Negative defense of “common sense” against skepticism
In the SD
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I would like to ask briefly,
I’ll start with a didactic question: Questions often arise such as: How can we know that the sun will rise tomorrow or maybe not? Descartes’ demon, etc.
All of these examples give the explanation of the commence X a logically feasible alternative Y.
And I think the main point of the negative response lies in the fact that one must distinguish between logical possibility and feasibility and epistemic feasibility, and there is no reason at all to assume that there is an identity between the categories. Because epistemic feasibility requires an additional assumption regarding coordination between thinking (or what produces the logical possibility) and reality itself.
moreover,
Because the assumption of epistemic possibility requires an implicit assumption of a correspondence between our understanding and reality, so as long as we lack this assumption, there is no reason to connect the two.
And it sounds like even the skeptic (who is not an extremist) would not claim that we *experience* and assume a “coordination assumption” towards the skeptical hypothesis (which we may not be aware is coordinated).
For example, that the demon correlates between our thinking about the demon and its existence.
But if we do not have the direct, immediate assumption regarding the sense of coordination, then even if as part of the logical possibility we claim that we have some kind of unconscious assumption about it, but as long as it is indeed unconscious, there is no reason to assume that the skeptical hypothesis has any chance regarding reality itself. (Otherwise, a chance of 0 assuming that all explanations are uniform, or an impossible probability, or this discussion also depends on the level of coordination and is essentially unanswered at best).
If so, this significantly dulls the sting of the skeptical question, even if it doesn’t eliminate it entirely.
Because the skeptic can indeed ask about this, who said that you are really coordinated, maybe you are ….. but he will not really be able to complete the sentence because any such completion assumes that a logical possibility has epistemic plausibility, but this assumption is possible only in a framework that has the assumption of coordination behind it. Because at most it allows the skeptic to be satisfied with the coordination of this, current system. But it does not allow him to give any other alternative explanation that has even a certain plausibility for it.
Questions:
0. Do you think the argument is valid?
1. Does the situation of partial coordination briefly mentioned above undermine this argument?
Because it seems that in the parts that we believe we are not coordinated, we don’t speak, like if someone asks questions about topics we don’t know, let’s say the number of people in country X. We usually won’t return an answer or assume that it has a certain validity.
2. Is the logical possibility that assumes that the same subversive hypothesis also exists behind it a certain coordination factor, but together with the agreement that the person without familiarity with it is truly epistemically implausible? Which is essentially the sting in the argument.
3. Are there also more positive arguments for accepting the assumption of commensality, apart from the (conscious or revealed) belief in coordination? In addition to the assumption that this is what is reasonable by its very definition.
I’m not sure I understood. But if I understood correctly, I disagree. The logical possibility is an epistemic possibility (in my opinion, it would be better: ontic) and not an epistemic certainty. Therefore, no assumption of coherence is required here. It is clear that everything that is logically possible is epistemically possible, even without assuming coherence. In short, skepticism does not assume any coherence between us and reality. On the contrary, it undermines coherence by claiming that in reality there may be many other things (and perhaps even ones that do not occur to me).
I don’t think there is an argument in favor of common sense, because this whole argument would stand on its own against common sense. I don’t think an argument is needed. The burden of proof is on the one who opposes common sense.
A. Interesting, precisely with your accuracy that you believe that it is more correct to speak ontically then naturally, let alone naturally.
And after all, the very assumption that what we think in our minds is supposed to reflect the ontically reality before us, is impossible unless there is coordination.
Just as in reality there may be many other things (and perhaps even some that do not occur to me).
Furthermore, according to you, due to the fact that there are countless interpretations of a line that maintains a completely defined relationship (between the two axes between force and acceleration) and only one correct line constitutes proof of intuition and difficulty for actualism.
A line that is accurate and speaks of the entire system (including the axes and everything behind them).
And so you also agree that there is no doubt that an arbitrary system will produce incorrect information.
And if so, apart from the fact that there is no reason to think that there is a connection between a logical possibility and an ontic possibility and you have not given any explanation for this. Also because the logical possibility is infinite, and if we assume that every explanation is given the same possibility, although it sounds unreasonable to treat it that way (because we have no information even about a uniform distribution), we are talking about zero probability.
Then even more so we have no basis to assume that there is an identity between the things (as one can easily think of a computer that writes nonsense).
If so, it is not clear why you do see an identity between “logical possibility is an epistemic possibility”. And after all, there is no connection between things in thought and their realization in practice without an additional assumption of coordination or that the brain that produces the thoughts produces reality, but that is also a type of coordination.
B. It is clear that skepticism does not assume coordination between us and reality as we understand it. But most often it does assume a framework of a certain explanation that can be treated as a coordination.
Like because Descartes' demon makes me see X, I see X.
That is, the demon here is found as a coordination that is unknown to me (and I cannot know it according to some of the books).
And so I asked whether there is a reason to see this logical possibility, as I have called it an “epistemic explanation”. Because it seems that because it is not built on the basis of a *concrete* belief that I am coordinated, it is correct to see it and associate it like any other logical possibility.
(And this is based on the basis of the division that I introduced in section A’, between logical thinking and epistemic beliefs and that skepticism relies on seeing identity and confusion between things as you seem to claim).
And the sting in the argument separates this, and if so, we are left with “one belief” Consider that it is the commencement. But no competing explanation whatever can compete with it.
And does accepting it require positive evidence perhaps as you mentioned. Although I am not sure that they are accurate.
I've completely lost you. I'll go back and say that in my opinion skepticism assumes no coordination. This can be phrased as ”according to you”: According to the theory of those who believe in coordination, there are other possibilities for what exists in reality. As a skeptic, I know nothing about this and do not believe in any coordination.
Well then I think we are simply defining skepticism differently and that was indeed the point of the argument.
The whole point of the argument is to show that there are only two options,
either belief in the coherence of the commensal (what seems plausible is ontically plausible), or disbelief in the coherence (and then there is no connection between thinking and reality).
But there is no third option. Like belief in ”X” a possible underlying factor that we think about but do not “believe” in. Or any other option or conclusion “X”.
And that is indeed the point of the argument only either “commensal” or “silence”.
Then to decide between the two options what remains is positive evidence for the position of belief in commensal.
But here we are talking about a negative defense (the conclusion of the argument that the skeptic is obligated to remain silent).
Indeed, for a positive defense, it is customary to use foundationalism. But that should be discussed separately.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
