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Morality I did not follow.

שו”תCategory: philosophyMorality I did not follow.
asked 9 years ago

Hello Rabbi, regarding the Rabbi’s lessons on Torah and morality, I would be happy if the Rabbi could give me sources from the Maharan and Maharal for why the Rabbi said they claim that morality is not always identified with Halacha. If there are other Rishonim or Acharyim who think this way, I would be happy if the Rabbi could also provide them.
And if the rabbi could explain to me how to define the concept of morality, I would be happy.


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0 Answers
מיכי Staff answered 9 years ago
For a definition of morality, see the fourth notebook. Maharal, Be’er Gola , Be’er Hashani (p. 1-2, in the Maharal Books edition): In chapter 2 of Dabba Metzia (21b), they said that it is not necessary to return the loss after the owner despairs. And this seems far-fetched to people, for a person to take what is not his, and he did not work or bother, and covet someone else’s wealth. And this is not according to the religion of morality, because the religion of morality requires that the loss be returned even after the owner of the loss despairs of the loss. And the reason for this is that moral religion requires something that is right to be done according to the correction of the world, even though reason does not require that thing, only that such is the correction of the world. Therefore, moral religion sometimes contains substance in something, even though according to reason and straight law it should not have been done. And sometimes moral religion is extremely lenient when that thing does not need to be done according to the correction of the world, even though it is not right according to reason, only according to moral religion. Therefore, according to the law of etiquette, the lost item must be returned after the owner of the lost item despairs, and this is a serious matter. And vice versa, if he finds a silver or gold item and announces it once or twice, and no one else claims the lost item for a year or two, then he is delaying it for himself and using that item, because there is no worldly correction in this, since if he announces it several times and waits a year or two or more, it will not come again. And this is not according to the Torah, but if he finds a silver or gold vessel and declares it many times, it is forbidden to him forever. Only let it be laid up until Elijah comes, he will never touch them. So they have become very strict. And all this is because the words of the sages are according to the Torah. All the words of the Torah are estimated by reason, and as is proper according to reason, so is proper to do. And as the Torah said (Deuteronomy 4): “And you shall keep and do it, for it is your wisdom, etc.” And it is not a moral religion that places things according to reason and according to thought, and the Torah is completely rational, and the Torah does not turn to reason. Sermons of the Eleventh Rabbi You shall appoint judges and officers for all your gates, etc., and they shall judge the people with just judgment. (Deuteronomy 16:18) Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhak wrote in his commentary (Deuteronomy 16:18), appointing righteous and experts to judge justly. And he was compelled to interpret it this way, since if it came only to appoint judges to judge justly, it is already written after it (ibid. 19) that judgment shall not be perverted, so he interpreted that it came only to say that the judges appointed would be worthy to judge justly, that is, that they would be righteous and experts. And so it is explained in my book (judges according to what is written there) that judgment shall be just, and has it not already been said that judgment shall not be perverted, that you shall not say that such and such a man is handsome, such and such a man is my relative, that is, and I will appoint a judge for us, therefore it was necessary to warn that we appoint an expert and righteous person. And certainly, the language and judge the people on his own behalf proves that it is not a positive commandment, but it is the language of description and narration, but in the same baraita that is explained in my book, he further proves from what is written after it that judgment shall not be perverted. This is the meaning of the text, as the Midrash of our rabbis z”l. But to the layman, the text is as follows. It is known that the human race needs a judge to judge between its members, otherwise each one will swallow his fellow man alive, and the world will be ruined. Every nation needs a political settlement for this, until the sage said that the group of rascals agreed among themselves on honesty. And Israel needed this as did all other nations. And besides this, they needed them for another reason, which is to set the laws of the Torah straight, (and to set) [and punish] those who are liable to be beaten and those who are liable to be put to death by the court of law who violate the laws of the Torah, despite the fact that there is no loss of political settlement at all in that offense. And there is no doubt that in each of the parties two issues will arise, one that will require that a person be punished according to a true law, and the other that he does not deserve to be punished according to a true just law, but will be obliged to punish him according to the correction of the political order and according to the needs of the hour. And the Lord, blessed be He, singled out each of these matters for a special purpose, and commanded that judges be appointed to judge the true just judgment, and He said, “And judge the people with true justice,” meaning He came to explain to these judges what they would be appointed for, and what their great power was. And He said that the purpose of the appointments was to judge the people with true justice itself, and their power could not exceed that. And because the political arrangement would not suffice with this alone, God completed His correction with the king’s commandments. And we will explain further when we assume one side of the parties, then both of us in the chapter were examining (Sanhedrin 42) let our rabbis know him as follows: “He permitted himself to be killed in the midst of a conversation, etc. There is no doubt that all of this is appropriate from the standpoint of justice, because why would someone be put to death, if not because he knew that he had involved himself in something that was punishable by death and had transgressed against it, and for this he would have to receive a warning for it, and all the other things discussed in that baraita, and this is true justice itself, which is handed down to the judges. But if the transgressor is not punished except on this path, the political system will be completely ruined, and bloodshed will increase and they will not escape punishment. Therefore, God, blessed be He, commanded for the sake of the restoration of the world by appointing a king, as it