Moral education

One more addition. I am against consequential thinking. If someone sets out on a killing spree, I must try to prevent it. But ignorance and training are not the appropriate way to do this (even if it were effective, and I am not sure of that). This is what they claimed after Rabin's assassination that religious thinking and education lead to extremism to the point of murder. And I argued that even if this were true, there is no argument here that would prevent me from educating my children religiously. At most, I should be careful that it does not happen. Perhaps when there is a near certainty of moral harm, there is justification for training (preventing thinking), but that is only in extreme cases. See the next column I will publish soon (continuation of the discussion on incitement).

I suppose it's a matter of personal taste, but the focus of a child, teenager and adult's identification with the religious world they encounter is an encounter through characters who see in their path and personality something great and significant that they want to adhere to, even if they can't define God or his beliefs in a precise literal way. Of course, the subject is not the characters, but the connection to God and the overall path, but the encounter is through existing reality and not rational and philosophical arguments.
I have no problem with being exposed to questions, and also recognizing various problems in faith, some of which are insoluble. It is also important to learn to live with certain problems. But my feeling from the site is of a complete disconnection from all of Israel's tradition throughout its generations. Intellectual clarification, as the site suggests, does not fit with this identification, but rather uproots it.
Even if everything is open today, an approach that identifies more with Israel's tradition can be beneficial to those clarifying, along with leaving religious emotion in its place.
I don't know many people who would want to be enslaved to a religion that seems intellectually reasonable, and perhaps more plausible than other alternatives, if it lacks a certain content of meaning and closeness to God. I wonder if you're not uprooting everything in order to arrive at intellectual proof.
The argument about morality revolves around this point: morality requires the same level of intellectual proof, and it is no more well-founded, and yet you don't bother to clarify all the philosophical questions before we refrain from stealing, murdering, and raping. Why? Probably, because there is less attraction to alternatives in this area (how many want to join ISIS anymore?). But that's not a real argument.
In short: 1. From an educational perspective, there is harm, in my opinion, in the sense of sharp disconnection from all Israeli tradition that emerges from the site. I can't blame you for believing in that, but if so, the educational harm must be recognized, and said that it is better for you. 2. On a principled level, I don't understand why we shouldn't fight at the same level with a simple commitment to morality.
Since you are not fighting the natural obligation to morality, it seems to me that the leading consideration is practical – what is the point of the struggle, and/or that you identify more easily with morality, and religion is a philosophical conclusion of a much lower level.

*reader

First, I forgot to add a link to my column on Shk”k that deals with this topic: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8-21/

According to your last words, there is a difference between morality and faith and religious commitment on two levels”
1. In the moral context, results are of great importance even without action from a decision, and there the decision and consideration are just a bonus. In contrast, in religious obligation, the decision is a condition for the religious value of actions (see Rambam, Suf, Mahalach, Melechim).
2. Beyond that, in the field of morality, identification is equivalent to a decision, as opposed to religious obligation, where identification can only express habit and not a decision. As I wrote to you, a decision does not have to be philosophical. As far as I am concerned, innocent faith is also a decision, although it is desirable to be aware of the difficulties and then decide in favor of innocence (since then it is a more complete decision).

Regarding the break with tradition, it seems to me that here we are already completely departing from the previous discussion. Here we are really not talking about luxury (being a decisive philosopher and not an innocent believer). Regarding faith and religious obligation, the question is whether to investigate or be satisfied with innocent faith, and therefore there is still room for discussion. But with regard to the content of tradition, the question is whether the details of the tradition are true or not (and not whether they are proven). My argument is not that it is better to arrive at content philosophically, but that I have great doubts about many of them as to whether they are even true, and therefore it is very important to examine them with reason. In other words, the discussion here is not whether to uphold the tradition out of faith or to examine and reach a philosophical conclusion that it is correct, but rather there is a big question as to whether it is correct at all. And here one should not give up on clarification and decision-making, even if they may lead to lack of identification and religious "coldness". The coldness of fools is not worth as much as a garlic peel in my opinion. There is no pious or ignorant people in the land who fear sin. And the wisdom of the poor is despised (metaphorically).

It is important to understand that the fact that people identify with a tradition just because it is a tradition does not necessarily indicate a hidden decision, but usually a mere habit. And the fact is that sometimes it is a cover-up of complete nonsense with no basis and no logic. This is in contrast to identification with the very faith and perhaps even with the status of Mount Sinai, where identification with the “innocent” can express an intuitive decision (since here the conclusion is correct even after logical criticism. At least in my opinion).
As a rule, in the case where this is not true, I am not willing to give up the demand that everyone decide in favor of innocence. See again the column on the bag linked above.

I read the column about holy lies. And indeed I justified that in your opinion you are here to sift out unfounded beliefs from Judaism – that is justified.
One argument for me – Don't present this as an educational rescue. I don't know who would choose to remain in such a cold religion. Separate and say that the very clarification of questions is an educational benefit, if the one who is useful in clarifying them believed in Judaism more fully.
You are here to do something else – to cleanse Judaism. And there will probably be some people who will follow this path. It is unlikely and not true that this path also prevents widespread dropout. I don't know if its educational benefits are greater than its harms. That is your right – but there is a difference between saving Judaism itself, and preventing secularization.

