Norms and changing halakhah

Sorry. I thought this was relatively well known so I didn't see the need to really expand (I read the wonderful article earlier).

Many of our sages believe that the prohibition of meat and milk is related to nationalism and was commanded against the idolatry of the peoples who lived around the Land of Israel. As a distancing from the pagan worship that existed. Like Maimonides in his book Moreh Nevokuhim, Part 3, Chapter 48, Rashba Ibn Ezra and others.

In the Wikipedia entry “Meat in Milk” it is stated that this is the opinion of Cassuto and Professor Rosenberg (of course, they base this on serious things and not baseless speculations).

– It is possible that the prohibition is for another reason, but we have no way of knowing, and this seems to me the most likely
– Today in our reality, there is no one who performs such rituals, and therefore there is no fear that my people will perform that idolatrous ritual.
– The Torah is apparently talking about a norm and not about an eternal fact

It is clear that a few lines on a website will not allow the prohibition of meat and milk.
But what are the rules and definitions of such and such changes in the Torah/halacha? I assume of course that there are none, but I would be happy to receive general guidelines.

It is still not enough to understand the issue. Since there are quite a few laws that I do not see as having a moral or other purpose, the conclusion is that there are other purposes in the law. I also do not see any reason to explain that they are all to uproot the ez. Therefore, such a hypothesis lacks a significant foundation and I do not know of one (I have not read the materials you mentioned).
But even if we assume that you managed to establish this, and even if we assume that there is no fear that the ez phenomenon will return (this is absolutely not necessary), it still does not mean that in today's reality the prohibition is null and void. And this for two reasons:
1. The explanation that you attach to the ez is not necessarily a restriction on the ez (so that we do not end up working with the ez). Sometimes it is forbidden just as the ez is forbidden. For example, I once wrote to resolve the contradiction in the Rambam at the end of the ez There he writes that sacrifices are the decree of Scripture and the verse he writes is a restriction on the sacrifice. My argument is that it is not a restriction but rather that there is an obligation to direct our religious work to God instead of to the sacrifice. In this formulation, even when there are no sacrificial obligations in the world, there are. Although here we are dealing with a prohibition and not an obligation, similar logic is possible.
2. Regarding the disqualification of women from testifying, I wrote a similar change to what you suggested, but there it seems clear to us what can disqualify someone from testifying. And since we have not found an explanation for why women should be disqualified, the most likely is because at that time they were uneducated and uneducated, and that has changed now. But regarding meat in milk, I doubt to what extent such a conclusion can be drawn, because it is not clear from the outset that there is a prohibition with a clear purpose here.

It should be remembered that the accepted view among the poskim is that all Torah prohibitions are not a restriction but rather a self-prohibition. In Atvan Da'Oriyata, he took the time to examine this and provide counterexamples (very few). And this may explain why they do not require a reason for reading. Your proposal is a clear requirement for a reason for reading.

Thank you very much for the detailed answer.