Payment of damages
I read somewhere in your writings on the Shas.0 that requiring a financial payment has both a punishment and a compensation dimension.
In other words, there are two reasons to pay money after damage: one to compensate for the damage, and one to atone.
Did I understand correctly? It’s a bit difficult for me to understand, I’m used to dichotomies: with a financial charge, it’s either a punishment or it’s compensation. And here it’s both, right?
I have written more than once about the problematic nature of educational dichotomies and in general. I don’t remember specifically what you quoted here. But we see that there is a dimension of compensation in this and we also see a dimension of punishment (that is why there is a Kim in the Drabs). Exactly what the relationship between these two components is, is another question.
The Rabbi writes that what is there is a Kalb, so it is considered a penalty, and not a debt. Apparently, that explanation regarding a legal debt does not apply to an exemption. And so the Rabbi also wrote regarding the debtor of a “beneficiary” who did not consider it a debt but rather a loan written in the Torah, since there is a Kalb in this.
But apparently it is explained to the Hadiya in some of the Rishonim that there is a Kalb also for a debt, see Rishonim B.K. page A.B. regarding the debt of a prostitute, where there is a Kalb. It is also explained in the Rishba in the response that the debtor of a “beneficiary” is considered as any ordinary loan and therefore collects a moderate amount.
How can this be explained?
I am not claiming that it is not a debt, but that it also has a punitive dimension. In the Bible, it is easier to see this in the law of the thief, “a fig prick from my desire” (returnable money). And to say “Kalbeder” about a benefit is a strange thing because in benefit payments there is no punitive dimension. Unlike in tort or theft (which for some is a renewal of the Torah, as a companion to what is written in the Torah).
A. According to the latter side, the reason for the obligation to pay is because he committed a crime in keeping it, then the payment is a fine for not keeping it, and not compensation, right?
B. According to the side that the reason for the obligation is because it is his property, I have seen some ask, "Then what if it is his property? After all, it is not him but some kind of omen, etc., so what does it matter to me that it is his property?", and in light of that difficulty, they say that since it is his property, it is the decree of Scripture that the person is liable for damages to his property.
Do we really have to go to the Gazzak? Is this question justified? What does "So what if it is his property?" mean, so what then is he responsible for it? It is simple! It is understandable from the beginning. It is like asking, "Why is it forbidden to kill? Because there is value in life. And why is there value in life?", and the answer is like that, it is simply self-evident, so here too, no?
A. Absolutely not. This is a tortious liability ground. See the opening lesson to B”B, which I believe was raised here as an article. Torts are not a penalty for any opinion.
B. Very true. A person is responsible for his property just as he is responsible for his body (his body is not himself either).
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