Moves among the standing

I understand that in the ”prohibition of mixing policy considerations” you are actually appealing to the rabbis, who should distinguish between substantive considerations and policy considerations, but not in the publication of every halachic ruling, since it is ridiculous for a rabbi to publish that in principle the halachic is A but that policy considerations are decisive B. The mix between the body of halachic law and policy must be created by the rabbi, and he does not always have to tell the whole crowd about his considerations. I agree with your fixed approach regarding ”holy lies” in general, but in my opinion there is some minimum line at which a rabbi takes responsibility for the public beyond dry halachic data. I see no point in feeling more enlightened than the rabbis or the sages of the generations who have taken this approach, and of course there is a limit to everything.
Moreover, policy considerations may be an integral part of halachic law. More than seeking to do the ”halachic” They seek to do what is right and proper, and the law also recognizes such considerations. Again, there is a limit to everything.
Isn't that so?

Absolutely yes. In every halachic ruling, it is important to make this distinction. The question of how much detail and reasoning to provide is a different question, but it is imperative to distinguish between halachic law and policy. Incidentally, according to Maimonides, whoever does not do this goes through a ”into the Bible”not to add”.

Moshe wrote:
A. By your definition, you are talking about a change in the bottom line, not a change in the actual law, and what do you mean when you say ‘reform’ and what will things lead to?

B. So you are actually appealing to the rabbis not to mix the considerations, because it is simply and clearly ridiculous to expect a rabbi to say that in principle the law is A’ but because of policy X he rules B’.

C. Not that I expect us to now enter into the long issue of “holy lies”, but does the rabbi not have any public responsibility that should lead him to a ruling that involves policy considerations? Of course he himself is clear about what he built his mix of, but the masses of the people who will be exposed to all the considerations can take it, with their lack of experience and intelligence, to unexpected places.

Me,
A. That is exactly my argument. They are wrong when they think this is a reform. But that's how they think.
B. In your eyes it's ridiculous and in my eyes the opposite is a lie, don't add and damage is expected.
C. His responsibility interests me like last year's snow. Why do you have to pay a drachma for sheep? Do what you are commanded and don't lie. The mistakes that come from mixing halakha and policy are more serious than the opposite mistakes. And that's apart from the fact that it is a lie.

In fact, my two responses are two versions of the same question, due to a glitch on my website. You responded to the first with a certain indifference, "The question of how much detail and justification to give is a different question, but it is imperative to distinguish between halakha and policy." You responded to the second more sharply, "His responsibility interests me as much as last year's snow." Why do you care about the sheep of Drachman? I don't understand why, if it doesn't interest you, the rabbi shouldn't be interested either. It's really not sheep of Drachman, but rather a matter for teachers to decide what and how to rule. Again, I agree that there is a limit to this, but it's not at all excessive that there are additional considerations, for better or for worse. [There are beautiful legends about rabbis who understood things from the question and therefore thought more carefully or, conversely, became worse when they realized that there was an ugly exploitation of the rabbi here. And there is also the rabbi who gave money for another Seder meal who was asked if it is possible to go out with four glasses of milk, etc., etc., rabbis are aware of the question and take into account the whole, although there is no doubt that they themselves know what the net halakha is and what is “surrounding”.]

“The errors that come from mixing halakha and policy are more serious than the opposite errors.” I understand that there can be serious errors from mixing, but to the extent of “more serious than the opposite errors”? Can you give an example?

“And that is apart from the fact that it is a lie” – I assume that most ordinary people trust the rabbi's judgment, so it is not necessarily a lie.

Already in the Sages we find laws that are not taught to many, as well as rabbis who forbade certain places things that are permitted due to their ignorance, so it is clear that those who comment are right that the rabbi is not supposed to provide the "Torah" answer, but the "halachic" answer, which takes into account all the factors, and is the conclusion that actually arises. Only when the rabbi asks what the Torah's conclusion is on a particular issue should he give his opinion.
Nevertheless, I have often wondered whether many of the rulings presented in the Sages can be trusted when they are based on an estimate of human knowledge and habits, which in most cases have changed, or are reasonably expected to have changed, starting with the interpretations of the law of the rabbi when a person is called upon for his life, etc. And to the teachings of Even HaEzer in the tongues of Kiddushin and cases of Gittith and its connection with the causes, etc. And I did not find peace in this.
I would like to receive the link to the lecture in question.

