On Commitment to God
Is the Euthyphro dilemma relevant to the question of commitment to God, because if morality – i.e., good, evil, justice, etc. – are entities to which God is also ‘subject’ (‘The Judge of all the earth will not do justice’), then perhaps the obligation that I feel not to do evil because it is evil is not due to the general commitment to the word of God, but rather to these entities, and it would not be possible to extrapolate from this to the prohibition of Satan…? (This is in contrast to the possibility that good is good because God commanded it – then there is no question…)
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Rabbi, I just now had time to read your answer. First of all, thank you very much.
Secondly, I still have a small question, the Rabbi said that morality is just a fish for a sense of obligation. But if we assume for a moment that morality and halakha are disconnected - then although I have no problem with the moral obligation - to which I feel a sense of obligation, the problem is the commitment to halakha, what do I do if I don't feel it…?
Feeling the moral obligation does not mean feeling that it is obligatory and that is it. After all, without God there is no morality (as in my fourth notebook in the 3rd century). Therefore, at its core, it is a commitment to morality because God commanded. But He also commanded the law. So what is the difference? Whoever is obligated to this is also obligated to this (to all His commandments).
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer