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What did they know how to demand?
They used their intellect and understanding countless times to demand sermons and shared explanations for each other's explanations.
So what are we obligated to their explanations?
Many times a certain sermon does not seem to me to be an explanation and truth by virtue of this well, another person teaches differently?
So why not me?

Who received authority and when?!
And why does it obligate my little ego that received nothing?

If my ancestors receive something, does it obligate me?
And even my ancestors, if they suddenly back down from them, they cannot?
What is an oath?

*And indeed, by virtue of this reasoning, another Amora learns differently.

I have often written that sermons are based on reasoning and are not just technical calculations. But you take this to the extreme and assume that sermons are only reasoning. Therefore, in your opinion, there is no need to know how to preach, and therefore anyone who disagrees with the reasoning disagrees with the sermon. But that is absolutely not true. The world of preaching requires knowledge of the use of the standards of preaching, which I do not have, even though I have worked on it quite a bit, and I allow myself to assume that you do not have it either. When you know how to use the standards of preaching, you can rely on your reasoning during the sermon. But if you do not know how to preach, no reasoning will help you.
Acceptance of authority exists in every normative system. The citizens of the state have accepted the authority of the Knesset, and therefore even if I do not agree, I must obey the law. Furthermore, as long as the law is not changed, it also obliges future generations who did not share in the acceptance of the ancient legislators.

If it really is not just a matter of reason and it is a matter of strictness,
Why don't we take this into account from the Gemara?
I mean talented people.
I ask seriously and not cynically.

A person who decides that he does not accept Israeli law can get up and leave and there is no problem with him.
But of course you don't agree that someone who does not accept the authority of the Chazal is acting in the right way?

And more than that, regarding the law of the state, even if the opponent of the state remains here, why does the law oblige him except for the categorical order that there is already a state and he would like everyone to observe the law.
But a person who does not see Chazal as an authority also does not want everyone to observe him.?
So what obliges him?

People who have accepted Jesus as an authority now among them must follow his ways?

And also in relation to the previous point. The Okimat. That when there is a correct thesis then we will adopt narrow excuses.
That is true.

But, every half minute in the Gemara the Amoraim put the Mishnah in harsh Okimat, and I say to myself okay, okay, you managed to make peace between the Mishna and the Bereito. But the simple feeling from the Mishna's interpretation is that the Tanna did not intend this in his dreams.

And this is annoying and frustrating and already feels strange because it happens a lot. Anyone who studies the Gemara knows. There is an interpretation of the Mishnah, and at the end of the issue comes a conclusion that does not fit into words. And in fact we did not understand the Mishnah at all because it speaks when there are two witnesses and they are stuttering and they are exactly on a ship from the Sea State because they were expelled because they …. I don't know what anymore ….

Reminds me of the story of David and Bathsheba, no matter what they say and make excuses, the verses scream that he sinned in Rahab.

Is this feeling of too many excuses understandable?

Isn't it strange for you sometimes? Just me?

I didn't understand the question. I explained that it's not about strictness of the precepts, because there is also a reason, but there is an element of skill in using the precepts. So far, we haven't been able to extract this from the Gemara, although there are advances.

This division is irrelevant. You asked how something we have taken upon ourselves or that others have taken upon themselves is binding. I showed you that it also exists in other contexts. That there are divisions is clear. So what? Anyone who does not accept the authority of the sages must interpret the will of God for themselves. If he has a way to do so, then yes.

If a person belongs to a community that accepted Jesus as authority, he is indeed obligated. He can of course leave. He can also leave Judaism. What if the halakha says no? He doesn't accept it.

Regarding validity, I don't understand your question. It's not a stretch, and that's definitely the intention of the Mishnah. I explained it well in my article.

And regarding David and Bathsheba, there is no problem. Anyone who says David committed the formal sin of a man's wife is wrong. But no one claims that David did not commit a moral sin. Rabbi Maydan elaborated on this in his book on this parsha.

I just saw the article on validity. My mistake.
But the question about authority is difficult for me.

I don't understand what you wrote!

“He can also leave Judaism. The fact that the halacha says no, so what? He doesn't accept it.”

But my question is why the halacha itself thinks it obligates me.
That if I don't accept the halacha, I don't have to listen to it. I understand it myself, it's a simple sentence.

My whole question is to you, as a man of halacha, how do you turn to me and explain to me that what the sages said and interpreted is binding on me when I didn't accept their authority.

And the fact that my parents accepted it doesn't interest me. I don't owe them or their decisions anything.
So what is your way of convincing me that I am indeed bound by the authority of Hazal as a man who thinks that God has authority over me.

?

What does it mean that ‘the law thinks’? If you left, what do you care what it thinks? And if I tell you that it is not binding or that it is binding, these are just words.
You are confusing the question of whether it is right and proper with the question of why it is binding. The covenant and the agreement at Mount Sinai were the reason for the obligation (that is what is commonly thought. I am not sure about this. It may be just a mountain coercion as a trick), but the observance of the commandments is right and proper on its own part. It does not depend on the agreement and the covenant.
You are obligated because the general public has accepted it upon itself, just like the law of the land (as mentioned, the division between them is irrelevant). But it has accepted it upon itself because this is the right way to act. Like someone who has not signed the social contract regarding morality, they will certainly tell him that he is still obligated because this is the right way to act. He cannot leave that either.

I thought it was only about the Gemara, right? (Because it was no longer written by the Sanhedrin)

I mean, the part where we are obligated to it because we took it upon ourselves.

Also about the Torah, if we assume that at Mount Sinai there was a Kabbalah (done and heard).

Ok. Thanks.

You wrote:

”Those who do not accept the authority of the sages must interpret the will of God for themselves. If they have a way to do so – by all means”.

A. So that's why you accept their authority, because in your opinion there is no better option?

And then that explains the sermon and the way of studying Torah.

B.
But what about specific cases where you think the sages are wrong and you are right, such as decrees and exclusions and regulations?

There I still don't understand what obliges me to bow my head and accept their words?

C. Regarding Mount Sinai, what is ”acceptable thinking”?
What do you think?
What did you think was at Sinai that obliges us?
Or what happened there in general?

A. No. I accept their authority because there is a ‘la tesur’. But if someone thinks that there is no ‘la tesur’ or that it does not mean that they have authority – let him act as he understands.
B. You are confusing interpretation with legislation. In legislation there is no question of what the will of God is, but whether the legislator has authority. Rabbinic laws are legislation.
C. From my perspective, the status of Mount Sinai requires that it is the will of God. Some have planted this in our Kabbalah (Contract Laws), and this is what the Gemara means regarding the claim of a large muda’a. Even if this is true, in my opinion there is no need for it.