Moshe, I highly suggest you read my friend Nadav Shnerb's article, The Jewish Ark of Lies:
<a href="http://woland.ph.biu.ac.il/?page_id=146&quot; rel="nofollow">http://woland.ph.biu.ac.il/?page_id=146</a&gt;

Eliezer,
I also suggest the above article to you. You will find a broad discussion of your questions in my trilogy, which is nearing the end of editing.
Link to the lecture:
<a href="

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Shnerb is an amazing and fascinating writer as always. Logically, it sounds great, but historically, he failed to convince. It seems to me from his words that the first and last rabbis never added extraneous considerations to their rulings, but I am not convinced of this, of course, it is not possible to understand that from their words, and that is exactly the point.
In any case, I accepted and understood both sides.
Only if possible, at least, an example of “errors that come from mixing law and policy that are more serious than the opposite errors.”
Thank you

This is not a matter of examples, but a general principle. For example, when poskim explain to women that they are halachically forbidden to take part in the synagogue, for example, such as women's ascents to the Torah or the Megillah. This is a mixture of policy with halakha, and the result is that people lose trust in poskim for two reasons: It is a severity that is unacceptable to them. In our global era, it immediately becomes apparent that the poskim lied and there is actually a halachic possibility of doing so, and then people do not listen to him even where he is stating agreed-upon and simple halakha.

Well, you know, there is a limit to everything. I will answer in two ways: on the one hand, if religion were even more inclusive and everything was on the table, maybe we would have many more religious people, at least by definition. On the other hand, I don't see those who want the currentness of the halakhah (for the sake of progress, feminism, post-modernism, etc.) adhering to the halakhah in its purity even without the political additions of the rabbis.

You live in a stereotype that I once lived in, of identifying liberalism with laziness. You are wrong.

“All stereotypes eventually come true. That's the terrible thing about life. All those things you fought
against in your youth – you begin to realize that they are stereotypes because they are true” (D’ Cronenberg).
I speak from the field, not from imagination. Maybe I haven't seen enough data for empirical research, but from what I know, those who want updated halakha don't see great halakhic rigor in the dry principles of halakha. I would be happy to be wrong about that.
Thank you

I am copying here what I wrote to the esteemed Nadav Schnerb about his important article. In the last part, there is a point that particularly touches on your claims that the law should always be “refined” and there is no room for additional considerations.
I would appreciate your response.

…Your article on the Jewish Ark of Lies really caught my attention. I spoke about it with a good friend who answers questions on matters of law, and he divided it into two. Regarding the point that the posk sees himself as responsible or a babysitter for the questioner and hides from him the necessary law, he completely agrees. He used several rabbis and left out those who behaved like landlords on the law. He claims that there is a wide variety of rabbis on the continuum, and often the questioner does not want all the clean sides and wants a complete and clear ruling that suits him and he also trusts the rabbi to arrange for him what is best in the eyes of God, but it is clear that in principle the rabbi is not the landlord and he must be fair and transparent. In any case, he completely agrees with this point.
The second point he mentioned is that this entire article is missing one word: humility. It really gets to us that we decide everything and understand everything with our own judgment, but this is not accepted in tradition. The important statement that both Beit Yosef and the Rema mention in their introductions is a spirit of humility that gripped them when they realized that they could not completely decide on matters that the first rishonim who preceded them had decided. This is something that has disappeared from many people today. Some look at the Rishonim and the Poskim as our equals and that we must fully understand all their reasoning and opinion and that the decision depends on our understanding. Historical reality proves that the Poskim of the generations conducted themselves with this kind of humility and did not decide arbitrarily even when they did not fully understand. If all of our halacha is heavily based on the Beit Yosef and the Rema, it is difficult not to accept their approach to some extent. So much for what I have said above.

As for myself, I really tried to understand rabbinic history as you presented it. I saw that you got a little confused with the biblical and rabbinical periods, but with regard to the Rishonim and Aharonim, it seemed to you that the halakhah is necessary and that there are no political considerations involved in it. And you wrote this hesitantly. If your article was essentially very convincing, I was less convinced by the historical part. You can see in many of the responses of the great Aharonim that in public questions they always added political considerations and added opinions and sides and a “long-term view” and a sense of responsibility on many issues, not just purely halakhic. So there is a choice here whether to follow reason as it seems logical to us and therefore not accept all the conduct of most of the respondents, or to fear that it is tradition that also determines that it is not completely understood. This is undoubtedly very painful and difficult for rational people, but if one follows tradition, it is very difficult to separate the ”dry” Halacha tradition from the conduct of Halacha moralists from generation to generation. Not that I am closed on this, but I present to you my deliberations on the subject.
In any case, the article is fascinating and amazing and its main arguments are very correct and I hope the situation improves.
Thank you!

