Non-Jewish burial from the massacre

According to your last paragraph, there was no halakhic problem with burying her in a Jewish plot (“From a halakhic perspective, I think there is no real obstacle”). Therefore, according to you, “it was possible to give them up”, as I, the little one who understands nothing about halakhic, assumed in advance. The fact that the rabbis' perception is different from yours no longer makes your opinion any better or worse, because they are wrong… and since I also recognize a human and sensitive side in His Honor (I regret the insult I had to share with you in these words), you bother to add a moral statement regarding consideration for the family. In short: you state that there is a moral and not halakhic issue and think that it was right to act according to my own gut feeling. Now you probably also understand why I see in fools like you hope for a shared future with the secularists. You made me happy.

I have a human and sensitive side, I'm just not willing to let it dictate my positions. Trying to put it under intellectual control. Consideration for those who suffer is not an emotional matter but a moral one. Just because we have such an emotion doesn't mean it's based solely on emotion. We have a moral emotion, but morality is not an emotional matter.
Unfortunately, in the religious world there is more willingness to put emotion (moral and in general) under control, because there is a habit of thinking rationally and coldly according to halakhic principles. In the secular world there is a very worrying identity between morality and emotion (belly) and that's how all the emotional monsters are born that destroy every good part here. That's how absurd moral principles are created out of thin air, straight from the belly.

And thus arises the superficiality of moral discourse and the pursuit of slogans and fashions.

I didn't understand. I showed you that you start your response by disagreeing with me and then contradict yourself and claim that you do agree with me (because in your opinion there is really no halakhic problem here, as I had assumed beforehand).
And now in your last two responses you completely ignore my substantive argument against your words and settle for general things about the “superficiality of moral discourse”?

If I haven't explained myself clearly enough, then I'll say it this way: I have no doubt that you are a sensitive and moral person, just as I have no doubt that on this specific point you hold a confused and completely self-aware view. Just reread your first response to me and the gap between its beginning and its end.

I can only copy your last paragraph:
If I haven't explained myself clearly enough, then I'll say it this way: I have no doubt that you are a sensitive and moral person, just as I have no doubt that on this specific point you hold a confused and completely self-aware view. Just reread your first response to me and the gap between its beginning and end.

My argument was that there is no real moral problem with being buried in the poorer section and not in the Jewish section. I also argued that the mother was in fact harmed (because of secular brainwashing. There is no real reason for this). Therefore, there is room for consideration of her suffering.
However, those you criticized believe that there is a halakhic problem in this and therefore are right not to consider it. It is true that if we add to this my position that there is no fundamental problem in this, I would consider it.
However, I added that the mother's baseless harm and the hysterical discourse surrounding this issue express the secular morality of the belly (which has infiltrated religious liberal circles). They are confusing two different claims (and you probably are too): the obligation not to harm the mother. The obligation to bury the deceased as a Jew. The first certainly exists (within the limits of halakhic law, of course) and the second is a secular sabbath.
If you can figure out where there is a contradiction here, and perhaps also add clarification where I agreed and disagreed with your words, I would be grateful.

I have no intention of discouraging you, but only of pointing out what I believe to be a mistake.
Since you agreed with me that it is morally better not to harm the mother (I did not go as far as you did and call it a "must", we only have to find out if there is a halakhic problem here, that is, a conflict between a moral value and a religious value. I replied that in your opinion it does not. Hence, it does not matter "what the rabbis think" (the religious ones and the secular ones) but what the truth is, and you have explicitly stated this. And here you are, not only is there a real dilemma here (contrary to your claim), but you yourself provide a solution to it - it was requested to bury her in the Jewish plot.

You've repeated what I said so far. Nice. I'm still waiting for an answer to my questions.

You wrote:

“So why should they capriciously submit to her being buried as a Jew when she is not?! This is a delusional and detached morality”

That is, in your opinion, the rabbinical decision is correct (and is not a “delusional and detached morality”).

Then you wrote:

“From a halachic perspective, I think there is no impediment here”

And you bothered to add that in practice the family should have been taken into account (moral consideration).

Now explain to me, with all your kindness, what should have been done in practice (a binary answer in a mutta) and do you find the rabbinical act reprehensible?