is written in this parasha (Deuteronomy 17:14-15), “When you come to the land, etc., you shall not set a king over you, etc.,” which is a commandment in which we are commanded to appoint a king over us, as it came in the acceptance of our rabbis, the late (Sanhedrin 22), and the king can decide without warning according to what he sees necessary for the political establishment. It was found that the appointment of the king is the same in Israel and other nations that need a political arrangement, and the appointment of judges is special and more necessary in Israel, and as he further mentioned and said (Deuteronomy 16:18), “And they shall judge the people with just judgment,” meaning that the appointment of judges and their ability is that they shall judge the people with true just judgments themselves. And I explain this further, and say that just as our Torah is distinguished from the customs of the nations of the world in the commandments and laws, they have no political correction at all, but what is drawn from them is the flow of divine abundance into our nation and they have adhered to us, whether that matter appears to us as the matters of sacrifices and everything that is done in the Temple, or whether it does not appear like the rest of the laws whose meaning has not been revealed, in any case there is no doubt that divine abundance would have adhered to us, and applied to those actions, despite their being far from the straw of reason. And there is no wonder in this, because just as we have pondered many of the reasons for natural beings, and with all this their reality is consistent, all the more so it is fitting that we should ponder the reasons for the flow of divine abundance and they have adhered to us. And this is what our Holy Torah is distinguished from the customs of the aforementioned nations, which have no business with this at all, but with the correction of the matter of their gathering. And therefore I believe and it is worthy of belief that just as the laws have no introduction at all in the correction of the political arrangement, and are a self-cause close to the world of divine abundance, so the judgments of the Torah have a great introduction, and as if they are shared between the cause of the world of divine affairs in our nation and the correction of the matter of our community. And it is possible that they would have turned more to the matter, which is more sublime in elevation, than they would have turned to the correction of our community, because that correction, the king whom we will set over us, will complete our affairs, but the purpose of the judges and the Sanhedrin was to judge the people with a true and just judgment in itself, from which the divine matter in us will continue to be adhered to, from which the arrangement of their mass affairs will be completely completed or not completed. And because of this, it is possible that some of the laws and regulations of the aforementioned nations will be found that are closer to the correction of the political system than some of the laws of the Torah. And we lack nothing in this, because whatever is lacking from the mentioned correction, the king would have completed. But we had a great advantage over them, because since they are just in themselves, I mean the law of the Torah, as the Scripture says, “Judge the people with a just judgment,” the divine abundance will continue to cling to us. And for this reason, the chief of the judges and their chosen ones stood in a place where the divine abundance was visible, and this is the matter of the pillar of the people of the Great Knesset in the chamber of the scepter (Medot 5:44). And therefore, our rabbis, may God bless them, said in the first chapter of Tractate Avoda Zara (8:2), when the murderers rushed in, saying, “We will come out of the earth and establish a son, and you shall do according to the word that they will tell you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10), indicating that the place is a cause. And from this side, everything that our rabbis, may God bless them continues (Sanhedrin 7:1). Every judge who judges a case of truth deserves that the Shekhina should be with them, as it is said (Psalms 42:1): God stands in the assembly of God, he will judge among God. And in this way, what our rabbis, z”l, said in the first chapter of Shabbat (10a): Every judge who judges a true and true case, even for one hour a day, is raised up by the Scripture as if he had become a partner with the Holy One, Blessed be He, in the act of Genesis, as it is written here (Exodus 18:14) from morning until evening, and it is written in the same way (Genesis 1:5) And there was evening and there was morning. And this partnership alludes to what we said, that just as in the act of Genesis, we see in the practice of the lower ones that from him came into being everything that came into being, so every judge who judges a true and true case, that abundance continues, whether his judgment is completely completed, a political correction, or not. Just as in the act of sacrifices, despite being completely far from the law, the divine abundance was seen, so in the judgments of the Torah it would continue and abound, even if, according to the political arrangement, it required more correction, which the king would complete. And it was found that the appointment of the judges was to judge the laws of the Torah only, that they were just in themselves, as he said, and they judged the people with just judgment, and the appointment of the king was to complete the correction of the political order, and everything that was necessary for the purpose of the time. And do not make it difficult for me what we have said in the chapter “The End of the Judgment” (Sanhedrin 40a) Rabbi Eliezer [ben Yaakov] says, “I heard that a court of law prepares and punishes things that are not from the Torah, and does not transgress the words of the Torah, but rather makes a reservation for the Torah, etc., from which it appears that the appointment of the court of law is to judge according to the correction of the times and the time. And this is not so, but at a time when there will be a Sanhedrin and a king in Israel, the Sanhedrin [are] to judge the people in just judgment alone, not to correct their affairs more than that, unless the king gives them his power. But when there is no king in Israel, the judge will include both powers, the power of the judge and the power of the king. For we find in the chapter The End of the Law (ibid. 44:1) that Amasa said to him, “Achin and Rekin, I will demand, I will forget it.” The Rabbis, in the tractate, opened it, saying, “It is written (Yehoshua 1:18) that every man who turns his mouth, etc., can, even according to the words of the Torah and Talmud, say (ibid.), “Be strong and courageous.” Here we have given Joshua the power of kingship even though he was not a king, and so our rabbis, the blessed ones, demanded (Midrash Rabba Shemot on the text in ibid. 3:5) and he became king in Yeshurun ​​(Deuteronomy 33:5), alluding to Moses.

