Multiple universes

Interesting.
1) And what about string theory? There I understand that they talk about multiple universes with different laws, but there too it is speculation like in the theory of inflation? And in general inflation is not agreed upon by most scientists?
2) Sorry to correct you, but I assume that you accidentally swapped the cosmological argument with the argument from complexity in this sentence: “Even if they had different laws of nature, it does not concern the physico-theological argument”, for the cosmological argument it certainly does not matter, but it refutes the argument from complexity. There is no more wonder than complexity.

1) Once there is a Torah, there is a structure behind it. There is no point in going into all this here. Only the theory of coincidences can be a dispelling (this is the Torah that sees coincidences as an explanation for everything).
2) True. Once you adopt the illusory thesis that complexity does not bother you, then it does not bother you.
After all, about anything complex you can speculate that many different things were created and this is just one of them, so it is no wonder that it is complex. And in any case, nothing can be concluded from complexity. For example, if you see a die that falls on 6 a thousand times in a row in front of you, you will not conclude that it is unfair because there may have been billions of tosses and you are predicting this by chance.

Sorry that I continue to bother the Rabbi and even more so during the fast, it's simply a matter of principle and there is no one else to ask (at least in our universe 🙂 ).
1) I didn't understand what you meant by “Once there is Torah, there is a structure after it”? Who said that it is a complex structure (argument from complexity), and not just a casual structure (cosmological argument)? In the next section you say that you did mean cosmological and not complexity.
2) It is clear that just inventing it doesn't make sense, but that is the very argument of science, it is not just to evade G-d, but it explains a lot of scientific things in different and separate fields, so it is most reasonable to accept it!
3) I just saw on Wikipedia, about the “Interpretation of the Multiple Worlds”, that they write in the list of advantages of the Torah, as follows: “The interpretation of the multiple worlds also solves the problem of the anthropic principle and the problem of the fine-tuning of the universe: the universe was not specifically tuned so that humans could exist in it, but is one of countless possibilities, one of which is the universe suitable for the existence of human life”. This means that they are talking about universes with different laws.

It is also important to remember that the logical conclusion is that there is an intelligent creator,
but then the atheists come along and change the assumption to a new and unfamiliar assumption - that there are infinite universes, all just to avoid the conclusion.

The thing is, when there is no basis and no real reason to change the assumption, we have no choice but to accept the conclusion. And we can't just throw out foundational assumptions without a basis unless we are really irrational.

[But they are probably authentic skeptics who see everything as 50/50. Maybe they are even in a dream (and I'm not sure that's any less logical than adding an infinite number of universes to the assumption)….]

Yosef,
1) If this structure produces life and complexity, it is special by definition.
2) Absolutely not. See the next section.
3) You are repeating my words. After all, this is exactly what I said, that the multiple universes were intended to solve the problem of the anthropic principle, that is, to answer the physico-theological argument. This is how you could solve the cube problem that I described in the previous message.
By the way, do not draw any conclusions from their words (which imply that every universe is with different laws. Not true). These are not particularly intelligent reasons whose purpose is to reconcile their absurd worldview and avoid the obvious conclusion (belief in G-d). Of course, if you create the multiple universes ad hoc to reject the physico-theological argument, you will create universes with different laws.

Kobi,
Indeed. That's what I wrote to Joseph.

Wait a minute, Rabbi, I've already lost you.
1) So you're claiming that even a mechanism that generates laws in such a way that it generates everything (and in the process also a universe as special and rare as ours) can be asked a physico-theological argument? Or only a cosmological one? What's so complicated about something that tries everything and in everything gets a special result? I think I missed something, after all, this is exactly the anthropic principle, and in the Rabbi's notebook he wrote that an argument from complexity only holds water if there are two conditions: 1. A probabilistically rare object. 2. Not enough attempts have been made to create it. A mechanism that generates lots and lots of universes with different laws eliminates condition 2.

2) When I said that a multiverse solves questions, I didn't mean the question of fine-tuning, but other questions: problems in quantum mechanics, strings, and inflation. One explanation that solves three things is better than one explanation for each (as the Rabbi said about that fool).

P.S.: Thanks for the whole site.

I think there is a difference between adding more dimensions and laws of nature, which are all very well defined.
And then the question is still the same.