I have explained it twice and I can only repeat it again: In my opinion, it is possible to bury her with Jews. According to the rabbis who opposed it, it is not. In their opinion, there is no reason for them to give in to this demand. This is a delusional and disconnected morality.

I will add my meager contribution as I understand it. You used the concept of morality in the context that the act is moral on its own, regardless of consideration for the family's feelings. If someone died as a soldier (and in the process of conversion, although I have heard claims that she resigned) she deserves to be buried with everyone. To this, Rabbi Michi argued that there is no morality in this.
Then Rabbi Michi added another moral consideration (the family was offended) and followed it up by saying that perhaps it was worthy of consideration, which is based on his view that there is no halakhic problem in this.
Finally, Rabbi Michi wrote that in the opinion of the other rabbis there is a real halakhic problem in this (i.e., it is not just a matter of conservatism) and therefore what the Chevra Kadisha did is legitimate, because the halakhic law rejects the consideration of consideration for unpleasantness.

So in your opinion, the rabbis are both halachically wrong and causing moral harm (hurting feelings) to the family, but at the same time their decision is correct. Why? Because they are going by their "ways". In other words, your and my criticism of their decision neither increases nor decreases. You would have decided differently, I would have decided differently, but that's not what's really important. What's important is that they decided "ways". I assume that in your opinion, if they had decided that this unfortunate woman should be buried on the moon, you would have justified that too. Provided, of course, that it was their way.

Yishai, as usual, you fabricate things from your own thoughts and insist on attributing them to me. I mean what you said as if I was referring to her death as a soldier and not to the matter of her family.
In general, I suggest you reread the three arguments (mine, Mikhi's, and yours) and tell me if it is possible to insert even a pin between them. It is impossible. They are identical. Despite this, Mikhi calls my description "delusional and disconnected", "sobscure beliefs" and so on.
Here an interesting question already arises: Does a moral description that is acceptable to me (I am Mikhi for this matter) become invalid and "delusional" when it is uttered by another person? Food for thought.

Doron, an accurate summary. That's right.
What I called delusional is the moral criticism of the rabbis. If you share it, then you are indeed delusional and based on false beliefs, etc.

Well, the really big problem with your position is not that it's morally outrageous or even theoretically unsound. The problem is that it's skeptical, and skepticism is a really boring approach.

Doron
I wanted to intervene and try to provide additional clarification on the multitude of explanations that I have made because I have bothered to provide you with his already clear words.
But your great confidence, which is in contrast to your reading comprehension, creates a slightly embarrassing situation for both parties and I don't want to get into it...
By the way, despite the moral speculation of the matter, the Dalai Lama does not consider you part of Tibetan Buddhism, which is simply outrageous.

David, I really appreciate your good will to help and your description of your inner feelings about whether to intervene or not. My psychological analysis also speaks to me. Regarding Tibetan Buddhism, I have already lost you. If you think you can overcome the temptations and bring a relevant argument that I have not heard before, you are welcome.

I have already stated my concerns:
Enough arguments have been made and not enough for you. As for Buddhism, for some reason I am not surprised that I lost you.
I will try to explain in a few words:
The discussion about her burial place is halakhic and the claims should be technical halakhic factual claims and not sentiments or morality (but these are the rare times when morality prevails over halakhic)
Miki added that in his opinion, considering the sensitive situation, there is room to allow (considering the sensitive situation does not change the halakhic! It urges you to find a permit that is not obvious) The rabbis who discussed the issue actually disagreed on it (I assume you agree with them thinking differently from him) and therefore no matter how sad for the family, technically, it is not halakhically possible in their opinion… similarly, it is very sad for the Dalai Lama, but you will not get the right to vote regarding the new Tibetan building in New York)

P.S. If it seems to you that considering their feelings doesn't instantly eliminate the doctrine they hold dearest (from which the whole unnecessary story of burial stemmed in the first place), you may be one of those who think that feelings and individual rights have the power to dictate facts (such as transgender people) and that the entire discussion is futile to begin with.

