Permanent and retired
Hello Michi
Something similar to what you wrote in your third comment was once claimed (when we were in yeshiva…) by Yehudi Jungster regarding the method of our Rabbi Hananel. I sent him an email and this is what reminded me (his explanation below)
Best regards, N.
The late Rabbi Hananel (Ketubot 15:1, 45 in the Koruna):
Nine shops and a take… It is forbidden to doubt, because they say that everyone who eats a dish from a beautiful place eats a shop and a shop, and whoever eats a cheap dish from a small place. And a shop in Danbela is a cheap dish, so they feel that they are eating a small place…
At the time, I argued that his intention was to cite an example of the argument that this is how it is (in today’s terms): a decision by majority is possible only when the question as it arises before us is a question about reality as it is, and there is no act that we know of that created the doubt. If there is such an act, such as when we know that a person bought meat or that a mouse took from one of the public before us, it is impossible to ignore the fact that actions are performed out of causality, whatever it may be, for example – a market survey in search of the cheapest meat, and since it is clear to us that there is causality for the result before us – it is possible to decide only by majority and minority, which is a decision that is appropriate only for cases in which it is possible to ignore the actions that led to the situation before us (because we do not know at all that such actions existed), such as meat being found among the stores. And since it is impossible to decide by majority, and on the other hand it is impossible to clarify the causality that led to the result – all that remains is to remain doubtful, that is, half upon half.
If I understood correctly, you mean to distinguish between a random action and a person’s decision based on considerations that he makes, which is not something random.
This is a suggestion by an artist that was brought up in Talkbacks. I replied there that it is indeed similar to my words, but this formulation is problematic in my opinion because even a person who leaves his home in the city to become a slave is a human decision, and yet the Gemara Ketubot 15a indicates that this is considered a case of leaving and following the majority (the majority of the city’s residents).
Beyond that, a piece found on the street was also brought by a person who bought and lost it. There is also a human effort to buy it there.
Although this has some merit, since we do not know who the person is and each person has their own considerations, it can be seen as a random variable. Although this is certainly not true for the R”H because he is talking about a cheap and expensive store, and these are considerations common to all people.
And his words in general are puzzling because according to him, if a store is the cheapest, why don't we assume that it came from there. What's more, he ignores the laws of the market, which despite the difference in price, each store probably has an advantage (air conditioning, proximity, ease of purchase, kosher), otherwise it would not have held up. It is a fact that there are buyers from all stores. And again, if it is known that most of them buy from store x, it is again not clear why we should not conclude that the piece came from there.
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