And adding universes that are not governed by the same laws of nature but by other laws of nature (and anyway, according to their definition, you can't see or hear about them at all, which is the problematic and stinking part of the story).

Yosef,
1) I argue that if there are enough universes with different natural laws to explain the uniqueness of the laws of nature (this means an imaginary, essentially infinite, number of universes with different natural laws), even then the mechanism of universe creation still needs to be explained. Assuming that there is such a mechanism, then indeed the multiplicity of universes (the infinite) can explain the anthropic phenomenon. I have already written more than once that the two arguments are related to each other, and the separation between them is only for didactic purposes.
2) And this also solves the fine tuning, if it exists.

Beyond that, the theory that will explain the entirety of universes is itself a particular theory, and I am sure that it will be unique (when it exists, and if it exists). Therefore, the question will arise about it.

I understand, you mean that the cosmological argument will still remain, and even a bit of complexity, because the mechanism will be complex itself.
On what basis is your hypothesis based that the mechanism for creating universes will be special? Because it ultimately reached a special result (our laws of nature)?
Perhaps we can explain your intention in more depth, by saying that the following statement can still be made about the mechanism: “Out of all the sets of laws that could be in the mechanism, only a tiny number lead to life (or a mechanism that leads directly to life, or a mechanism that creates an infinite number of universes and thus reaches life).
What does the Rabbi say?

What power should infinity have?
The set of all functions from R to R is A2, right?
Determining the value of the constants is A1 so it doesn't matter.
But the question is what functions exist. Is there a finite set of physical quantities between which functions can be defined and then it is really A2, or can we think of completely different things that would give a greater power?

Yosef, a mechanism that creates universes is a powerful mechanism. It doesn't happen out of some structureless nonsense.

Yishai, it doesn't have to be literally infinite because the values of the constants don't have to be perfectly precise (there's a gap where similar properties will still exist for a long enough time). And there still have to be lots of universes with lots of sets of laws. I don't know what the point of the functions between the constants is here.

The thing about functions is that if there are universes with different laws, then what needs to be checked is how many functions there can be between constants, for example between mass and force. I think it's A2.

Mass and force are not constants. Mass is a constant and it connects force and acceleration.
Maybe you mean how many functions can exist between physical variables, such as acceleration and force. To that I say you need to remember that random laws of nature can be of completely different types from ours with different variables (perhaps a nature in which there will be no motion at all, and then there is no velocity and acceleration), with a different amount of constants and of course with different constant values. By the way, they can also be not functions at all, and also laws with non-constant functions and more as your imagination allows. Beyond that, the relationship between the variables is differential and not a simple function, and this increases the number to completely different levels.

Thanks!!
But “powerful” is not necessarily special. The hurricane is also powerful. Maybe you meant “powerful” in terms of programming? And is the explanation I gave above correct?

Indeed, I understood what I meant. Even when there is no motion, there is a function that connects force and acceleration.
A differential equation that describes something physical is supposed to eventually give a function, even if it cannot be found or written analytically - it gives each X a single result in R.
What is true in quantum mechanics is that each X instead receives a single result, a distribution, that is, a function, and then there is actually a function from R to the space of functions from R to R, which will give a3. It seems that you can complicate it as much as you want and get as high a power as you want.

Yosef, no. It is indeed powerful in terms of properties, but not precisely because of our universe. Creating universes in general is a non-trivial ability (to put it mildly).

Yishai, the function that is obtained in the end does not bind an acceleration force but gives a trajectory in space-time. This is not a law of nature. The equation is a law of nature. And in quantum mechanics we do not obtain a function but a distribution of possible outcomes. But these chatterbox are not really important for our purposes.

Obviously this is not important for our purposes. It's just for fun.
I still don't get the point of differential equations. After all, if every force has an acceleration, there is a function here, and so on between any two variables.
Why isn't a distribution a function? A distribution gives every situation a chance.

Take a spring for example. Its equation of motion is that the force is equal to the minus the distance from the equilibrium point times the spring constant: F=-kx. The force is the mass times the second derivative of that distance, so here we have a differential equation whose solution is the position as a function of time. Something like: ( x=Bsin(at
The solution is a function, but it does not relate the force to the acceleration, the relationship between these two is always linear (Newton's second law) with the constant of proportionality being the mass. This is no different between all situations.
The distribution is a function of a random variable, or a function that describes probability as a function of position. But it is not something that relates physical variables to each other.