I don't think he or I suggested not involving policy considerations, but rather clarifying what is law and what is policy. And even if the questioner wants a ruling - we don't work for him.
Regarding what they did in the past, I completely agree that the situation today is no different from what it was in the past. However, in my opinion (and I've written here several times) today, continuing this policy is destructive because in the age of databases and the Internet, everyone loses faith in rulings when they discover that it is a subjective matter. Therefore, it is better to work with transparency.

Regarding the lecture attached here:
You claim that it is possible and necessary to be satisfied with every law and commandment that appears in the Torah whether it is still valid in our time, and if the explanation says that there is reason to say that it has been abrogated, then it should be abrogated, and if there is doubt about this, this law should be treated from now on as only doubtful.
And according to you, a person who sees in his understanding that the entire Torah was intended only against the idolatry that existed in the past, but today that the world has progressed enough for him to hold on to local morality and culture and no longer needs religious commandments, you will not reject his words, but will agree with him that in his understanding he is truly exempt from observing the laws of the Torah.
It seems to me that every system of laws must be based on the obligation to prove a change from it, and it is impossible to come and say that the reason for the law is ‘not to wear warm clothes in the summer’ And according to this, changing the law without evidence, because in this way there is no existence for the law, which as mentioned, anyone can arise and invent new definitions or conditions for the commandment in his own interpretation and there is no possibility of denying it.
Therefore, every writer of a constitution must establish rules when changing it, and if he did not write out of necessity that he intended to understand and fulfill his words literally – even at the cost of distorting his intention, because without this there can be no existence and continuation of anything. Everything can be changed and said to be no longer relevant, etc., and as the Reformers do in our day, who also believe that they are doing the right thing [in the eyes of the Creator], and that their way is the legitimate way to fulfill the spirit of the Torah [as I think].

Not to cancel but to change. The claim that anyone can interpret as they wish is not a claim. If it seems to him that this is the interpretation, then that is indeed what he should do. If he is just exaggerating or inventing, he has a point. He can also just not comply. Regarding the obligation of proof, this is a vague claim. The question is what strength of proof is sufficient. I am willing to accept that in a reasonable situation, we would leave the halakha intact (and that too depending on the price).

Sometimes to change [that women are not allowed to testify, women are allowed] and sometimes to abolish. She argued that the legislator intended to establish his laws, and not to leave the Torah to each person to decide what he thinks is the reason, and whether according to this the law is still valid. No religion or constitution can exist like this, and it is clear that God, who gave the Torah to his people, could not allow himself such possibilities of changes.
Why really do not you question the validity of many more commandments, let's take one commandment and start philosophizing about what we think is its reason, and if it does not turn out that it was said only in accordance with the culture and needs of the third millennium BC, and everything that seems to me worthy of change, I will change.
Note that in your opinion, new Torah laws will also be born, such as if the explanation requires that rest on Shabbat is not abstention from all labor but something else, then all those things that logic dictates are generally “rest” will be prohibited according to Torah law, since this is the soul of the commandment.

Isn’t this the dispute between the Rabbis and the Sages if they demand a reason for reading? Indeed, according to the Rabbis, it is possible to raise arguments regarding the intention of the legislator and the Afi’z to change the law, but the Sages disagreed on it, and the law is like them.

We repeat ourselves. In my opinion, no constitution can function as you suggest. But beyond the question of function, there is the question of truth.
I am not taking a mitzvah and asking whether it is relevant. I am asking how it is right to apply it today. The things are mainly meant for sermons and interpretations of the sages and less for things that are explained in the Torah. In sermons, the preacher himself uses the meaning of the word.
As for the reason for reading, it should be extended. In short, I say: 1. The First Toss wrote that when the reason is clear, then they preach. 2. In sermons, a reason for reading is certainly required. 3. Many changes are based on a boundary and not on a reason. 4. In practice, the Sages require a reason for reading all the time.

I would be happy to elaborate on why your opinion mainly concerns sermons and interpretations of the Sages and not explicit commandments. Apparently, with every commandment and commandment, one can try to discuss whether we would also be commanded to do so in the reality of our lives, and in this way.

