On the concept of duty

“To be obliged” is an expression that belongs to the normative sphere. It is not an emotion or an impulse.

If you don’t do what you must – you will simply act incorrectly (and I assume that this has problematic/damaging consequences. But I don’t know how to point them out). Maimonides in Refa’i Mehal’ Teshuvah writes that labor of love is doing the truth because it is the truth.
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Asks:
I didn’t understand what it meant, that it was an expression that belonged to the normative count.

Wikipedia: “A norm is the manner of behavior expected of groups and individuals in a particular society, which is perceived as appropriate and acceptable according to the values ​​of that culture.”

Is this a social issue?
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Rabbi:
Normative is what is proper (versus what is found. Facts). In some uses it describes norms derived from some culture. But not always the accepted is the source of the obligation. In my opinion what is proper is proper for its own sake, not because society has decided. Manners are what society demands, and morality is proper for its own sake.
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Asks:
Excuse me, I still don’t understand what it means to “be obligated.” We just moved the question, instead of what is “obligation,” to what is “due”?

This whole “need” “must” “ought” “ought” thing is not clear to me what it means? What is the difference between “I want to eat ice cream” and “I need/must eat ice cream”?
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Rabbi:
A bit of a strange question to me. And do you use the terms want and owe in the same way in everyday life? Simply put, a owe is the recipient of a debt created by an external entity and wants it from myself.
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Asks:
In everyday life, “must” is used by me in two ways, neither of which fits the definition of religious obligation as stated by the rabbi.
1. Obliged in the context of law and justice, which then means that if you don’t do it, you will be forced to do what you are obligated to do or you will be punished.
2. Must in a personal context, it is a very strong emotion or impulse, a kind of feeling that I will not be able to cope if I do not do what I must. “I must eat” because if I do not I will suffer torment and eventually die of hunger.

