Moral judgment for the return policy
Rabbi, do you think the logic behind the law of returns is a moral logic? Is there any significance to the moral level of the population against which the judges rule in relation to the ruling of the law of justice? Is there any room to argue that it was appropriate to rule as Beit Shammai did, against the law of returns, and that the ruling at that time stemmed from local social considerations and therefore there is no room to accept it today? The question stems from the comparison between Samuel’s Mimra on the response of the people of Nineveh, “Even if he stole a portion of the land and built it in the capital – he should demolish the entire capital and return the portion to its owners” (Bavli Taanit 16) and “That grandmother Datai told Rabbi Nachman, saying to her: A resh galuta and all his rabbis, a resh galuta in a stolen sukkah, he will be buried!” She screamed and I will not look after her, Rav Nachman. She said to him: “Why did my father give me three hundred and eighty-eight shillings of my servant Tsuvah, and I will not take care of it?” Rav Nachman said to him: “It is a shilling, and it has nothing but the blood of trees.” Rashi – “Because of the law of the returnees” (Babli Sukkah no.)
There are divided issues and sages disagree on many issues. The possibility of ruling is open to anyone, as long as the Talmud itself has not spoken. And the ruling can and should certainly be a function of the situation and circumstances.
A ruling like Beit Shammai is more problematic, since the Talmud ruled that the Shabash instead of the Ba’ath does not matter. Although we find Amoraim who nevertheless ruled according to the Ka’bah. It seems to me that someone who believes in the Ka’bah can rule like them. What is being said is that they should not be trusted against the Ba’ath. But someone who rules like this because that is what he himself believes, the fact that the Ba’ath also think so is not a problem. Also in the matter of Didan, you are not ruling according to the Ka’bah, but ruling according to your opinion, but the Shabash also thought so.
The first question is whether practical considerations are part of the moral question or are they an additional layer of policy? Or can we say that there is no point in separating them because morality that is not practical has no meaning?
There is no moral question here at all. It is just a practical-consequential question: what will make people repent?
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