Two main reasons:
1. In sermons, the halakhic conclusion is always based on reason. Therefore, there is no problem of a reason to read, because in principle the sermon is based on some reason. In verses, there is a problem of a reason to read, although as I explained there too, this is not absolute.
2. It is difficult to attach the Torah command to a specific period (although some have done so), and therefore it is difficult to argue in favor of a halakhic change due to a change in circumstances. But any law that comes from the interpretation of the Sages of the Torah (I am talking about the laws of the Torah) can depend on circumstances and a period, and then there is room for arguments for change.

This itself is condemned – why are we limited from demanding the meaning of a Bible, proving as I say that the constitution must remain in its simple form, and not subject to change according to the understanding of the heart of man, and from his limited and current shortsightedness. [A parable to a small soldier who decides to discuss the meaning of an order according to his understanding, what a mess he is likely to cause from it. And Solomon who demanded the meaning of the command and failed will prove it].
You understand that the sages demanded sermons according to the circumstances and the period. And according to you, the sermons of the sages were not in the scope of interpreting the Torah and extracting laws from it, but rather dressing their logic and reasoning into the verses of the Torah, and if so, it is strange that they called these laws Da'urayah.
Apparently, if the laws that come from the sermons are called Daorita, and that is the intention of the writer of the verses [although we do not understand exactly how these laws came out of the verses that were cited, according to what rules. To say that the sermons are only references is very puzzling, and yet], their law is equal to the other laws that are explained in it, which you also seem to admit is not to be ‘reinterpreted’ [although I did not understand why]. Where did you find a difference between the explained laws and the laws that came out of the sermon regarding the requirement of the cause of reading?

A quote from your website, which shows an example of the mess that is supposed to be created by your method:
“For example, if an easier way of slaughtering is found (causing less suffering), would you permit eating without kosher slaughter? I suppose not, but if so, then you yourself are not taking the reason Maimonides wrote for slaughter seriously. If in our opinion this was indeed the reason for the mitzvah, we should act accordingly.
[Of course, it can be said that you will not do this because of doubt, but in my opinion there is no satisfactory explanation here. After all, if this is the reason for the mitzvah, then the halakha itself instructs us to act in the new way and not in kosher slaughter. If so, the doubt is on both sides, because if you continue to slaughter as usual, you are a criminal. So why don't you consider the reason you found and slaughter in the new way?]
In general, if this is the reason for the mitzvah of slaughter, it seems to me that you should have prohibited the eating of meat today for everyone. The suffering that animals go through today during their breeding and on the way to slaughter completely cancels out the suffering of non-kosher slaughter.

I did not write that sermons are references. The opposite is true. References are given to the laws of the rabbis, and sermons, according to most opinions (except for the Rambam), are from the Torah. What I said is that there is an ideological component in the sermon. The Torah writes two words that are equal and we are supposed to make a distinction between them. But as for what to compare? That is the decision of the preacher, and he accepts it from his own interpretation. In any case, there is no reason not to change it if the interpretation changes, since, after all, the law is based on interpretation. And these things are explained in the issue of Pesach regarding Shimon Ha-Amsoni, who demanded every law in the Torah, because it is well explained in the issue that the sermon is based on interpretation and without interpretation there is no sermon.
If I were indeed convinced that the reason for slaughtering animals is cruelty to animals, I would indeed support changing the halakha. I do not think so. Regarding eating meat today, you are wrong. This is about helping, not about hurting animals. Food does not hurt, but rather causes pain. Indeed, for this reason it really seems that eating animals should be prohibited today, without any connection to the reason for the law of slaughter. But rather from the law of slaughter itself.

To Rabbi Mikhi
More on that lecture (which if I try to summarize in my sentence “Halakha is not the act itself but its projection on reality”)
How far are you willing to draw the line? The laws (i.e. “bottom lines”) that were cited in the Gemara seem clear from the lecture that you believe need to be changed. But what about the Mishnah? And maybe so? And maybe even explicit verses from the Torah? It is certainly plausible that the commandments cited there were given in light of the reality at the time [such as the verse “You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk” According to Professor Cassuto (the Maimonides also raised this possibility in the 3rd century) he spoke only of the era of the rite of separation that was customary in those days (and archaeological evidence of this was found in the city of Ugarit), which means that the whole issue of separating meat from milk in our day is wrong.] From your perspective, it is clear that the commandments (which are only the implications for reality and not the act itself) were given even in the time of Moses only in accordance with the reality of that time. It seems that we will also have to change the laws that are learned from explicit verses [perhaps with the exception of the Ten Commandments, which we cannot change (as is stated in the Book of Principles in article 3)].