An external factor will never be significant to me if it does not affect my interests. Therefore, when the rabbi speaks of a religious obligation that is detached from interests and emotions, it empties the word “obligated” of its meaning.
To this day, I have understood religious obligation according to interpretation #2, “must” = a feeling of very strong urge. And a person in his nature does indeed have a strong urge to cling to God, he does not always recognize that it is his urge or he does not interpret the urge correctly.
And what the Rambam says, “He does the truth because he is the truth,” means that in this way, man by nature has a strong urge to connect with the truth.
Daniel,
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Rabbi:
Hello.
This discussion is fascinating to me. At first I was sure we had a philosophical debate (whether it is possible to be obligated to something regardless of the sanction on one’s side or not). But it turns out that this is basically a semantic debate (which perhaps hides the substantive debate behind it). I am very interested in whether after the semantic clarification (where I think you are wrong, a simple mistake) a philosophical change will occur (where I also think you are wrong, but this is already a question of opinion and not of facts).
This reminds me of a friend who always thought that the word “cucumber” meant “from a cucumber,” meaning that the name of the vegetable is “cucumber,” and when they say “you ate a cucumber,” they mean “you ate from a cucumber.” Except that there, it’s a semantic error that has no philosophical background. Here, of course, it’s much more fascinating.
You translate must as “I have an interest.” When someone pays you a wage for something or gives you a candy, do you also use the term “I must do it”? What is the difference between a wage (positive motivation) and a punishment (negative motivation) in this regard? This ties into Nozick’s fascinating distinction between temptation (which is permitted by law) and extortion (which is prohibited by law). Temptation is by a wage and extortion is by punishment, but both involve motivation by reward. So what is the real difference? I discussed this in the third book of the Talmudic Logic series, where I used it to define the difference between a positive and a negative commandment. But both temptation and extortion belong to the realm of motivation by reward. “Must” has nothing to do with it at all.
And what about “worthy”? In a previous message here I suggested the translation that something I owe is something that is worthy to do (as opposed to being motivated by self-interest), and you said that this did not solve your problem because now it is not clear to you what is worthy. Do you also translate the term “worthy” as there will be a reward (positive or negative) if I do? That already sounds like a grosser mistake to me. Here it clearly seems that this is not the meaning at all.
“Must” in your sense is a borrowed use of this term. It belongs more to the semantic field of compulsion or necessity. Even if it’s not actual compulsion or necessity, it’s still something of the same kind but a softer one. But must doesn’t belong there at all. It doesn’t talk about the content of my self-interested calculation (reward or punishment) nor about the degree of my freedom or necessity (whether I’m deterministically compelled or choose to do it). It concerns the nature of the act itself. There is a neutral act, meaning that in itself it is worthless, neither positive nor negative. I do it to gain something or to escape a sanction. But there are acts that in themselves have value, and it’s appropriate to do them regardless of self-interested calculations. That’s why I say I “must” do it.
I will give a few examples here: paying off a debt, helping others, prohibiting murder, observing the Sabbath, obeying the law (!), honoring parents, and so on. All of these have value, and I should not do them because of a self-interested calculation, but because it is right. This is what I call “doing because I must.” There are moral obligations here, or halakhic or legal obligations, but they are all obligations in the sense I am talking about.
One consequence is that there is an obligation or prohibition for such acts even if they are done in secret. The obligation to honor parents exists even if no one knows about it, including them themselves (for example, to honor them after their death). Here, there is no self-interested calculation that causes me to do this (see below the argument about doing it for the sake of satisfaction or remorse, which are also a type of calculation), but only because it is appropriate. I must honor parents. Even if on the halakhic level this can be linked to reward and punishment (in the next world), then in the context of morality or the law there is no reason in the world to keep them secret, if indeed it is only a matter of interest. There is no one there who will pay me reward or punishment for acts in secret.
It seems to me that a mistake like yours is damage that results from accepted legal conduct. In the legal world, the perception is that a law that prohibits something must always be accompanied by a sanction. In the halakhic world as well (although in some cases the sanction is in the world of the world and not here). But the same for side reasons. On the contrary, the justification for the sanction is because it is appropriate to do so even without the sanction. Only because of this is there justification for the legislator or the Supreme Court to impose a penalty on those who do not do so.
Maimonides in his R.P.I. Mahal’ Teshuvah wrote that this type of worship of God is “the way of women and children” and it is not appropriate to worship God in this way. Incidentally, in the 3rd chapter of the 6th chapter of the 7th chapter it emerges from his words that it is also not appropriate to worship God out of love and fear. Why? Because these are also motives that depend on calculation. Religious work is not supposed to be done out of calculation. The focus is not me, but the unconditional commitment to God. This is what he calls there “acceptance in God.” God is a factor whose very fact that He commands is a sufficient reason for me to feel obligated to do so. This is in contrast to any other obligation that depends on calculation.
In the margins of my remarks, I will add that these words of Maimonides indicate that even a calculation that is based on my motives is a calculation. For example, some people base the moral or religious obligation on the satisfaction it gives me, or on the remorse I will have if I don’t do it. But these are also types of calculation. This belongs to the realm of necessity and coercion (the softer one, unless you are a determinist), and not to the realm of the obligated. It is just like a labor of love or reverence.
It seems to me that on the semantic level it is difficult to argue that this is the meaning of must or ought: an act of this kind is not neutral but “charged,” that is, has value in itself. It motivates action and does not just describe a fact. When I say that one must not kill or that one must give charity, I do not mean only to describe a type of action that does something to me (such as: scratching one’s back makes me feel good), but to make a different kind of claim (whose content is not factual). In philosophy, this is called a prescriptive sentence (=legislative, and perhaps, according to me, also a motive) as opposed to a descriptive one (=descriptive). When you hear that one must not kill, it is not like saying that in some place it is customary to stand on one leg every day. From the point of view of the listener, this is supposed to motivate him to act or prevent him from acting, and not just bring to his attention some factual information. When I say that someone must, it means that he must do it even in secret when there is no calculation and when he has no sense of conscience and the like that motivates him to do so. Maimonides, in the eighth root, elaborates on this distinction, in the following.