I'm glad you overcame your inner doubts and managed to provide a substantive answer. What you were less successful in, in my opinion, is understanding Michy's answer stating that the rabbis were halachically wrong (“From a halachic perspective, I don't think there is a real impediment”) and you probably didn't get to understand how their mistake changes the whole picture. For if the religious-halachic consideration falls away, all that remains is the question of taking into account the family's feelings (which is a purely moral question, not halachic!). Surprisingly, Michy also thinks that sensitivity should be shown in this matter, meaning that he thinks like me and therefore you would expect him to find fault with the decision of those rabbis. That didn't happen. Instead, he claims that I hold a moral position that is “delusional and detached” (even though it is identical to his own position…).
I hope that this time you will read more carefully what was written.

Read one of Michi's countless commentaries again.
Maybe you simply didn't recognize the concept of controversy. So like this: Michi thinks A These rabbis think B Michi claims that they have the right not to follow the “delusional and disconnected” morality and to act in accordance with their halakhic understanding (B) Of course he would have been happy if they had consulted him, or he would have explained to them in toto”d that it was not A but B.
Is there?

Doron,
I will quote your words and then you decide for yourself who is right. “It is unnecessary to mention the conflict between this statement and natural morality (*as understood by her family and many others)” In other words, your moral claim was not that a family was offended, but that they have a moral claim in their own right. As you wrote, the moral claim is from the place of how people understand. Although I also need to correct a detail (and not the main thing), that the claim was that she was murdered as a Jew and not that she was a soldier. But the essential point is that there is a moral argument here that because she was murdered because they murdered Jews, then she is also Jewish. https://news.walla.co.il/item/3622311 That is what it means from here and that is the claim in whose name you spoke. After all, you spoke about the moral claim of her family and many others.
This is what Rabbi Michi mainly addressed in his answer.
Besides, it seems that you do not accept the position that judging whether an act is moral or not is not based on the other person's positions. This is where you and Rabbi Michi seem to disagree.
(By the way, I'm really waiting for a response to the Yom Kippur column)

David
I see that you are working on the values and are slowly managing to move in the direction of the matter. You are not there yet, but where the Baal Teshuva are standing…
Regarding “dispute” (in life in general and even in Halacha itself) it seems that you have a methodological problem very similar to the one that Mikhi demonstrates in this discussion, which is the hidden assumption that there is no objective truth and there are no more or less successful and serious ways to approach it. Despite your failed assumption, it turns out that reality and Halacha work differently. Mikhi actually claimed – he just didn't understand his claim… – that if those rabbis had made more of an effort (if they had been more open and sensitive, if they had not been bound by the fossilized religious establishment, etc.) they too could have reached his own conclusion – which is closer to the objective truth. In such a situation, they would understand that the dispute has left the halakhic realm and has taken its place in the moral arena. I would add a few more methodological comments here on the connection between consistency and truth and skepticism and the basic, in my opinion minor, flaw in Miki's approach to this matter, but as I said, you are still in the process of repentance and I have no interest in burdening you with all these annoyances.

Yishai
You continue to do as you please in the text. This is indeed a very Jewish approach, but it does not contribute to attempts to get closer to reality.
I did not claim that the murdered Jew was a kosher Jew according to Halacha. I was only concerned with the question of her burial place (partly Jewish or not).
In your second comment, you touched on a half-truth: the principle of consistency (“according to them”) is an a priori necessity for any moral decision, but unlike Michi, I think it is not enough. Anyone who thinks that it is sufficient empties morality of all content and in fact leads himself to an irrational position, to “boring” skepticism.
Regarding the Yom Kippur column… Come on. You have a habit of trolling me on all sorts of topics, putting words in my mouth (even now) and when I try to formulate an answer for you, you disappear and do not respond. You're talking to me about Yom Kippur and I don't remember what I did yesterday.

I was right in my concerns when I didn't want to enter the discussion.
Eliezer Yudkovsky once wrote a wonderful column called “When Everything Is Gray” I recommend it to you.
In fact, just because there is objective truth doesn't mean you have it.
In fact, you completely missed the point, perhaps for fear of being a postmodern skeptic. In your view, are democracy, pluralism, etc. completely passé?
It is also important to note that in opinions about facts, you are not willing to give weight to the other person's opinion, but emotions have a grand place for you and they take precedence over factual claims.
By the way, thinking that post-positivism blankets is an excellent joke, thank you for it.

