Obligation for faith in God Almighty

So how does the Torah require belief in several beliefs?

such as?

1. That the world was created.
2. That God is one.
3. That there was a Mount Sinai stand.
So?

I think that Michi's position here misses an important nuance regarding the concept of the obligation to believe. The obligation to believe in something (religious or otherwise) is not tested only through its “realization”, that is, by a person's transition from disbelief in something to belief in it. It is preceded by a necessary condition in which a hierarchy of beliefs is created in the consciousness of the one who is commanded to believe. For example, a person exposed to the obligation to believe that the Torah is from heaven learns in this way that this belief is more important from the perspective of Judaism than the competing belief (that the Torah is not from heaven). Therefore, even if he is not convinced that the Torah is truly of a supernatural origin, he will still understand very well that his conviction in this matter is required (compared to other matters in which there is no such thing).
On the surface, my argument seems tautological (one must believe in what is said to be an obligation to believe…) but in practice this is not the case. The correct formulation: It is imperative to understand the specific hierarchy in which a person is required to give priority to one value over another.

There is no obligation to believe in anything. The Torah tells us that the world was created and now we know it. Where did you see an obligation here?

I am the Lord your God. Some early scholars explain that this is a commandment. So here we find an obligation upon faith.

If this is your position, then I think you will not be able to explain and certainly not justify details that the Torah bothers to place at the center (for example, the existence of God or the very fact of its being given). Do you think the Giver of the Torah reports all of this to us by chance? Do you assume that he did not understand – what you and I understand – that these facts are necessary conditions for the obligation he wants from us? And since they are a condition for obligation, it makes sense that these facts themselves are obligations.
Of course, if you insist on holding the position of the naive positivist skeptic and demand an explicit verbal reference (which would say something like “you are obligated to believe this and that”) you can always say that there is no “obligation”… but no one really lives like that and no one believes it consistently.

*What I meant in the last sentence I wrote was that no one relies solely on positive facts and explicit verses. Reason has necessary weight.

Please, I guess you're not new to this site. What do you want from me? I've written my opinion here more than once about the commandments of faith, and the fact that the Rambam wrote this means nothing to me. It's hard to believe that he himself thought so, and one can perhaps speculate as to why he listed this commandment in the first place. But even if his intention is simple, I disagree. And it's not just that I disagree, but logic disagrees.

Did you respond to me? I didn't write anything about Maimonides.

I wrote that I responded to ’Please’

And as for you (Doron),
Who said the Torah writes this by chance? He wants to bring this information to our attention so that we know it. But you can't define a duty to know.

I explained in what sense it is possible to define a duty to believe (and not a “duty to know” as you wrote in your last response).
In my opinion, your position on this matter does not deviate from the position of the standard skeptic (with all the attendant costs that inevitably accompany it). What surprises me is that you do not recognize in your argument the same skeptical pattern of thinking (one that looks for completely positive smoking guns) that you yourself often warn against.
Think, for example, of all the long discussions in which you recently argued about the implausibility of a law without a legislator. There too, you did not claim that all the laws of our world are required to be accompanied by an explicit ”stamp” of the legislator, but simply showed that it is reasonable to conclude that that legislator exists (and we do the same in everyday life).

I lost you. If you're talking about a duty to inquire, there's no problem. A duty to believe and a duty to know are the same thing, and both are absurd.

That is, do you agree that the act of “clarification” that appears in the Torah is an obligation from God, an obligation imposed on the Jewish person?
Regarding your second claim that believing and knowing are the same thing, this is a really strange claim. Forgive me, every native Hebrew speaker knows that there is a difference even if it is not always easy to explain what it is (and sometimes very simple…)

I did not write that I agree that there is a duty to clarify. I wrote that such a duty is not logically problematic.
In my native Hebrew it is exactly the same. I have already stated this more than once. This is not a question of Hebrew (semantics) but of essence.

I would be very happy if someone among the readers who understands Mikhi (and maybe even agrees with him) would help me understand his position. I don't understand. And since this is an interesting and even important topic for the “natural” audience of this site, perhaps he would volunteer for the task…

Doron, you should clarify what you don't understand. Otherwise, even those who want to explain won't know exactly what they should explain. Maybe even your faithful servant can help with something.

What part is unclear, Doron? Rabbi Michi explained himself well.

The obligation to believe in the fundamental principles of the Torah, which carry with them the obligation to even the smallest details and commandments, is not in man himself or in the verses explained in the text. It is objectively found in God or in His intentions. Therefore, even if man turns his back on these principles, they do not cease to exist. Why think otherwise? Or perhaps Mikhi's claim that they are not an "obligation" from God but only a "recommendation"...? I did not understand that.

They are not an obligation or a recommendation, but information. Assuming that I accept it, an obligation is created on me. If I do not accept it, then I cannot be forced to accept it, because there is no authority over belief in facts (=acceptance of facts).
Suppose that if a person is shot in the head, he dies and the prohibition of murder is violated. If I do not accept the fact that a shot to the head kills, I cannot be forced to accept it. At most, I can be punished for murder without accepting it (and that is not easy either).

