Morality that is not according to the categorical imperative
peace
I’ve been thinking for a long time about Kant’s categorical imperative and whether it is really the only criterion for a moral act.
I have 2 questions:
1. Why is the categorical imperative a criterion for a moral act? Is it because it seems to generalize a great many cases in which our intuition says that the act is moral?
2. Cases where I don’t want the act to become a general law but they are still moral. For example – taking leadership or command of a group. In this case, one person needs to do this, but a situation where everyone takes command is not a desirable situation. Another example is accepting different roles in society – for example, choosing to be a doctor seems like a moral act, but it is impossible for everyone to be a doctor, etc.
I would appreciate your consideration.
To understand where the categorical imperative comes from, you have to read Kant. He has a whole process that leads to it.
But in practice, it is clear that we have enough intuition that this is appropriate, and at the same time it is clear that it is not enough and does not exhaust the criteria for morality. In my opinion, it only provides a conceptual direction that helps us think about things.
In practice, even if you wanted to implement it, there is great ambiguity and several different options. For example, in the leadership example you gave, I would like there to be a general law that whoever is most suitable would be a leader. You see, your principle falls under the categorical imperative. Even the example that Kant himself gives, the prohibition against lying in any case because we would not want there to be a general law that permits lying, can be argued in the same way: I would like there to be a general law that permits lying in times of distress.
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