On the philosophical level, one can of course argue and not accept the existence of norms in this sense. You can philosophically deny that there are actions that must or must not be done in this sense, and accept only a self-interested calculation. But I think you have to agree that the semantic distinction is such and is completely clear (even if it is empty in your opinion on the practical level). But perhaps after this semantic clarification, its meaning will suddenly become clear to you and you will also be convinced philosophically. Sometimes the philosophical conclusion is because concepts are not distinguished on the semantic level, and perhaps this is the case here as well.
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Daniel:
In the Rabbi’s opinion, is serving God for the pleasure of being close to Him and adhering to Him considered “acceptance in God”?
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Rabbi:
If it is about pleasure and no matter what, it is not acceptance in God. It is like a labor of love (loving God is a mitzvah, and still labor out of love for God is not labor for its own sake). If for devotion as a value – then of course it is.
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Daniel:
This raises the question for me: does a person want ice cream for the pleasure or does a person simply want the ice cream itself and when he provides himself with what he wants, does pleasure come?
I don’t know if we can even answer such a question. Which makes me think that a person is never able to know in the depths of his soul exactly why he does something. Rather, all that can be discerned is whether I want the thing itself or I want the external thing that accompanies the thing itself.
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Rabbi:
I’m willing to agree that sometimes it’s not clear. I don’t agree with the blanket statement that you can never know. For example, with ice cream, it’s clear to me that I eat for pleasure, and not that the pleasure is the result of doing my will.
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Daniel:
I am not a linguist and my goal is not to discuss the meaning of the words but rather their actual content. The Ramchal writes, “Speech is nothing more than the transfer of the picture from the mind of the speaker to the mind of the listener.” My goal is to understand the picture, and no matter what words we use, we can call the obligatory A and the proper B. It is not a matter of principle.
I conclude from observing myself and observing the people around me that all a person wants is to feel certain emotions. A person never wants something that does not cause any emotion. Or to put it another way, everything a person wants has some positive emotion in it and it is impossible to separate the emotion and say that the person only wants the thing without the emotion that accompanies it. The same goes for keeping a commandment. I do not believe that there is a person who would keep a commandment if it did not create some emotion in him. When a person wants to be moral, it is because being moral creates positive emotions in him (this can be explained psychologically at length). Therefore, I think that must means a great, significant and essential desire for the existence of the thing. For example, a person must eat, means that in order to exist, there is a necessity to eat, but it is based on the desire to live and the pleasure that a person has in his very being. If a person does not want to live, he does not have to eat. Similarly, regarding the observance of mitzvot in order to sustain the spiritual part of a person (which is also the more important part), there is a necessity to observe mitzvot, and this is also based on the desire to sustain the spiritual part of a person and the pleasure of his existence. I do not translate must as “I have an interest.” I translate must as “I have a vital interest,” an interest that is essential to my existence. Therefore, when I am offered a salary or candy, it is only “I want,” but when I am offered life (if such a thing could be offered theoretically) it is “I must.”
In my opinion, the meaning is similar to the meaning of expected (from the word expectation). For example, when I say to a person who does not wear a kippah, “When you enter a synagogue, it is appropriate that you wear a kippah,” it means that someone expects you to wear a kippah. This someone could be me, or the congregation in the synagogue, or God, or even the person himself expects him to wear a kippah. And each of these possibilities has an emotional impact, so in the end I appeal to his emotion. If we say that my intention is that the congregation in the synagogue expects a person who enters the synagogue to wear a kippah, the emotional meaning of this is that with a kippah you will be treated with more respect than without. And so on with everything.
Reward and punishment are external rewards. I do X for Y. In “oblige” as I interpret it, I do X for X because I want X itself. All I’m claiming is that there is always pleasure in the X that I want.
The concept of “value” also includes pleasure. Stealing creates negative emotions and being an honest person creates positive emotions (=pleasure), so not stealing is a value.
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Rabbi:
Hello Daniel. I didn’t understand where in my words you saw a semantic or linguistic discussion.
We have a debate (whether a person acts without emotion). You repeatedly reiterate your position that the fundamental motive for action is always emotion, and I have no choice but to reiterate that I completely disagree.
Furthermore, anyone who acts this way is simply a deterministic machine, because emotion is created in us without control (that’s how we are built), and if it is what causes us to act, then each of us is driven to act and does not decide on it. Therefore, it is an action devoid of moral or religious value.
But I think we’ve exhausted it.
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Daniel:
I will just add to the last argument regarding determinism that even according to my method, one can say that there is free choice.
1. A person creates a large part of their emotions through their thinking. Cognitive behavioral therapy, which is a popular psychological therapy, is based on the approach that a person’s emotions and actions are a product of their thinking, and when they change their thinking, their emotions will change. It seems to me that anyone who looks within themselves will notice that this is so – our interpretation of reality is what creates our emotions, and different interpretations will create different emotions.
2. Even if a person does not create his own emotions, he still has a choice between emotions. A choice between the pleasure of the taste of ice cream and the pleasure of being thin and healthy. And according to the way in which obligation speaks of an essential and meaningful pleasure on which a person’s existence depends, there is a choice between low pleasure – meaningless, and high pleasure – essential and meaningful. And about this, the Ramchal wrote, “Man was not created except to delight in God and enjoy the light of His presence, which is the true pleasure and the greatest refinement of all refinements that can be found.”
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Rabbi:
This is a lack of understanding. After all, the decision to develop some emotion is also a decision I made. We can also ask about it where it comes from and how I got it? And again the two options will arise: either from free choice or a previous emotion that created it. And here we are back to the previous situation. You can continue to infinite regression, but that is a failure.
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Daniel:
I wrote about this in the second part. Several emotions are created together and the choice between the emotions – according to which emotion to act.