What do I care about the position of the spring? I care about the function that relates force to acceleration. There may be a universe where this relationship cannot be expressed by an analytic function or even by a differential equation, but it is still a function.
Clearly, a distribution is not a function that relates physical variables to each other, but it does relate a physical variable in R (i.e., magnitude A1) to the space of functions of random variables (i.e., magnitude A2), and so if I am not mistaken, the set of functions that do this will be of magnitude A3.

We are probably speaking two different languages. The function that relates force to acceleration is very simple:
F=ma. That's all. It's true in all cases and in all circumstances, and there is no multiplicity in this matter, nor is there anything differential. It has nothing to do with differential equations or their solutions.
Indeed, this is a function that in another universe could be very different, and it is the one I wrote.
Regarding distributions, our languages are probably completely different. Even the power of the sequence (C) is not necessarily a1 (it's just the continuity hypothesis). The distribution also does not relate a continuous variable to the space of functions, but rather between a continuous variable; and chance.
But I think there is no room here to continue this.

Hello Rabbi. I am just busy plowing through the answers on your site, and I am thrilled by what is going on here.
I came across one answer that talked about the anthropic principle, and there the questioner asked you this: “Does the anthropic objection only exist if there is randomness in the universe?” (He meant actual randomness as in quantum) and you answered him: Yes.
So I understand that you meant this here too, that only if the mechanism for creating the laws of universes is quantumly random – then the multiplicity of universes undermines the view from design, and if there is no quantum randomness there – then the argument from complexity remains the same strength despite the infinity of universes that the mechanism produces.
So is this what you meant here too? Did you only talk about a completely random mechanism?
And also, I would love to explain why if it is deterministic then multiverses would not explain anything, it sounds really strange to me.
Thanks.

Hello.
The principle is this: If there is a die that falls randomly and after a lot of tosses you get a series of 6s a hundred times, there is no probabilistic problem with that. Therefore, if there is a random mechanism that creates a multitude of universes and one special universe emerges from them, there is no probabilistic problem with that.
There is still a problem with the formation of universes because the mechanism of creating universes is itself a mechanism that requires explanation and requires an operator, and moreover, we have not seen such a mechanism, and therefore this is unfounded speculation.
When there is a die that is rolled deterministically, then no distribution is special. If you get a chain of a hundred different tosses or a hundred equal tosses, neither of them is more surprising than the other, since it is the structure of the deterministic mechanism that dictates the results. Of course, if this structure itself is created randomly, then the wonder arises of how a structure that creates a hundred identical tosses was created at random, and we are back to the random case.

Quantum randomness is not a solution to anything at all, since quantum theory itself is a special theory that requires explanation. Randomness occurs within it.

I understand that from a deterministic perspective there is nothing to be “surprised”, because everything was expected. But what is at issue here is drawing conclusions from an argument from complexity, and if there is a mechanism that ”tries everything” and in the process (probably) also reaches our special universe, then our special universe is completely explained, and then it has been proven that this mechanism is not special in terms of the creation of our universe (perhaps it is special only in terms of the very mechanism that creates universes), because it is not “focused”, to create special laws. Then the anthropic appeal also applies to a deterministic mechanism for creating universes, because we can already see that the mechanism is not really special in terms of our universe.
Like, for example, a deterministic machine that shoots a billion arrows in all directions, in a deterministic manner, it is true that in the end it will also reach the exact middle of the board, but seemingly one cannot draw a conclusion from this that it is special (by virtue of the special hit, perhaps just by virtue of the mechanism), even if it is deterministic.
All of this, of course, without going into the fact that this is speculation at all.
[Now it occurs to me that perhaps the Rabbi means that after we know that there is a God from the cosmological perspective, then the special result of the mechanism can be more easily attributed to Him, since the mechanism is deterministic, and its programmer is responsible for everything. That sounds true, but if we are talking about the very proof of complexity, then the complexity is null and void].
Sorry for the length.

No mechanism can try everything. There are infinite "tools". Therefore, there is a structure to this mechanism that chooses what to create, and this is its uniqueness.