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אריק replied 8 years ago

Shalom Rabbi
I am not sure that the example from the Maharl shows that the halakha has no connection with morality. The halakha is concerned with both the morality of one person to another and the self-morality of the person. At a basic level, it is concerned with the person trying to find out who the object belongs to. So much for the owner's despair. From there on, it is blessed but not obligatory. The very fact that from the beginning the Torah tells you to search for who the object belongs to, and even to the point of the owner's despair, clearly has a connection with morality.
In addition, there is also a lesson in building a person's personality, which in my opinion is also a moral thing, correcting one's manners, even if it is not expressed in an action towards another person. The very fact that the Torah tells me not to use even if the one who lost it never comes to demand it, builds in a person a deep consciousness that he is using only his own, what he worked for, perhaps even in order to distance himself from the prohibition of theft. Therefore, a moral aspect can be found in both matters.
And the very fact that in many of the laws, and especially the laws that are between man and his fellow man, a moral basis can be seen, shows that the law really has a close connection to this. Because otherwise, I would expect the mitzvot that are between man and his fellow man to appear arbitrary on a regular basis and not just in extreme cases like a gentile on Shabbat... Why don't you steal? You won't murder? You won't covet? And if so, in the mitzvot that are between man and his fellow man, we can look at the general system of the mitzvot and assume that even the least understood ones have a moral root, because there is no reason to divide between the purpose of the mitzvot that are between man and his fellow man and the purpose of the other mitzvot.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

It's not that there is no connection to morality. Halacha adds a religious layer on top of the moral one. The fact that some of the commandments are of a moral nature (although their definitions differ from the categories of morality. Like murder in the gram and reducing, etc.), does not mean that all of them are like that. At most, we can say that the Torah also wants morality, but certainly not only it. This is reinforced if we see that food prohibitions, like many other commandments, do not reflect anything moral that I can discern. So why assume otherwise?
According to your logic, if there are commandments that come to protect property, that means that all the commandments come to protect property. That's strange, isn't it? In my opinion, it means that there are commandments that come to protect property because the Torah wants that too.

אריק replied 8 years ago

So what else could the Torah want? What else can be achieved from the commandments? If this is something that we do not understand and never will, and that we will never see any benefit from it in reality, either in the world or within ourselves, then the commandments lose their meaning. If we do not see any result from the actions and never will, why keep them in the first place?
And if you say that the action is to show the commitment to the thing even if it makes no sense, then the commandments are arbitrary and it would not matter at all what we were commanded.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

Wonderful questions (in the sense of “not wonderful is it from you”). But they are irrelevant to your claim.
I wonder what your answer is to these questions: that the Torah wants morality? What to do if it does not stand the test of facts. The prohibition of pork has nothing to do with morality, nor do other forbidden foods and many other prohibitions and commandments.