First, I disagree with your conclusion. That is not what I claimed. It is certainly possible that there are commandments that concern the result and some that do not. But in those that concern the result, one must examine whether the result is achieved by changing the circumstances.
Second, in order to change, one must be convinced that it is indeed a commandment of result and that this is the desired result. If we are not convinced, but rather we are in doubt, one must examine the costs.
Third, there is no limit to how far I am willing to go. If it is indeed convincing, it must be changed. I do not see the difference between the Ten Commandments and the rest of the halakha.
Fourth, there are considerations of authority. Sometimes even if we are convinced of everything that is necessary, we do not have the authority to change.
Fifth, regarding the examples you gave. For example, I am far from convinced that this is indeed the purpose of the prohibition of meat in milk. Even if evidence was found in the city of Ugarit, it really does not seem reasonable to me in light of the details of the halakha of meat in milk. The Rambam”s reasons in the Moreh are evidence of the problematic level of the scoundrels of his time. If all these strange explanations were useful to them, then their confusions were really not very deep. In short, the fact that Cassuto or Maimonides raise one dubious hypothesis or another does not seem to me to be enough to explain the mitzvah. I owe nothing to their hypotheses.
Sixth, I have already mentioned here that the bulk of my remarks address laws that are not explicitly written in the Bible. Such laws involve the preacher's reasoning, and therefore there is no reason to involve our own reasoning. Although, as I have already mentioned, this is not categorical. In principle, this can also be applied to laws that the Sadducees acknowledge.

First, I would be happy to see an example of a mitzvah that is the act itself and not its best result in the world. I personally did not find it.
Second, it was precisely from the lecture that I understood that one does not necessarily need to be convinced, it is enough that there is no better argument around (after all, “maybe this is not it” can be said about anything). For example, regarding slaughter as asked earlier or regarding separating meat from milk, I do not find a better explanation than what was presented. Perhaps this is not the most “satisfactory” explanation, but it is the only explanation that can still be somehow understood (in contrast to all sorts of “spiritual” explanations that can be given even for the custom of walking in a swimsuit on Mount Hermon) and therefore we must accept it and apply the consequences in reality.
Third, it is wah amina to say that since the Ten Commandments were given to us at Sinai and were not given by a messenger but by God in the sight of all the people – they are something completely different from all the other commandments in this regard. They are not at the level of adapting the act to reality (an adjustment that is made in the mind of the messenger) but are truly “eternal” norms that are correct for all times.
Fourth, I do not understand, if the law is not the act itself but the ”idea behind it” then in order to preserve the idea it is necessary to change the act, this is not called “change”. On the contrary, it is precisely those who leave the situation as it is who make the changes and are the ones who need an authoritative source in order to continue on their crooked path.

A. Love and fear of God. Faith. Honoring parents. Waving the lulav. Prohibition of eating pork.
For some of these, you may find purposes beyond them, but on the surface I don't see any.
You can of course argue that the purpose of honoring parents is some state of mind it creates (correcting the soul of the honoree), but even if that's true, I don't see what circumstances it depends on.
Beyond that, when you claim that a mitzvah should change due to a change in circumstances, you must show that in the past it did achieve its purpose in the best possible way and now the circumstances have changed and the same purpose is achieved in a different way.
B. The fact that there is no better argument around doesn't mean anything. I don't see a good argument around for the prohibition of eating pork. So what? I will accept any explanation? What is unreasonable is unreasonable even if there is no better option. If there is an option that sounds reasonable to me, then I will prefer it to the hypothesis that there may be another option that I haven't thought of.
C. I didn't understand the difference between the Ten Commandments and the other mitzvahs. What did we hear in the commentary and what did we not? This is assuming that the entire Torah is formulated from the mouth of the hero. By the way, at least according to Chazal, even if we did not hear the Ten Commandments from the mouth of the hero, but only the first two.
D. You are repeating here what I said in the lesson. Very true. What is the question? If you are referring to the lack of authority to change the act, and you claim that changing the act is not a change, this is not true. In general, changing the laws is a commentary on a change of the bottom line. See, for example, the Rambam, the Rabbis, on the regulation of the invalid reason that requires a great bi'd in wisdom and minyan. The Rabbad also says that a bi'd is required (even if not great in wisdom and minyan). Both see this as a change. On the issue of authority, it makes sense to follow the bottom line. But on the issue of logic, this is indeed not a change. And there too, the poskim have already written in many places that really change the bottom line. See my article on changing regulations and decrees:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%91%D7%99%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95/

