Mental/psychological damage
Is psychological damage considered a crime in tort? It is important to note that in psychological damage there is a “change in the human body” for example in post-traumatic stress disorder there are hormones whose secretion increases/decreases in response to trauma.
The question is about cases in which physical harm was caused from which mental harm results, for example rape (although it is not clear that the act of rape created physical harm). What is the law regarding the harm that results from the act of rape?
And what about traumas caused by something external or indirect, for example a person being locked in a dark stairwell (in a way that the perpetrator is at fault) or a small child being shown a horror movie?
Hello.
You asked a worthy question and it touches on several broad aspects of the attitude towards mental harm (such as the permission to desecrate Shabbat for mental harm, i.e. fear of mental harm. There are discussions in the AGM and the Hatas about sending a mentally ill person to a hospital that treats him but feeds him forbidden foods. Is it permissible to break a prohibition in order to heal the soul? See also Rabbi Yisraeli’s article in Tecumin 1 or 2 regarding spiritual desecration, i.e. desecration of Shabbat for saving a Jew from destruction. He cites a dispute between Toss and Rashba about whether this is more serious than physical desecration or not, and even in this regard, Papal Tuba has some merit). I don’t have time to go into this in detail, so I will address it here in a nutshell.
First, I will preface this by saying that in my opinion the physiological aspects, as long as they are not apparent, are not relevant to the discussion (see also Rabbi Binowitz’s discussion in the well-known reply in the Nachum discussion on a magnetic card that opens doors. There he insists that changes in the world that are not apparent do not count as changes in the matter of Shabbat work). Therefore, if we decide that mental injury is injury, this will be true even if it does not have an organic origin, and if not – then it is also true if it has such an origin.
As for the matter itself, in the Talmud itself we find that there is permission to desecrate Shabbat due to fear of death in a woman giving birth or a child, etc. It is true that such expressions can lead to danger to life. But I think that in the law of the Shura, we have a deinite opinion that one desecrates Shabbat, and Rashi and R”t disagree on whether this is because of the fear of death (R”t) or because the eye is as important as life (Rashi). And according to Rashi’s view, there is great reason to believe that significant injury to the soul is certainly no less serious than blindness in the eye. And if the injury exempts a person from a mitzvot (as a fool), then ostensibly one desecrates Shabbat for him so that he will keep many Shabbats, as if it were a dangerous injury to the body.
Although all of this is on a principled level. But with regard to damage and compensation payments, there is room to discuss the law of non-apparent damage (because the expenses of treatment are only a burden and are exempt from them in human law unless it is a case of significant damage, in which case one of the five things that the tortfeasor pays is treatment). Although, ostensibly, when the damage is apparent in apparent behavior, the damage is apparent, but here we have returned to the opinion of Rabbi Rabinowitz above. And it seems to us that in our day such damage is certainly completely apparent, and is considered normal damage for everything. Just as intellectual property on its content is not considered something that does not exist today. In these matters, everything depends on the culture and customs in our environment. And today there is a clear recognition of injury to the soul as injury to everything.
But of course these things require much more detailed clarification.
Thank you very much for the quick answer.
In my opinion, there is no connection between the permission to desecrate Shabbat and the obligation of the harmdoer to pay for his damages. The permission to desecrate Shabbat in a state of pikuach nefesh does not result in a charge for damages. A person who harms his friend in such a way that the damage is in a state of pikuach nefesh is certainly permitted to desecrate the Shabbat on him, while the harmdoer will be exempt from paying.
Regarding the physiological aspects. In my opinion, damage is evident not in how its effect appears but whether there is a “change” in the damage. The change must cause a financial loss because otherwise it is not harmful) and therefore “substantial” is the damage (there is a financial loss) that is not evident (because there is no real change in the wine. The change is a spiritual law, not a physical one)
In essence, my question is whether when a person suffers from anxiety at the sight of a murder, he should be paid for it because there is a fundamental change in the damage (both physiologically and evident in his behavior) and he is obligated to pay. Or, since trauma is created in a person as a result of experiences and the background from which he comes, it can be said that the harmer is not solely responsible for his damages because the damage is also "faulty" and therefore can be exonerated.
In my opinion, there is no direct connection, and I also wrote this. But the desecration of Shabbat is an indication or another context in which mental damage should be discussed. That is why I brought this up.
Regarding the obviousness of the damage, I already wrote in my words that internal physiology is not something obvious. If there is something obvious here, it is in the mental symptoms.
When a person suffers from anxiety about a murder that was not committed against him, it is at most a gramma. Like a person who sees a murder and is frightened and falls and is injured.
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