Moral realism
If God’s legislative authority stems from ontological gratitude, and you believe that the concepts of good and evil are independent of him, what happens if that authoritative entity chooses to legislate evil?
At first glance, I thought that in such a situation I would be in a dilemma between the duty to obey him and the moral duty. But the latter does not exist without a command.
So apparently I was supposed to listen to him.
Beyond that, if he had chosen to enact evil, then perhaps I would not be obligated to him. Then I would not be obligated to good because there is no command, nor to evil because the source of the force has lost its authority.
But this is probably an ill-defined discussion. It’s kind of like asking what would happen if the triangle were rectangular. A complete being who created our world cannot legislate evil (maybe theoretically can, but in practice it won’t happen).
I don't think I understand why a complete being cannot legislate evil (and if so, what defines the Creator of the world as such) and why, if the moral obligation does not exist, then the fact that he legislates evil causes him to lose his authority. In general, if indeed the first link in your normative assumptions is that the validity of the moral law derives from the legislator (since it seems that you reject Godless moral realism), why should there be an assumption of a connection between the obligation to obey it and the conformity of the content of the commandment to one or another ideal world (even if you say that its very existence is external to the legislator because the definition of good and evil is true in every possible world)
A complete being is supposed to be good. In fact, we could perhaps say that it is supposed to ‘choose’ good. But this is a compatibilist ‘choice’ (meaning that it could not have been otherwise in light of the nature of the chooser).
If he legislates evil, then part of his authority falls because part of it is based on his being good (beyond being the creator).
But as mentioned, this is a hypothetical discussion, because we live in a world where there is valid morality and there is a good creator (I assume), and it is doubtful to what extent it is possible to discuss another world within this framework.
If his authority is based on his being good, how is this different from the usual position of moral realism other than that there is another entity that accepts the validity of morality (but is also obligated to it as moral facts)?
This entity is not obligated to it. Its nature leads to it. In the language of the latter, the “nature of the good is to be good.” Since it is obligated to it, it commands us, and this also obligates us. I argued in column 457 that morality is as true as mathematics or logic. There is no possibility of another good. But the question of whether to do good is a different question. That is, the assertion that good is not only a neutral fact but also something that obligates action (from the existing to the desired). But the obligation to do good (contrary to the definition of good) imbues authority. God, who is perfect and omniscient and acts correctly by His very nature, is obligated to morality, and we are obligated by virtue of His command.
It must be remembered that God is also obligated to logic and mathematics. These are necessary connections by their very nature, and therefore there is no subordination here in the usual sense of subordination to the law or to someone else. With us, authority is required in order to oblige.
If mathematics and logic were necessary, there would not be a plethora of logical systems and mathematical theories built on different and even contradictory axiomatic systems. Is it possible for something to be “necessary by its very nature,” even though there are alternatives and even more useful ones? And that God is “subject” to it in some unique way because of that? This doesn’t work when the very talk of “logic” in the realm of knowledge is a huge problem, as anyone who has taken an introductory course in the philosophy of logic will know.
This is nonsense. You should repeat the course. When talking about different logics, it is not a substitute for classical logic. Lukashevich's three-valued logic, for example, is itself discussed through the usual binary logic.
Regarding mathematical axioms, this is already a real lack of understanding. Each set of axioms in geometry represents a different reality (space). A given space has only one correct geometry. Beyond that, mathematics is not the axioms but the derivation from them. The logical derivation rules are uniform and agreed upon. When other systems are presented, they are not a substitute for this system but a conceptual framework for a certain context within it.
It is difficult to go into detail here, although this is a very common mistake.
If the transition from the desired to the existing does not occur without the legislative entity, how can it be said that if he chooses evil, this erodes his authority?
I don't see a connection. I explained that our duty stems from his command. But with him, moral obligation is not a duty but a result of his nature. If his nature were different (bad, imperfect), his authority would be eroded.
Miki, where did you dwell on these "vain words"?
I don't remember extending it in one specific place. I commented in several places.
For example, in my article “What is ‘Halot’?”, in an article about contradictions and quantum theory, in columns and answers about the nature of the “laws” of logic (which are not laws like the laws of physics or the laws of the state) and therefore God Himself is subject to them.
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