Light bulb with motion sensor
Hello Rabbi, I stayed with friends on Shabbat. In their neighbors’ garden there is a lamp that turns on when it detects movement near it. The problem is that it also turns on when you pass by the garden next to it (where I stayed). The question is, is it permissible to pass by where I know it will turn on? By the way, I don’t enjoy it turning on, its light hardly affects my yard.
In my opinion, it is permissible (although one has to consider the law of the meddling and the psir, and in particular that here the meddling is against the rabbinical prohibition and there are poskim who permit it – Maga and Terumad, and Akhm). I remember that there is a refutation by Rabbi Wesner about motion sensors and I remember that he permits it. My simple explanation for permitting it even without regard to the law of the meddling and the psir is something like no one forbids something that is not his. It is not possible for someone to put something in his yard and thus not allow me to use my yard. This is indeed an explanation in the law of neighbors and not in the law of Shabbat, and to me it seems correct. If we prohibit it, it allows us to put such light bulbs in the yards around me and tighten my indroniya.
Regarding the rabbi's ingenious explanation, I usually also extend it to matters of Judaism, for example (it is not possible for a clothing manufacturer who mixes linen with wool to force me to pass against my will, just because I am wearing the garment).
I don't know if this is a joke at the expense of my explanation or if it was said seriously, but the example is not similar. The manufacturer failed you in a crime, but because you bought it, it is indeed a crime. And if you found it there, you demand your money back. What is the point of this, Dan Didan?
And some jurists have already divided that when the prohibition is in the possession of a person, a person prohibits something that is not his (for example, when someone mixed your meat with your milk). See my article in a good measure, P’ Hakkat (appears on the website).
Is it possible to explain the Rashba's opinion regarding a person closing his house and finding a deer kept inside it in this way?
I assume that you will limit the explanation only to the case of a grama in which the person who places the sensor and the sensor can be seen as performing the action, and not the person who walks by it, and not to the case where my action is direct.
🙂 Joke of course
Rashab”a writes explicitly: Unless we intend to lock a door for it, and to say that if we have to lock a door for it, it is permissible even if we intend for the deer to be hunted inside it.
We see that this is not because the deer cannot force you to commit a crime, because it is permissible to even intend to hunt it
No one forbids something that is not theirs, it does not belong here. Because they did not impose a ban on something that is yours. You are simply not allowed to do a job, and if it is a job, it is a job.
D’
I see no connection to the deer. Can't the deer make me commit a crime? The deer is not intelligent and this explanation does not belong to him. In general, this Rashba's opinion, as is known, has received several explanations in recent times, and now.
Daniel,
I wrote that it is a kind of opinion that a person does not prohibit something that is not his. It is clear that this is not exactly it.
It is not clear to me what “like” you thought no one forbids, etc.’.
Or this act is a work/birth – and then it is forbidden.
Or this act is not a work/birth – and then it is permitted (and it may not be a work because it is a natural occurrence + it is not permissible for it).
It cannot be that this is a work and that it is permitted only because it allows for placing such bulbs in the yards around me and for me to be tied to the indroniya. We have not found that a work would be permitted because of the possibility of abuse by others.
Unless you mean to say that this is a stronger level of “it is not permissible for it”, or you mean that this is not a work from the Torah, and the Sages did not rule on this kind of work because it allows for abuse (why did I get angry? Need evidence for this).
See here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0BwJAdMjYRm7IY0xlc1dmYTMweVE
Lesson 40, Constitution
I have already explained my opinion. I will only comment on the request for evidence. If there is a reason, evidence is not required (why did I call it a reason). And even if I were to bring evidence to the Rabbi, would you ask him if he had evidence? So why is the Rabbi allowed to bring up a reason and not me? There are such reasons in Halacha, and usually they come from reason and not from evidence. That is why I referred you to my article on the Constitution that is mentioned here. In particular, it concerns a rabbinical prohibition, and I also included other considerations here (such as the passage in the rabbinical prohibition).
Following on from this question, you mentioned the explanation that a person does not forbid anything that is not his. What would be the ruling if I visited a secular friend on Shabbat whose entrance to his house has an electronic eye (an LED that flashes when you pass by) and a lamp that turns on automatically? Would it be permissible to visit the friend because this falls under the same permissive rule of no person forbidding anything that is not his, or in this case because it is a yard that belongs to the friend and he also owns the lamp, then he forbids himself and the entire world from passing by the lamp and the eye?
Indeed, this explanation does not belong in the person's own court. But there are other permissions.
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