that has no basis.
I'm done.

So what if the creation is not necessarily good? Not necessarily, since a complex world exists, this is a sign of a designer. We only assume that there is probably a designer, but surely? Why not. Hence the conclusion that the assumption that there is a creator for a complex thing has no basis.

Is it possible to have a good creation? According to the Rabbi, it means yes, and these are exactly my questions when are good creations called such. And when are they not? According to what parameters do they go by? Perfect or perhaps maximum pleasure. Etc. Etc.