Well, I don't see that leading to anything. Thanks for the try.

See, there is a deaf dialogue here. It seems that everyone here understands the concept of ”obligation” (and perhaps other concepts) differently.
The sages have established (and also explained in the verses) that there are several basic approaches to serving God: love of God, fear of God, and ”learned”.
A person who acts from the system of ”learned”, puts on tefillin (because everyone does), observes Shabbat (because his father kept Shabbat), and in general fulfills all the mitzvot only as norms. Now, when someone comes (a sage, for example) and instructs him to behave differently, then the question naturally arises of what the authority of the commander (formal or substantive), because the discussion here is about establishing and changing norms. One can naturally conclude that there is no authority regarding facts, and therefore no commandment regarding faith applies.

Why won't it let me upload the rest of my comment?
Someone needs to check (technically) this site. If they have a problem with my comment, I would expect an error message.

But a person who acts out of the fear of God will not understand this discussion at all. For example, the well-known parable of the sorcerer states that if I am thirsty, and there is a glass of water here that I want to drink, and a fool comes and tells me that there is poison in the water, then it is clear that no rational person would drink the glass before thoroughly investigating. And it is equally clear that the fool has no formal or substantive authority, but in this case he made me obey him (not to drink, at least for the time being).

Why is he interrupting my comments?

The "scholar" will argue that this is not an "obligation" or a "commandment" in the sense in which he understands them (and therefore this is a completely different discussion), but he too will be able to understand that the result is the same (obedience to the commandment), and the bystander will not always be able to discern whether the obedience stems from receiving authority or from some other reason.

I will try another example. The Ramban's method is well known, that the obligation to listen to the Chazal is not from the Torah (it is not from the La Tesur, etc.). That is, they have no formal authority. Needless to say, substantial authority (even if they have it) does not create an "obligation" to obey. Obeying an expert may be rational, but it is not obligatory. Therefore, here (for the Ramban) there is a complete halakhic obligation to obey the Chazal, and this obligation does not stem from any authority whatsoever. I suppose that a "scholar" would deal with this somehow, but it is more natural to conclude that the Ramban's system of concepts was different. He did not think in terms of one authority or another.

In the system of concepts of reverence, it seems to me that Doron is right (if I understood him correctly). Suppose a religious man tells me, “There is a God, and He wants you to keep the Sabbath.” It is clear to me that God can benefit or harm me (if He exists), and it is clear that keeping the Sabbath is significant for me (if indeed God commanded it), and therefore it is clear that I will go and clarify these points to the letter, just as I would clarify whether there is poison in the cup of the Greek. A “scholar” would not regard this as an “obligation,” and certainly not an “obligation to believe,” but the result is the same. In fact, I have an obligation to clarify the matter, even though the necessity did not stem from the authority of the aforementioned religious man (because he does not have one).
(There is another issue here – if I investigated the matter and came to the wrong conclusion. But that is another issue, “rape of opinions”, and on which the Rabbi has already elaborated sufficiently. I did not get to understand the Rabbi's words on this, but that is another issue).
And of course, someone who operates from a conceptual system of love of God or fear of the sublime will not understand these two discussions at all. “authority” is not relevant to him at all, nor is the fear of harm. But I have already elaborated sufficiently.

Ariel, thank you for your comment.
In my opinion, Mikhi ignored the gist of my words.
Your formulation appears in an internal religious language that is a bit foreign to me, and therefore I have difficulty deciphering it. What I can say on this matter are a few simple points:
1. I was engaged in a philosophical-conceptual analysis of the concept of obligation, and for this purpose, the need for sources and “history” neither elevates nor detracts.
2. My main argument is that the concept of obligation necessarily includes not only the person who undertakes (or the one who is expected to undertake, even if he refuses to do so in practice), but also an obliging factor.
3. Regarding the obligation of faith. I completely agree with Mikhi that it cannot be forced on a person if he refuses to accept it upon himself. I am only arguing that such an act on the part of a person does not yet cancel the obligation.
4. Regarding the obligation to believe in the Torah. A distinction must be made between the essential and the trivial. Here it seems to me that it is not reasonable to interpret all the information in the Torah (say, how many days the world was created) as something that the Torah giver considers an “obligation” to believe. In the case of the days of creation, it is likely that this is merely a metaphor or something like that, and their exact numbering will not help strengthen a person's commitment to the text. On the other hand, the belief that there is a God and that He is the one who gave the Torah certainly gives it a higher status a priori. This is simple common sense, and there is no reason to assume that the Torah giver did not think about it himself (and therefore added it to the text). Therefore, it is reasonable that the Torah giver would impose on a person an obligation to believe in this principle even though he understands very well that a person could turn his back on this commandment.