On the existence of God and basic concepts

peace.
A. God exists in exactly the same sense that we exist. The term “exists” describes material and spiritual beings in exactly the same sense. Perceiving a place in space is a property and not the essence of existence, and therefore the two things should not be mixed up. “Exists” is a fundamental concept that cannot be superimposed on other concepts (after all, there must be such concepts), but this does not mean that something in it is incomprehensible. On the contrary, it is so understandable and fundamental that other concepts can be based on it.
Although some want to divide existence into necessity and existence, in the appendix to my book Two Carts I argued that this division is wrong. The element of existence is common and has the same meaning in both contexts. I wish existence was necessary only appeared in one of the contexts, but that does not change the essence of existence. Existence is part of ontology, while necessity belongs to logic.
I do not identify with Maimonides’ ancient philosophical views, and I find it difficult to defend them.
on. You assume a sequence, but it is certainly possible that it is a creation and not a sequence. According to this, we did not emerge from it but were created by it. But a sequence can also be considered. This is the effect of our spiritual on the physical. Our will manages to move electrons, as if there were a physical source of power here. In any case, even if we do not understand this, this is a lack of understanding and not a contradiction. A lack of understanding of G-d and creation is certainly something to be expected, when we ourselves and our thinking constitute part of creation, and therefore it is likely (although not necessary) that we will not be able to understand what lies at the foundation of our thinking and existence.
Good afternoon, Michi.
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Asks:
Are fundamental concepts that cannot be reduced also not characterization? That is, it is not possible for a certain thing to exist, that is, to occupy space in space, and this is not a positing of a prior concept, but a characterization of existence.
A sequence, not necessarily, also in creation, and in fact any connection between the spiritual and the material is seemingly impossible. (Is it possible to resolve the psycho-physical problem by saying that the material and the spiritual are not divided dichotomously, but rather that there is a long scale with the most spiritual at one end and the material at the other, and that there are ‘gray’ things and through them there is a connection between the spiritual and the material? And assuming so, is this also beneficial to the very essence of creation?).
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Rabbi:
I suppose it is possible to characterize such concepts, even without reduction in the full sense. Certainly if one is willing to do so in circular forms (such as explaining one concept through concepts derived from it. This is Quine’s ‘conceptual network’ concept).
But I don’t see from this why you distinguish between existence and occupying a place in space. In my opinion, an idea can also exist, as can God, and the soul, and none of these occupy a place in space. At most, they influence beings that exist somewhere in space (like a soul on a particular body).
In principle, the psychophysical problem can be resolved in this way, under two conditions: 1. You convince me that such intermediate states do exist. 2. That this seems to me to be a satisfactory solution (not to me. But in my opinion, no solution is needed. In my opinion, wind can move electrons, and I don’t see this as a problem in principle).
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Asks:
I didn’t mean the concept of existence specifically, but in principle whether it belongs to characterizing concepts even without explaining them by another concept. And my words stemmed from the fact that I saw in your book (‘Two Carts’) that every argument about a concept must stem from an agreement on the ‘substance’ of the concept, and I asked whether it is possible to have an argument about the characteristics of the concept without arguing about its essence. Furthermore, is it not possible to argue about something before us, whether it exists or not, or in what form it is, even if we do not agree that at least ‘substance’ that is common to both of us exists? (We may argue about what is in the space before us, and we agree on the existence of space, only that we cannot deduce from this that concepts exist, but rather we argue about the concept before us as if it does not exist, and if it does not exist we would be ‘nothing’ altogether, as Parmenides said).
And another short question: Even if ‘the thing in itself’ is not attainable, when we say of an object that it is green, aren’t we saying that its substance/essence is in a certain way that appears to us in green color?
There is a phrase that is repeated in many variations in the words of ancient and Kabbalah philosophers, which states that God “does not exist as we do.” How does this reconcile with your words?
thanks
I forgot to ask, how can electrons be moved by wind? (I hope that no great knowledge of physics is needed to understand this).
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Rabbi:
. I didn’t understand how you could characterize a concept without resorting to other concepts. Saying that it exists is not a characterization but a reference to its essence. There is no such thing as an argument about essences. Every argument is about the characteristics.
2. True. When we say that an object is green, we mean that there is something in it (=its crystalline structure) that makes it appear green to us. That’s what I wrote for the book.
3. The only difference is that it necessarily exists and we do not. I think in the appendix to my book I argued that there is no difference in the meaning of the concept of ‘existence’ in the two contexts. In other words: the difference is in logic, not ontology.
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Asks:
A. The debate will be conducted in such a way that one will say that the concept before us is in such and such a form, and his friend will say that it is in an unknown form, but there is no agreement between them except that there is a concept, not that there is a ‘substance’ common to both sides in the debate, but just as it is possible to argue whether we are in front of a chair or a bench, and what is common to both sides is that there is something, not an idea but an object, that is, there is a fundamental characteristic that exists for both sides in the debate. (For example, in the debate about who is a Jew, both sides agree – by way of example – that one must be the son of a Jewish lama, but not that this is his substance, but that this is the main characteristic). By the way, isn’t it possible that being the son of a Jewish lama is the essence of a Jew?
on. With your permission, I will ask another question that has also been bothering me for a long time.
Everyone knows that there are ‘methods and schools’ in Judaism, such as Kelm-Novardok-Slobodka, etc. A brief study of these ‘ways’ suggests that they are nothing more than how to behave, whether properly, carelessly, or with respect, but in the end they do not touch on Judaism itself, which is 313 commandments. And so, do they have any religious content at all, or is it like going to a psychologist to be cured of a mental problem that prevents him from fulfilling a certain mitzvah, for which this act is nothing more than an instrument, and all these ways are nothing more than practical advice to make it easier to fulfill the mitzvahs? And is the discussion of how to do them nothing more than an instrumental discussion and seemingly devoid of ‘value’?
And in fact, apart from observing the commandments as required by Halacha, there is no religious content to anything. Is it right to reduce religion so much?
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Rabbi:
A. If this is a characteristic, then when there is a situation where it is not agreed upon, there is nothing left in common. It is possible that a son of a Jewish mother is the essence of a Jew, but it seems that not everyone agrees with this (by the way, there is also conversion). So how will you argue?
on. This is a semantic question. The main question is whether these ways have importance in the service of God or are they psychological phenomena. There are few philosophical questions about matter and chance here. In my opinion, this has religious significance as long as the person doing it does so for religious reasons. At the same time, there may be an argument, or someone who does not think that this should be done. And that is perfectly fine.
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Asks:
In fact, we find that all concepts are basic, because either A is B and B is a basic concept, or A is A, right?
What is the actual discussion when we try to characterize a concept, since in the end it will be basic, we can seemingly only discuss whether it is indeed a concept in itself, or an angle of a complete concept? For example, why is the concept of ownership itself (which you discussed in the book in its essence) not said to be basic?
– I mean to say that all methods are a technical aid, but there is nothing valuable in the fact of how I behave, but rather how will it make it easier for me to keep the Torah?
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Rabbi:
I don’t understand the question. There are indeed basic concepts, and others are derived from them. In my opinion, the concept of ownership is indeed a basic concept (and therefore it has substance, meaning that the concept itself exists in the world of ideas). What I am trying to do is characterize it and prove it for itself (that it is a basic concept and not a bundle of rights).
The discussion of concepts is basically a discussion of distinctions and classifications: who is basic and who is derived, and what is derived from whom and how. The purpose of the discussion is to help us observe the idea of ​​the concept and thus understand it. The descriptions are only an auxiliary means to this end.