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Rabbi:
Choosing between emotions is the usual choice. That’s what I’m talking about too. The decision of which emotion to choose is itself not explained by emotion, and the question of how you receive it is itself. If you agree that this is not the result of emotion – then you have come back to admitting what I said.
I repeat myself over and over again. I think we’ve exhausted ourselves.

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Daniel:

I know that the rabbi is busy with many matters, and yet the rabbi takes the time to address each questioner, and therefore I greatly appreciate each answer from the rabbi. When I ask again, it is not because I am trying to convince of my position, but because I really did not understand the things and I am trying to understand. I do not think that the rabbi repeats himself over and over again, but rather each time explains a different point that is not clear to me. It seems to me that this is the nature of negotiation. I will accept with understanding and respect if the rabbi writes to me that he cannot continue discussing the matter.

As for the substance of the discussion, I am not claiming that the motive is emotions. I am claiming that the goal is always emotions. And that in everything a person wants, there is always an emotion and the emotion cannot be separated. Therefore, as I understand it, even when a person wants to obey God because of the pleasure in obeying God (not external pleasure), it is worship for the sake of God. The Rabbi told me that he did not agree with this. Now in the last response, the Rabbi wrote that he did agree with this, that the choice is always between emotions and when a person chooses to obey God, he chooses the positive emotion in it (=pleasure).

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Rabbi:

Hello Daniel.
It’s also permissible to persuade, and there’s no need to apologize. But I really thought there was nothing new here beyond what had already been said.

I agreed, for the sake of discussion, that it is possible to say that there is a choice between emotions as long as that choice itself is not made out of emotion. But then it follows that a choice is not motivated by emotion.

If I understand your clarification now correctly, you are saying that a person chooses something not because of emotions but in order to reach some emotion or another (emotion is not the cause but the result/goal), and if so, I do not agree, but I do not see a very fundamental argument between us. If doing the truth is called emotion in your opinion – for health. That is semantics. In my opinion, there is an emotion that may accompany it, but it is not done for the emotion but “to do the truth because it is truth” (the words of the Maimonides, Rafi, in the Teshuvah). This of course depends on the definition of emotion (I am not inclined to agree with the definition that is reflected in your words). If a person does a mitzvot for pleasure, and does not change pleasure from what, it is work not for its own sake (see Maimonides, 37:36, that action out of love or fear is not action for its own sake, and it is not an action that is obligatory). And in my opinion, there is action that is not intended to achieve pleasure of any kind. Action of something because it is truth. Apparently, we are arguing about that.

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Daniel:

According to the rabbi, the phrase “do the truth because it is the truth” does not make sense to me at all.
What does it mean to “do the truth”? How do you do the truth?
Until today, I understood that the meaning of the word “truth” is that something is indeed so. For example, it is true that the current year is 2017, and conversely, it is not true that the current year is 2014.
But what does Isaiah have to do with truth?
Or from another perspective, why is putting on tefillin telling the truth and scratching your ear not telling the truth?

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Rabbi:
The factual truth of a claim is determined by comparing the claim to the state of affairs in the world. Halachic truth is determined by comparing the claim to what the Halachah says. Moral truth is determined by comparing what the moral says to what I claim about it. Scratching one’s ear is not a Halachic obligation, but keeping Shabbat is. Therefore, I keep Shabbat but do not scratch one’s ear. Anyone who thinks that scratching one’s ear is a Halachic obligation should do so. I disagree with him.