Rabbi Michi
Regarding the commandment to honor one's father, it turns out that there is a direct psychological connection between a bad family relationship and unhappiness in life, so it seems reasonable to me to say that this is the reason (although Peterson in his book formulates this commandment in reverse and says, "Do not let your child do things that will make you dislike him," and we'll see if there is a fundamental difference here). In general, I believe that for every mitzvah [not including all sorts of "particular mitzvahs" that were established because "something had to be established" (Moshavim 1:3)], a "good" implication can be found in reality. (Or simply – any mitzvah that affects reality, its effect must be good) Otherwise we say that this mitzvah is pointless or useless and it is an insult to God (Rambam”m) and therefore all sorts of rabbis bother to clarify the “reasons for a mitzvah”.

And in general, doesn't the rabbi think that this whole matter that ” the sages have determined that it is forbidden to change the determinations of the sages ” is a bit… problematic? And I will determine that the things I determine are of divine validity (including this determination).

Well, I don't think so. And I certainly didn't say that. When I say that a mitzvah has no purpose outside of itself, this does not mean that it is an arbitrary and pointless act. It is good for its own sake and not because of any purpose outside of it.
The Sages' determination is not problematic at all. After all, the Torah gave them the authority to establish regulations and decrees, and in doing so they also establish the rule that regulations may not be changed. What is the problem with that? And for the same reason, even if they interpret the Torah and say that regulations may not be changed from the Torah - that is also not problematic.

The Torah gave them the ability to amend regulations only because they interpreted it as giving them this authority. After all, they could have interpreted this verse differently. There is already a dispute between the Jerusalemite and the Book of Revelation regarding how far “You shall not turn aside from what they tell you right or left” goes [Books – even on the right that is left. Jerusalemite – only on the right that is right. But if they said on the right that is left (i.e. they were wrong) we should not listen]. And in general, where do they get the authority to interpret the verses as they wish while we do not? And all this does not even enter into the question of whether they are the same “wise” that the Torah spoke of.
And what is an act ” good for its own sake” that is not related to its impact on reality? A good act is an act that makes the world a better place.. In other words, a good impact on reality is required here.

Indeed, they interpreted it. So what?! In the entire system, the supreme authority also makes decisions about himself. This is how the Supreme Court makes decisions about its powers, and the Knesset about its powers. There is no way to escape from this, and therefore there is no problem with it. Especially since their interpretation of ”Thou shalt not deviate” is reasonable and logical (in my opinion). If you think that their interpretation of ”Thou shalt not deviate” is incorrect - do not obey them (and argue this in a superior court. Maybe they will accept your argument).
None of this is in any way related to the teaching of error and the sources you cited. If it is clear to you that they were wrong, do not listen to them. Who told you otherwise? That is not the discussion here.
Regarding the good deed, in my opinion, gaining knowledge is a good deed not because of any of its consequences. An educated and wise person is a better person (humanly, not really morally). No consequences are needed for that. A humble person is better, even if it has no practical consequences. But we repeat ourselves over and over again. I see no point in it.

The supreme authority in a system with divine authority is supposed to be God. If you haven't heard him say, "This is my messenger, listen to him" (or maybe it would have been better if he had just told me straight up what to do), then where does the system get its authority from? Of course, it's like that in every other human system (although perhaps it's possible to create a "circle" and so on), but here we're talking about a system that's supposed to reflect God's will. The statement, "There's no way out of this, so there's no problem with it" seems similar to the statement, "This is an unsolvable problem, so it's not a problem." Or simply... This is indeed a difficult problem for religion.
And regarding the B'd of Ma'ale, I was planning to ask you, "Do you think a religious Jew should believe in the afterlife?"

This is not a question of logic but of life management. Therefore, the lack of choice is an excellent argument.
As I wrote, the Knesset is also sovereign in our country and the court interprets its laws in a way that gives itself powers. And anyone who thinks this can be avoided does not understand what chess is.