Maybe if I put it this way, you'll understand:
The rabbis were wrong, (you agree they were wrong I suppose) The question now is, did they commit a moral wrong because they didn't consider emotions?
Because if they were right, they acted right… and how do you expect them to know they were wrong?
People are often wrong with confidence, maybe you and Miki and I are currently wrong with confidence (with a degree of skepticism you have to agree)

In your first response, you continue with the glorious ad hominem tradition that you have tied yourself to and spice it up with all sorts of assumptions that are irrelevant to the discussion of “democracy” and ”pluralism” that I supposedly oppose and so on.
I, for one, what is “post-positivism”..?
Regarding your second response. If you had read my words carefully in the question I posed to Miki at the beginning – you haven't bothered to do so yet – you would have seen that I left open the possibility that the rabbis were halachically right. If that were the case, I probably wouldn't have come to them with claims, as I explicitly said there ("Who's the villain here?").
I would also be happy to answer you on the question of how I expect them to know that they are wrong, but you're not there yet. You are still arguing with a straw man inside your head (although from your last response I see that something new is starting to sparkle there… and compare its content to your first response to me). Bottom line: If you are interested in a critical, open and fair discussion without psychological descriptions of others or yourself, the door is still open. If not, go to Yudkovsky.

This debate is repeated and will never end. I think the dispute is about a case like the following:
Reuven takes his weapon and runs to Nir Oz to fight the terrorists. He sees from a distance a man with a keffiyeh pointing a gun at a group of people and immediately shoots him with a gun. After a few minutes it turns out that it was ours, and the people were Gazan civilians who had followed the terrorists to despicable murder.
Doron claims that he is a despicable murderer. David and I claim that he is absolutely not. He misunderstood reality and the result is unfortunate, but he is not an immoral person. On the contrary.
That's all, or, as Vinto Zatsukella used to say: Oh.

The example you gave serves me well because it reveals the connection between the moral (and in fact epistemic) skepticism that you hold, in this case, and an important and, in my opinion, even necessary component of any moral position: common sense. Common sense also deals with content, with reality itself, and not only with the formal procedures that ultimately lead to skepticism. In your example, you emphasized the similarities between the two cases (the burial and accidental killing of a Jewish soldier), that is, you emphasized the procedure but ignored the reality for the time being. There is no such thing as halakhic interpretation that takes place in the armchair of the commentator/posek while the books are laid out in front of him, he is familiar with the laws of halakhic law and understands the possibilities of the “game” In it, and he understands that he is dealing with fundamental social questions as a law of momentary decision in the reality of a battlefield (especially if the soldier who appeared in front of him bothered to wear a keffiyeh for some reason, like you…). Another difference has to do with our acquaintance with the corrupt religious establishment (about which you have written many words in the past) and with the low intellectual honesty that characterizes its representatives. I, apparently unlike you, see the ability for constant self-criticism, carried on the back of intellectual honesty, as a necessary condition for moral decision-making.
And I have not said anything about the principle of interpretive grace and your mistaken perception of it in my opinion (see my response in a column that appeared a long time ago on this subject).

A: Sorry for the ridicule. It's a shame I entered the discussion from the bottom of my heart, and if I did, I would have at least stayed to the point, I was wrong. Ad hominem is not. I never intended for the ridicule to be part of the arguments, and as you noted, my first response had no arguments at all (except for a hint of one)
B: There were no assumptions, but rather questions – very relevant when it seems that you are not flouting a person's right to act as he understands, even if it differs from your opinion or mine or mine.
C: You are again “assumption” that I did not read, when the simple truth is that no matter what you claimed or not in your first response, the recent responses we are dealing with (the truth is that not only the recent ones, but it doesn't matter right now) attribute decisive weight to the fact that the rabbis are wrong, and that is what I responded to.
D: You can read that you often analyze psychologically and belittle the various arguments in the discussion and there is a lot of arrogance, this is what pushed me to respond as I did and my recommendation is “Dress yourself first”
In short:
I am very interested in an open and fair critical discussion. I am less interested in this discussion – that leads nowhere or as Ehud Barak said “There is no partner”
Sorry for everything, a successful path.

