Pascal’s Wager
I thought about Pascal’s infamous wager, which might actually not be so bad with a little renovation.
We did not randomly choose a god from our imagination and base our bet on him. It can be arranged like this:
Given a (specific) 10% probability of God – worshiping Him would be right, and if not, it’s so bad that we won’t take the risk… Even Dawkins would agree that there is a significant probability of some kind of God (the truth is that specifically Dawkins the moron wouldn’t agree, but I understand)
In my opinion, one can rightly blame Pascal for probably intending to gamble in this way.
What do you think?
I didn’t understand anything.
Sorry. It came out unclear.
I mean that we can add information and formulate Pascal's wager like this:
Suppose I have researched and come to the conclusion that there is a God with a probability of 10%. Now I can make Pascal's wager without the criticisms of it (I omit from the wager the toying with infinity). It is difficult to formulate the wager formally like this, because it is impossible to calculate things like gratitude, hell, etc. But we can formulate it freely, that a 10% probability that there is a God is enough to make me worship him.
Assumption A: There is a specific God with a probability of 10%
Assumption B: If there is a God, we should worship him
If there is no God – and we worship him – we will neither lose nor gain.
If there is no God – and we will not worship him – we will neither lose nor gain.
If there is a God – and we worship him – we will gain
If there is a God – and we do not worship him – we will lose
The expectation of worshipping God is positive.
If we make the above assumptions before making the bet. Doesn't this correct Pascal's wager?
Sorry.
If we work for Him and He is gone, we will lose. The effort. And again, it is impossible to calculate this formally. But in my opinion it is easy to make a third assumption that the effort of working for Hashem is less than the need to work for Him if He exists (this is not something that can really be calculated because they are not on the same plane, but it still works intuitively. Like a steak tastes better than an orange) and again the expectation is positive.
In short, my idea was to add values to the bet.
I don't see any difference here from the original wording, except for the assumption that the chance is 10% and not something tiny. In such a situation, my appeal may not exist, but the other appeals do (there are other religious options with a similar chance. There is no value in working out of faith, etc.)
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