Moral realism: a question and implications

3. Thank you, but I didn't understand exactly what the difference is between “ethical realist” and “ethical objectivism”, I understood that you belong to both.

P.S.
D.A. I was thinking about another question that you briefly addressed in the previous answer, and I understand that you did not rule it out even though you did not write it explicitly.
You claimed that normative facts such as morality or other commandments from God that appear in the Torah, it is not appropriate to make a prior reduction to why we should observe them, and on the other hand, this is not an arbitrary premise but an axiomatic premise, that we understand that this is a commandment that we should do.

And in any case, it follows from this that you accept that the idea that we accept the Torah upon ourselves cannot be deduced from observing the world. Or if God commands you to do something, it is a sign that you should do it more than if a bunch of market goons commands you to do something and you should keep their words.
Z”A We have the ability to clearly distinguish the strength of validity between a command from God and the command of stupid people. Even though it is ostensibly not derived from anything in our world.

But on the other hand, there are many people, even atheists on the Internet, who, if they are “brought evidence” that there was a Torah giving, will be convinced that they should keep the Torah.
Z”A According to what you say, it can be said that the very fact that they are willing to accept the Torah if they have a real reason for it is a sign that they already secretly believe in God, because without God it does not seem likely that they would have the ability to distinguish between a command from God and the command of the bunch of market goons. (As a kind of anthropological evidence).

3. For our purposes here, it's the same thing.
I didn't understand your argument. What do you mean by "not derived from anything in our world". There is some difference in the world of ethical facts that makes us understand that a divine command is binding and a command of illusions is not. This is exactly the ethical objectivist's argument.
I completely agree with your last comment. Anyone who says that if physical-metaphysical (non-ethical) facts are revealed to him, such as the existence of the Mount Sinai status, he will begin to keep the commandments, is a believer in a certain sense. He at least understands that the revelation at Sinai is not just a physical or metaphysical event, but an event with normative significance. The main difference between believers and non-believers, in my opinion, is precisely on this level and not in the belief itself. At least on the conscious level (it is possible that subconsciously, when they are convinced that there is a God and that He has commanded, they will also understand that it must be kept. But now they are not aware of this assumption that is hidden in them).

Yes, I meant in the material world around us.
In the ethical world, the difference is I understand that you claim that God's command is firm and exists somewhere above. And when we see the command, we understand that it must be kept. (And here it is no longer possible to say why we should keep it, but this is not an arbitrary decision of ours, but a basic understanding (that cannot be reduced) that we must keep them as soon as we encounter them.
So it follows from your words that, as a result of our recognition of religious commandments if they are separate from the moral commandment (which you of course like to claim), there lies a belief in the existence of those commandments, and from this belief we can easily deduce the existence of God Himself, who enacted them, through anthropological evidence. *And* it is not a subjective feeling following a religious education that developed it.
So then, why don't you start the books on faith from this point and that's it. Just as the book of the Khozari began with a dream.
And for those who don't have that feeling, even the proofs themselves won't help them. After all, they will still ask why to keep the Torah.

This is a didactic point. I estimate that many people will say that they have no intuition that there is an obligation to comply, and an anthropological argument in itself is not very strong. That is why I end at this point (the end of the fifth notebook) and do not begin there.

In fact, if that's the case, then morality itself is also weak in itself. Because it too is essentially built on intuition.
Or you claim that religious values are even less strong than moral values. Because moral values have been firmly established throughout humanity, including secular ones. On the other hand, religious values are found mainly among religious people, and in particular among religious Jews who are full of commandments, decrees, regulations and customs, and I think much more so than other religions.
In any case, it's simply obvious to me that it's clear to the average atheist that if they prove to him the credibility of the Mount Sinai status and the fine tuning argument, he will begin to observe the commandments.

So how do you understand that this issue is structured (I would appreciate a reference because it's a long thread) that we are not aware of the multitude of normative values that exist in the world, but become familiar with them only after prolonged thought about them.
The idea is that there were many immoral cultures in the world, but over the years they seem to have become increasingly extinct when they discovered morality, so how did they not know about it until then?
Or nowadays, for example, if you ask an average person about vegetarianism, is it good to eat meat, he will feel discomfort, but on the other hand, when he does not think about it, he does not feel discomfort at all or that he is doing something wrong.
How does the possibility of refining this non-sensory observation arise in us?
Because at first glance, it seems simple that as much as we are exposed to these invisible ideas, then it is appropriate that we know everything at once or that no idea exists. On the other hand, empirically, it does not seem so.
(And, so how can we improve our observation).
Are you talking about this topic somewhere on the site?

Indeed, moral values are more accessible and acceptable than religious ones.
I have not written about this directly. But I have written more than once that to me it is like scientific progress. Over time, more and more ethical facts are discovered, although here it is done in broad social processes (and not within a limited scientific community). I have written in the past that society has an active role in these discoveries.

It follows from your words that the philosopher does not understand matters of morality more than the common man, and there is no expertise in morality.
Rather, the expertise is for the collective tendency, does this also relate to your approach that there is such an entity as a collective?
And the Knesset of Israel is closer to its supreme root?

Doesn't it feel to you that, given the initial assumption that we can expect the ideal of goodness, the obvious conclusion from such sharp changes in the course of human history as in the case of the Humes is one of moral relativism?

You've jumped too far. The philosopher is usually more skilled. Even in a social setting, there are some who formulate the insights and understand better what they mean. They're not necessarily philosophers, by the way. But on average, their understanding is better than the general public.