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What is your opinion on Yuval Dayan’s failure to shake hands with the President of the United States? Is this from the rabbinic point of view? And what is your halachic opinion on this issue?
(Another unrelated question) What is your opinion regarding Rabbi Ovadia’s ruling regarding the permission for modern-day scholars not to pay taxes (Yecheva Da’at Part 5)? And what is the definition of a scholar in your opinion?
Thank you very much in advance.
I wrote about it briefly here a day or two ago. In my opinion, Yaffa did it in her opinion that it is forbidden. In my opinion, there is definitely room for leniency when it is not a matter of (sexual) affection and showing respect to a person, and certainly to the president. But I think her action deserves great appreciation, and it certainly does not constitute blasphemy, as all sorts of self-styled intellectuals have confused people with.
I am not familiar with this ruling, and I highly doubt whether there is such a ruling. Rabbi Ovadia or anyone else is not authorized to exempt anyone from taxes. And even if he is halachically correct, it does not exempt them as long as the law does not exempt them. Therefore, there is no point in discussing the definition of a scholar in this matter.
This ruling is found in Yahveh Da'at, Part 5, Section 17. I would be happy if the Rabbi could look there at his leisure. And also regarding the argument that I am only obligated to uphold the laws of the government/kingdom but not the rulings of the High Court of Justice. What does His Honor think about that?
If we assume that the halakha will exempt Torah scholars from taxes even though the law requires them. Why would he be obligated to pay if the halakha exempts him? Because morality requires it? One can also doubt to what extent morality requires it, because if we accept the assumption that Torah scholars are superior people, etc. and protect the world and without them the world would collapse (I am exaggerating of course), then they actually "pay" us enough taxes, so the moral argument also fails...
I quickly went through. His first claim that there is a law of demalkuta in the Land of Israel as well, is not necessary. The obligation can also come from the law of the community regulation that certainly applies to every community. His second claim that there is no permission to impose a tax on a T”H, I did not see in his words why this rejects the law of demalkuta. And I did not see that if they passed and imposed it, it does not apply. And I did not see what the law is regarding a country that does not practice according to the halacha. The whole matter is absurd in my opinion. It is a fact that taxes must be paid legally. Besides,
they also receive services in exchange for taxes, and if they do not pay, it is theft (even for a system that is forbidden to impose taxes on them), and the concept of tax today is different from what was accepted in their time.
Those who contribute to the economy also contribute to Israel's security. Can they also evade taxes because of this?
I didn't see his statement about the High Court (as I said, I skimmed it quickly). On the face of it, this too is completely absurd. He did not detract from the rules of the congregation, and what's more, Dina Demalkota gave them the power.
The words about the High Court are actually referring to the tweet of Eliezer Ch'16, the sign of the hand,
If I understand the Rabbi Institute, it claims that even if the law forbade taxing a tax collector, if it chose to tax the tax collector, then the tax collector is obligated to pay the tax, and everything that we are not obligated to obey the state is precisely in things that the state says violate Torah prohibitions, but if the state acts against the Torah, that does not mean that we are not obligated to obey the consequences of this action.
I would be happy if the Rabbi could take a peek there, Eliezer, and glance around.
I took a look. He claims that if there is an obligation to obey a court (and not a direct order from the king) the doctrine of prohibition of courts is abolished.
This does not concern the High Court, since the High Court interprets the law, and it is like a direct order from the king. Furthermore, a High Court order is not a judicial order but a law. They do not deal with a specific person but with the interpretation of the law itself. Therefore, it certainly does not belong there.
Personally, I believe that there is no prohibition of courts here either, or more precisely, there is no obligation to obey it. See column 448.
I understand. Thank you very much.
In the words of the Yahva Da'at [that there is a law of royalty from the Torah even for the king of Israel in the Land of Israel, and even for a worshiper of idols, and it is the law of the government, and even for the government of the Hizmet, and therefore it is forbidden to smuggle in the customs. “However, we need to be aware that according to the Halacha it is forbidden to impose taxes on Torah scholars who study Torah”]
A. You said even if there is no permission to impose taxes on the T”H, perhaps there is permission from the law of royalty, and even there is no permission for the monarchy if it imposed a binding law. [The Yahva does not deal with this, and perhaps it does, but I will ask in the form of suggestions]. The suggestion that the royal decree has permission is not clear to me, so why did they say there is no permission to impose a tax on the private sector? Of course, they turned to the body that can impose a tax on other people, meaning it has royal decree for this, and they turned to it and said, "You do not have permission to impose a tax on the private sector." And the suggestion that even something that a king is forbidden to do if he does it and does it has a dina demalkuta, in itself does not seem so plausible, and there is also evidence for this from the reasoning that is cited there, which rules that everything stated in Parashat Melech Melech is forbidden to do and says that therefore even the kings of Israel do not have a dina demalkuta law, but they judge only according to the law of the Torah, it is proven that the reasoning taught that if it is forbidden by the king, then it also does not apply to the dina demalkuta, and that if it is forbidden to impose a tax on a household, then it does not apply to the dina demalkuta.
B. The issue of a state that does not practice according to the law of the law, did you come to give it additional power and therefore it will have the power to impose taxes on a household, even though a state that does practice according to the law of the law does not have the power to impose such taxes and they have no validity.
C. The issue that the concept of tax today is different from what was accepted in their time. You probably mean that taxes in their time were to enrich the king's coffers and taxes in our time were to finance public functions. But it is clear that even in their time, funding was required for public functions such as fixing the roads and maintaining police officers, and this funding came from taxes, and from this tax exempt taxpayers.
Therefore, even what services are received in exchange for taxes and if they do not pay is theft, this must be discussed. Ostensibly, in public services (such as paved roads) the taxpayer who is exempt from tax can certainly use them, so what is the power of the exemption, and the public's duty to share with them. And in private services such as pensions and individual grants, which these private services are apparently a new thing in recent generations, the discussion remains as to whether the taxpayer who is exempt from tax is entitled to cheat and take from them. But this distinction between private and public services is very vague, and if it is based on it, then it must be said more broadly that there is no division between the two and that everything that the individual receives is received as part of the public.
A. A community also imposes taxes. And in many cases, even when the king imposes taxes, the community distributes them among its people. I don't think the comparison to the king of Israel is appropriate. He is prohibited from having many wives and horses because he is Jewish and subject to the law. That doesn't mean he has no authority. For example, is a Gentile king forbidden to have many wives and horses? Of course he is allowed. The king of Israel is prohibited from having many wives and horses, but that doesn't mean he doesn't have that authority.
B. The same answer. Everyone has the power to impose taxes, but it is prohibited.
C. I disagree. A T. cannot use the road if he doesn't pay taxes, if the public forbids him. The fact that he is not taxed does not cancel the prohibition of theft. The same is true regarding the public's obligation. Even if the public has an obligation to share, it is the public that decides on it. I have an obligation to give charity, but that doesn't mean that the poor are allowed to take it from me.
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