Another point in this context is that from what I have read so far, I have not seen a direct argument against many of the beliefs included in the Jewish tradition (apart from knowledge and choice, the obligation to strive, and a few others). I have only seen a hypothesis that almost all of the intellectual content of Judaism is not included in the Torah from Sinai, and has been accumulated over the generations. You as an individual do not identify with them, and therefore prefer to sift Judaism from them.
You could choose the path of continuity, and see yourself as continuing one line or another (say, Maimonides in his interpretation of parts of the Torah as parables, or his attitude towards demons, etc.). The bottom line is, there is no holy lie here. It is an axiomatic choice - whether you trust the Jewish tradition as a whole or not. Many trust the Jewish tradition, recognizing its strength, and dealing with various intellectual difficulties - offering solutions, etc. The filtering and refining is also done out of a sense of belonging. The message that emerges from your important words is that most of Judaism is a lie, except for a small kernel of truth.
It seems to me that softening the message would not be a lie even in your eyes, but it would allow many to accept your teachings, and to justify different beliefs in Judaism.
I do not expect you to preach the faith of the sages, God forbid. Just to convey a more gentle and softened message.
Thank you very much and best wishes

I don't differentiate because in my opinion it does both things. Maybe you don't agree with me, but that's my opinion. By the way, in my opinion it may not save the essays but it does save the more intelligent part (as I wrote in column 36 that we are losing it).

I don't know those who are getting the message from my words, but that's not what I wrote. I have written more than once that in my impression the majority is an addition of later generations and was not given from Sinai (the Maimonides also wrote this in the Hadith), but the identification you make between this and the assertion that the majority is false is a wrong identification. On the contrary, my argument is that authenticity is not a condition for obligation. And see the language of the Maimonides in the second root where he wrote that he does not list the midrashic laws not because "they are untrue", p. 111. But it is true that even if Maimonides had not written this, it would not bother me (I do not rely on him). The belief of many in tradition as such is wrong in my opinion, and it has nothing to do with axioms. It is a baseless belief, like Russell's heavenly teapot. Baseless beliefs are not axioms that I see as a reasonable doubt (50-50).
On the other hand, it is true that even if tradition says something, if it is not authentic (not given from above) there is room to doubt it. It is not automatically wrong, but it is not automatically right either. And in general, automatic assumptions are illogical.

All of this will be explained in my trilogy.

We'll probably have to wait a bit longer for the trilogy.
In the meantime, I'll make a few (last?) points:
1. Regarding the inquisitive religious people, I think the law of small numbers is affecting you in recognizing the magnitude of the problem. Since so many of them come to you to clarify their faith, the phenomenon seems out of proportion to you (in my opinion, many of the points you mentioned are correct, but not to the right extent). I studied in quite elitist and equally intellectual institutions, from high school to kollel and university, and in my opinion the phenomenon is completely negligible compared to the religious people as a whole (I know one and a half of the type you described). I certainly don't agree that we've lost the intelligent and honest ones. Life circumstances, and the feeling that the Torah doesn't suit them, are what usually make people change their ways. What is true is that serious people are not willing to accept the option of religious-lite, and if fundamental things bother them in the Torah, they switch sides. To answer, the solution to this has more to do with a deep spiritual response to dealing with the modern world, than philosophical proofs. In any case, I admit that I too am influenced by the law of small numbers, but I have less reason to assume that my sample is biased…

2. I recognize a fairly small gap between your proofs in the fifth book of the Torah from Sinai, and a general trust in their morals, and in their views as a whole. This does not mean that it is impossible to discuss and even disagree on various details. But your starting point, that nothing should be accepted from their words in terms of thought, even in the basic ‘held’ Torah, seems to me wrong, and certainly not healthy for the existence of religious life, and the education of young people.

3. This stems, among other things, from the fact that the identification of the Torah as an influential and founding factor in the people of Israel is related to the great disciples of the sages who developed it and led it from generation to generation. One can argue and disagree with them – of course, most people do not have authority for a specific opinion. But it seems to me that it is not at all right to discuss from scratch – without any reference to their words, which according to you are tantamount to abrogating the Torah, can be studied on Tisha B’Av, are quite boring and so on.
In my opinion, this is similar to the attitude towards science: a person stands before the system of science as a whole and recognizes that there is much truth in it, and therefore will trust the greatness of scientists as a starting point, at least until he studies the issues in depth and comes up with one or another conclusion.
4. For this reason, a person who recognizes the power of the Torah will trust the system as a whole, and will build his view from a dialogue with it. Hence, identification with the Torah and its morality is a significant consideration in (rational!) faith, along with the considerations in the fifth book. I admit that various phenomena, specific incidents, and public behavior of entire communities greatly damage this trust, and this is also another meaning of ‘blasphemy’.
Thanks again