I admit and leave Yeruham.
However, I don't know where you saw arrogance in me, I don't know why you think I “don't fly” on the right of others to express their opinions (and therefore also to be exposed to criticism) and I certainly don't understand why you think I “do too much psychological analysis” when I'm constantly trying to go for a principled and relevant philosophical argument.
“The rabbis are wrong” is the working premise of this entire discussion – of Michi and therefore also of mine. It is possible that we are both wrong and then the discussion will change. In any case, I explained the conditions under which there is a point in a moral discussion of a mistake (and as a result of this, to pass judgment) and when not.
Sha Bracha

Doron,
You are dealing with a side issue instead of addressing the main issue. What I said is very simple. We will use different terminology. Rabbi Miki Brisha addressed the question of whether there is a moral problem here in essence, as emerges from the arguments of Alina's family and the other people discussing the issue (which is why you also heard that you are talking about it), while in Sifa he addressed the question of whether there is a moral problem here in case.
The division between essence and case, to the best of my knowledge, originates in the ancient Arab philosophers such as Ibn Rushd and his companions, I hope you are familiar with the concepts.

I don't understand your examples. I really tried. I allow myself to quote what I answered Michi above, this is the essence of my position and I have no other position.

“Michi's answer stating that the rabbis were halachically wrong (“From a halachic perspective, I don't think there is a real impediment”)… changes the whole picture. For if the religious-halachic consideration falls away, only the question of taking into account the feelings of the family remains (which is a purely moral question, not halachic!). Surprisingly, in this matter too, Michi thinks that sensitivity should be shown, that is, he thinks like me [that the deceased should be buried in a Jewish plot] and therefore you would expect him to find fault with the decision of those rabbis. That didn't happen. Instead, he claims that I hold a moral position that is “delusional and detached” (even though it is identical to his own position…).”

Doron,
I do not agree with you about the judgment in this case, but I also probably do not really identify with Rabbi Michi, I am somewhere in the middle. But that is not what I came to discuss.
All in all, I came to say something very simple. You claimed that Rabbi Michi contradicted himself in his first answer, to which I say that at the beginning of the answer he spoke about the question of whether there is actually a moral problem here, and at the end he spoke about the reality that there may be a moral problem in the case. It seems that you insist on not understanding.

I think I've reached the end of your mind regarding the terms "object" and "case". You probably mean the distinction between the principled discussion and the discussion of the individual case. But none of this is up or down. I asked only about the individual case and here, as mentioned, Miki agreed with everything I said and then made a strange U-turn and condemned my "delusional and detached" morality (which he also holds).

Indeed, it is gratifying that you understood. It was regarding the phase of addressing the question of whether there is a moral conflict here.
I will only say here where I think you are wrong about the judgment and will probably leave the discussion for the near future.
If we take, for example, an engineer who makes a mistake in his calculations and leads to the Versailles disaster, it is possible that the engineer is truly morally wrong. In what case? In the case where he got such an absurd result (in relation to the standards of the profession) that he had to check himself again. And because he did not do this, then there is also a moral problem here. That is, only in the case where the halakhic decision really contradicts common sense (not in terms of the moral criterion but the halakhic) can one come to them with claims. But on this, Rabbi Michi says that their decision is within the reasonable limit and is therefore legitimate. Therefore, they are supposed to act according to it. (Perhaps it would be easier to understand with psychology, that even if there is in truth only one psychological method that should be followed, other psychological methods can be accommodated, while some are not acceptable at all)

I am certainly willing to soften my position and if necessary retract it completely if I am convinced that the rabbis' mistake was within the reasonable range. I am not yet convinced. I have already mentioned several reasons for this.
I speculate - and this is really just a conjecture - that what happened there is not far from what happened to the female observers in Gaza. According to what is being published today (and we have to wait for the investigation committee to verify this) for many months these girls have been warning their commanders about suspicious behavior beyond the fence and they are ignoring them, belittling them, and one even told someone that if they continue, they will face trial.
The common denominator: a clique that has been infiltrated by arrogance, intellectual laziness, unwillingness to self-criticize, a political apparatus that ties down their hands, and perhaps a bit of chauvinism.
From an "epistemic" perspective, these are some of the characteristics of the skeptical position that I attacked.

https://www.inn.co.il/news/620287