Knowledge and choice
I heard in the rabbi’s lesson about free will that the rabbi claims that God does not know because it is impossible to know something that has not yet happened, and you mentioned that perhaps God is above time and you said that it does not seem that way to you, and I did not understand why, because after all, if there is a contradiction to the things we know because of His knowledge, this justifies drawing a conclusion that He does not know. But if He is above time and we have no idea what is truly above time, how can we conclude just because it is impossible to know something that has not yet happened that He does not know?
2. Regarding the very question of knowledge and choice, I don’t really understand why this is a contradiction because if I am now at a crossroads and can choose to continue straight or to the left or to the right and I choose to go right even if God already knew it and today I cannot continue straight or to the left, this does not contradict that I am the one who chose to go right and not in another direction even if today I cannot choose otherwise from His knowledge because in the end God knows what I choose and although this greatly narrows my choice, it does not completely negate it and God’s knowledge does not necessarily contradict my choice.
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You wrote “But then you cannot say that He knows something “now” or at any other moment.”
Naw, exactly, you cannot say ‘that God knows’ according to Maimonides. Just as you cannot say that He is wise, omnipresent, one, and all the other titles.
Therefore, if God gave this information to the prophet, then it negates free choice because ‘the information already exists’, and therefore in the laws of repentance he asks about ‘A stranger will be your seed’ ‘and this people will arise…’ Why does this not negate free choice, and not simply refer to the question of knowledge and choice.
It does deceive, as the Maimonides himself says. But that was not the initial question.
I read the columns. I didn't really understand the argument against the opinion of the conflict (I think RS writes this too), or what you called the 'movie'.
The Nikomb paradox only proves that there is a contradiction if the information meets the behavior of the person in certain situations. What contradicts the possibility in general that God knows but I have full choice?
Thanks
It was explained in detail there. If God has the information, He can always play the prophet's game.
I ask, since the prophet's game of contradictions that you presented only in certain situations, why is it contradictory in general? I couldn't understand. You explained modal logic and then said you disagreed and went straight to examples.
I'll come back again. If he has the information, can he or can't he play the prophet's game? It's not a specific situation. He can always play it with the information he has.
So the contradiction is in the situation?
And if he chooses not to play? That is, God knows and doesn't tell anyone.
I'm trying to understand if there is a fundamental contradiction here. What do you see because of the prophet's game?
I don't understand what's unclear. I'll come back again. It doesn't matter if he decides to play or not. The fact that he can start a game like this creates a contradiction to the assumption.
Sorry, but I didn't understand😬
So God ‘can’t’ play the game. Why does that mean he doesn't know?
He can. Why can't he?
Because there is a logical contradiction in the game.
But there is no logical contradiction in that he knows.
So he can't play just as he can't break all the rules of logic.
He has all the information. Why can't he play? There's no reason. That's it, I've exhausted it.
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