אריק replied 8 years ago

So there are 3 options in my understanding. 1) Try to understand what is moral in these mitzvot. If I am not mistaken, Rav Kook goes in this direction. And again, this does not mean that this is the absolute reason, there will always be other dimensions. 2) Do not try to understand what is moral in the specific mitzvot, but understand through deduction that if the system of mitzvot comes to purify me morally, this is also what happens when I keep mitzvot that I do not understand. 3) Come to the conclusion that certain mitzvot have no benefit in any way, and therefore derive from this that I simply have no reason to keep them. Isn't this the expected result?

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

1. There is nothing moral in these commandments, so it is a waste of time. Indeed, God tried to go in this direction and in my opinion he brought up clay in his hand (as expected).
2. I don't really see this "deduction". But the conclusion may be correct (I have no idea).
3. Even if they have no moral benefit, it does not mean that they do not have other benefits. If God commanded it, it is reasonable that they have benefits. Therefore, I do not understand why the conclusion from this is that there is no reason to keep them.

אריק replied 8 years ago

1. Perhaps there is nothing moral in the act itself, but if the act creates a moral consciousness in me, which may also later be expressed in moral actions - it is a moral act.
3. So if the act has some benefit or other that improves reality, by performing the act and being useful, I am performing a moral act. Isn't it?

אריק replied 8 years ago

You say that there is a benefit and therefore one must keep the commandments. But just as you say that there is no moral benefit because I cannot discern it, what reason is there to say that there is any benefit at all? After all, I do not see any benefit and if we are consistent, just as there is no moral benefit because I do not see it, so there is no benefit and therefore there is no reason to keep the commandments. If so, it must be said that although there is no apparent benefit, there is certainly a benefit because it causes me to keep the commandment, and therefore although I do not see the moral benefit at the moment, it is very possible that the moral benefit is the goal.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

1. As I wrote, it is possible that these actions have hidden moral effects. Although I do not notice this and do not see any indication of this. I also do not actually see a relationship between the degree of adherence to the law and the degree of a person's morality. Beyond that, if the commandments are a means, then it is possible to think of other, perhaps better means to achieve the same result. This actually empties them of their content a little.
3. There are various improvements to reality and they are not necessarily related to morality. This is what I call religious values. Renovating the house of the Almighty is not necessarily moral. Just as the goal of creating the world is unlikely in my opinion to be a moral improvement (because morality is a means to create a better society, but then it is better not to create a society and not to ask it to improve and be good).

There is a fundamental bug in the comparison you made at the end. Regarding morality, you and I understand very well what morality is and know how to distinguish what is moral and what is not, what contributes to morality and what does not. Therefore, here I assume that if I do not see a moral aspect in a certain mitzvah, then it does not exist. But as for other (religious) purposes, I do not know what they are, and therefore it is difficult for me to determine that in one or another mitzvah there are none. On the contrary, as I wrote to you before, a very reasonable logical consideration says that it is very likely that creation and us have such purposes beyond morality.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

By the way, I'm not saying that one should observe it because of the benefit. One should observe it because God commanded it. It's just that it's likely that without benefit, it wouldn't have been a mitzvah.

אריק replied 8 years ago

What do I care about renovating the house of the Holy One? If there was no value in it, I wouldn't do it. The question of "what does the Holy One care about me putting on tefillin" takes on real meaning, because I really don't know what He cares about and what He wants from me. Looking at the mitzvot as unrelated to the commandments and our improvement loses their content. And yes, we also keep the mitzvot because we understand that this is what needs to be done. If I didn't think that this is what is true, I wouldn't be interested in it being "the word of God." Because the word of God without any connection to us has no meaning for me.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

The conclusion according to your system is this: Your father comes and orders you to stand on one leg every morning. Since you don't see any logic in this, you tell yourself that it must be beneficial to make me a richer person and therefore I will do it every morning. Oh, don't you see how this is beneficial to wealth or anything else? It doesn't matter. I want to survive and there is no other logic, so you decide that there is this explanation against all logic.

אריק replied 8 years ago

The only difference is that in the first place my father would not have commanded me something that was illogical and meaningless and would not benefit me or him. Since God does not need us, what remains is that it is for our own good.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

See Toss’ Yevamot v. 8221;a that the obligation to honor parents is only (!) when it is in their best interest. And so some rabbis state that if they command for your benefit and not theirs, you are not obligated to obey them.

Does this seem like honoring parents to you? To do it only when it is beneficial to you?

