Jewish Answers to Ancient Philosophical Questions
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Greetings to you.
A. - Regarding your statement that there is a problem in relying on the Sages' view, the article was written with the opposite mindset. There are additional important virtues in the biblical text in the field of philosophy in general and in the fields of ethics and the philosophy of language in particular.
The great skepticism that prevails in philosophy today does not allow for any proof or stable basis for agreement between people. Philosophy and ethics in particular must be based on education, on culture. For the sake of social existence, society needs a social contract that will be binding on everyone, and this was one of the main goals of the giving of the Torah. In the Middle Ages, Maimonides compiled the Jewish canon in the field of thought, faith, modeled on the tenets of Judaism. I see these tenets, and primarily the tenet of Torah from heaven, which were accepted in the communities of Israel as axioms, as a stable basis for the authoritative growth of Jewish philosophy.
Therefore, relying on the absolute acceptance of the Mishnah and the Gemara in all the Diaspora of Israel, I chose to develop specifically Sage sources into philosophical views concerning other issues.
-The words were written from the belief that all miracles can be considered as within nature (except for the ten things that were created on the eve of Shabbat between the sunsets). The wonder at the remote possibility of their existence always accompanies them, but they are not unperceived as natural. In any case, the main purpose of miracles is to save the believer, and not necessarily to prove their divine origin. (Regarding the sign and miracle that come to encourage those who are weak in faith, we are warned not to take it too seriously – “The sign and miracle that spoke to you, saying, Let us go and serve other gods…”).
B. -Of course, calling the name of the vessel is, as you say, a matter of definition, and refers to the human use of the vessel. So with the ship of Theseus and so with the tools mentioned in the mishna. Apart from that, I do not find any ontological meaning in the artificial name of the tool.
-Indeed, in the use of the term ‘humanism’ the intention is that man is the measure of the world. As explained at the end of the third question: “It is humanistic, since it refers to laws, the purpose of which is the eternal good, as revolving around man as his condition.”
C. -The reference to the widespread use of the word ‘good’ as usually referring to relative and not absolute good. Thus, the commandments came as a response to reality in order to improve it.
-That is precisely how the supreme ’good’ of hearing the voice of the court was mentioned, and it surpasses current moral-social good. Regarding the discussion you referred to from Tractate Horiot, to the best of my recollection, it is only discussed there when the court would have reversed itself if it had understood it properly, and not when it was stubborn in its claim (as in the case of Aknai's oven, where they insisted against Rabbi Eliezer). Am I right?
Best regards,
1. I understand that you accepted my main comment about the falling tree. In your words, you only addressed the question of why to rely on the sages. But even in this you gave me a didactic educational answer, while I asked a fundamental question. If the sages are not a valid source on which to build philosophy because they are wrong in these areas, it does not help to say that such a construction is useful because people trust them. People who trust them are wrong. I argue that the sages were not qualified in philosophy or science, and have authority only in halacha. This is similar to the situation in my opinion if you were to base a theory on the sages that the Earth is not round because people accept their authority on these issues. Is this reasonable in your opinion?
The belief that miracles can be considered part of nature (which is expressed by quite a few rishonim and thinkers) is wrong, as I explained. My intention is to say that miracles constitute an exception to the laws of nature that we are familiar with. Therefore, the question of when they were created (before or within the world) is irrelevant. In short, when a miracle occurs, the laws of nature that are familiar to us are temporarily suspended. All this is regardless of the role of the miracle (whether to save the believer or not). I am talking about the very existence of the miracle itself.
B. But if this is so, then the conclusion that the derivation of the impurity laws regarding consciousness that generates reality has fallen, since this is a definition and not an ontic phenomenon. So what does it have to do with quantum theory? By the way, even quantumists no longer really believe in this today (they did an experiment with two cracks without human consciousness and there was still a collapse). Think of a concept that is defined according to the person, such as a “comfortable chair to sit in”. Let’s say that the person is now thin and this chair is no longer comfortable for him. Would you argue that you see from this that the person’s consciousness affects reality? Is it correct to draw an analogy from this to “humanism” in the form of quantum theory?
C. As I explained, there is no connection between the evidence you presented and Euthyphro's dilemma. It doesn't matter whether goodness is relative or absolute.
Regarding the one who errs in the mitzvah of listening to the words of the sages, opinions were divided among the Rishonim. Some wrote as you said. I remember there is an article by Yaakov Blidstein on this, and many more.
All the best and much success,
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