אריק replied 8 years ago

I wrote to him or me. And of course, even more so, that my parents' benefit is my benefit - at least the moral one.

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

But He probably does need us, otherwise He would not have created us. As I wrote above, creating us for us is an oxymoron. He would not have created and there would be no one missing who needs to do things for Him.
Beyond that, the benefit can be for us, but not a moral benefit but a spiritual-religious one. For example, the commandments can purify us and make us closer to Him. This is possible in principle even without any moral improvement.

אריק replied 8 years ago

Can you give examples of religious spiritual benefit? What does it mean to draw closer to Him? Are they just words? Is it correction of morals? Personality building?

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

First, if possible, please give one example of the moral benefit of not eating pork or milk (during pregnancy).

אריק replied 8 years ago

I didn't say I have. But a religious spiritual benefit without explaining it is like saying benefit x. From what I know, devotion to God is likening Him by adhering to His qualities. What is He merciful, even you. And is that immoral?

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

We have exhausted ourselves. I will summarize my position and part as friends:
My argument is that there are commandments in the law that clearly seem to have no moral significance. Therefore, it is unreasonable to attach hidden moral benefits to them. The alternative I propose is that perhaps they bring a different kind of benefit (spiritual, religious, devotion to it, etc.). Perhaps they refine my soul on the moral plane in some hidden way and make me a more moral person (something that does not really correspond to the facts as far as I understand it, but in principle it is possible).
I cannot explain what all this means, but this is the conclusion that follows from the facts. Thus we conclude from the phenomena that bodies with mass fall to the Earth that there is a gravitational force that attracts them. A person can ask, "Please explain to me what that gravitational force is," and he will not receive an answer. It is simply a conclusion that follows from the facts that there is such a thing. I have no direct description or explanation for this thing that there is an abstract existence.

One thing is clear. Anyone who, due to his lack of understanding, attributes to these commandments vanishing moral benefits is suffering from a serious error: he is converting something we do not recognize into something we do know is not true. So what is the benefit of such explanations?

All the best

אריק replied 8 years ago

Thank you and have a good weekend.

מושה replied 8 years ago

My opinion is that whoever calls the force of gravity – the force of gravity is a heretic, because it is a force that God created only after the completion of creation. And it is not correct to call it that, but rather a miraculous force, because this force only works when there are several bodies. And the purpose of God in creating this miraculous force is so that the creatures in the lower world will stay here and not fall, because we are on a ball in the air. Only on Wednesday were the rest of the luminaries created, and yet we are not attracted to bodies larger than the earth.
So from now on, call it a miraculous force

גבי replied 8 years ago

Shalom Rabbi
Following the Maharal's words that you quoted from the Exile Commentary, he continues to explain the logical reason for the Halacha's attitude towards loss after the owner's despair, claiming that the Halacha draws from objective truth (and thus also has a positive effect on those who observe the Halacha) as opposed to the moral religion that originates from interpretation.
Doesn't this contradict your claim about the lack of logical/moral reason for the Halacha?

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

I never claimed that there is no logical reason for the law. I claimed that the law does not necessarily reflect a moral reason.
On the contrary, it seems reasonable to me that there are reasons for the law, even if they are unknown to us. The Mehrab explains that the laws of Shabbat Avidah are not consistent with morality – and these are my words.

גבי replied 8 years ago

His claim that it is not appropriate for polite religion, why necessarily define it as morality?
The source of the loss should not be returned after the owner's despair because according to the truth the loss no longer belongs to the owner of the loss. Is it not possible to define morality according to the truth, if it turns out that it is precisely following the truth that is beneficial, and the real correction?

גבי replied 8 years ago

There the Maharal explained that from this halakha we learn about the value of a person's wealth and other possessions as they are not essential to him, in that after leaving his possession it is no longer his. In contrast to Torah and good deeds which are essential to the person himself, and therefore halakha is supposed to influence the world of a person's values and moral considerations. Isn't this a moral reason?

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

Gabi Shalom.
The religion of politeness is morality and ordinary human justice. See his words there.

No. At most it teaches an important lesson, but it does not justify not returning a loss to its (moral) owners.

גבי replied 8 years ago

From the Rabbi's words "Morality and Ordinary Human Justice" does it mean that there is another type of morality, what do you mean?
Can you also give a brief definition of the concept of morality?
Thank you

מיכי Staff replied 8 years ago

No. There is no other type. For the apocalypse of those who talk about supreme divine morality and other nonsense.
I don't have a simple definition. I assume everyone understands well what we are talking about.

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