Personal Responsibility According to Peter Strawson

Justification is overrated. They are looking to delve into metaphysics (moral realism + free will) instead of discussing given feelings and the factual or sensory implications of other actions and feelings. That is all that is interesting, and indeed, therefore, there is no practical consequence whatsoever to the neglected question of free will, and the gentleman whose words were presented here and rejected by Gila Dharta is very right. In my system of processing, terms like “to establish” or “to validate” are perceived as conceptual blurring of the senses, and the name is reserved for the naive.

Lest you be offended:
If all that matters are factual implications (and even sensory facts are facts), then there's no point in discussing anything, is there? Why even try to reconcile causality with personal responsibility? People act in a certain way, and that's it. Psychological-physiological-sociological analysis. This may really be what Strawson was trying to claim – Don't worry, people have always acted on the assumption of responsibility, and that's how it will continue to be. A given fact. But then - why is this even a concern? And why is it interesting? And where is the problem in the first place?

(Indeed, sensory facts are facts too, but I thought it would be clearer to address them explicitly.)
Why is there no point in discussing anything and why is it specifically related to factual implications? On the contrary, why do you care whether there is a morally charged fact floating around somewhere and whether you yourself have freely “decided” to follow the right path? You are simply interested in engaging with it and finding out the truth about the world, and so am I.
Before I try to loosen anything, allow me to describe the structure that I understand you are proposing and please confirm whether I described it correctly: You are suggesting that ”the objectively right thing” is that in a certain situation where someone has chosen a certain decision, “responsibility applies to that person”, and therefore it is “right” that he feels responsibility. That is, one is required to assume moral realism of the object of “responsibility,” to assume free choice, to assume that this object is honored to rest on a person only as a result of decisions made by that person’s free choice, and then to assume that the resting of such an object on a person obliges him to behave in a certain way or to feel certain feelings. Have I described the four assumptions correctly?

Yes, I think you described it correctly. That is, a materialistic perception of the world denies the existence of that object (=moral obligation) and therefore its imposition on man. Are you actually saying that a perception like Strawson's is actually based on the denial of moral realism?

I don't know Strawson and can only say my opinion and from what you wrote here. It is possible to assume moral realism and still be a determinist (I was one for a while, although it seems to me that I probably never managed to grasp it in the way that realists-of-reality experience it; I'm not there anymore, but I still think that this is a consistent and possible position), simply the imposition does not depend on the question of whether the person “decided” freely or unfreely. Because a) there is no problem with the imposition being imposed even without a free decision b) such a strange free decision does not help the imposition of the burden (a new verb form that I like from now on).

Taking responsibility is great.
So basically, you're saying, I feel that X owes me a moral duty, and therefore he owes. And that's the end of the discussion. Or did I miss something?

Me (without moral realism and without free choice) or the position in my previous message (with moral realism and without free choice)? In the previous message I presented a position that is not related to emotions but only to the mechanism of action of realistic morality. And I myself (also not a realist) think that in a certain situation I feel that I must do so and so or that X should do so and so and feel so and so, and that's all. Without the ’and therefore he is obligated’. [The concept of ’obligation’ is not realistic and is simply the word in the language to describe a certain feeling].

Don't be offended,
I'm trying to understand your ”first year”.
What do you think is a ‘moral duty/responsibility’?

This is the first and second year.
Explain to me what you think such a duty is and I will present whether and how it differs in my opinion in all sorts of different years.

“First Substantive” – Your previous position.
In my opinion, moral obligation is something transcendent, which can only apply to a free transcendental “I”. We can only know about the implications of these concepts: that the sense of moral obligation is real; that we do indeed have good reason to be moral; that we should not be fatalistic as the deterministic position supposedly requires.
You could argue that this is ridiculous, and that is perfectly fine. I am not arguing that there are all these transcendent things, but only if there is something in this formula can we talk about moral obligation at all.

The position of moral realism together with determinism? I probably don't understand this realism and the way the moral imperative is perceived by realists in depth, but I don't see any problem here. Realism itself should be peppered (which is also an unnecessary metaphysical scaffolding in my opinion) and maybe we'll get to that, but please explain why this abstract something can only apply to a free me? I don't see any connection. It's interesting that it didn't decide to apply only to redheads.
Maybe you meant to say that only a free me can choose to obey this abstract something, while an unfree me might just behave according to this imperative, and in your eyes it has no “value”?

I meant what you wrote in the last two lines.

So the sense of moral obligation is real and there is a very good reason to be moral, and the process is, as usual, the consciousness's compliance with the command. So what remains to be ascertained? In my opinion, this has excellent "value", and certainly a strange process like free choice does not add even a tiny grain of value to anything.

If the ”mind's response to an order” is just another dry material process like everything else that happens here in the world, then why does it have more value than, for example, eating falafel?
And you haven't explained what the ”very good reason” is to be moral. The fact that there is a process of &#8220mind's response to an order” is a factual description and nothing more.

Why do you think the choice to obey an order has more value than the choice to devour falafel (in a painting where a choice is exercised in the decision to eat)?
In this position (which holds to realism) the reason to be moral is precisely because there is an objective obligation.

Because in my opinion there is an idea of ‘good’, which defines morality as valuable and eating falafel as worthless (because that is how I feel, and I assume that my feeling describes objective reality, just as my other senses describe reality and are not just an illusion).
In your opinion (in the position in question), if the ”reason to be moral” is because there is an “objective duty”, then the problem shifts to the concept of duty. What is an “objective duty” and what does it mean when it is imposed on an automatic machine, no matter how sophisticated it may be?

(In my opinion, man is not a machine but a creature that is constructed in such a way that imposing a duty on him is meaningful)

There is an idea of good that defines morality as having value, everything is good and beautiful. Exactly the same even if the mind does not use an unknown mechanism of free choice but forced. The meaning of objective duty when it is imposed on an automatic mind is exactly the same meaning as it is when it is imposed on a free mind: you are obliged to do so and so. When you give me a clue as to why the "meaning" and the "value" and all the other nonsense have something to do with the question of what motivates the mind to make the body do actions, I will try to pull the carrot.

Don't be disgusted,
Does the objective duty also apply to cats, bells, walls? Can it be said that the tectonic plates whose movement caused the tsunami – violated their moral duty?

A deterministic realist would say that the obligation applies to consciousnesses that recognize it and are capable of performing actions because of it and in response to it (I am really, really not a materialist). Honestly, I don't understand these difficulties.

You seem to think that there is no concept of “value” at all. Is that true?
To my understanding, value is what I see as valuable. There is no need to explain why it is valuable, and it is impossible to explain, I simply feel that way and I assume that my feeling reflects reality.
Please explain what you think “value” is, if there is such a concept at all.

According to what assumptions are we discussing? As far as I understand, if there is realism, then value is exactly what you also understand, and I don't understand what it has to do with free choice, yes or no. Without realism, there are only diverse feelings, which in practice probably converge with the situations in which you see value, but simply without the metaphysical construction and the typical twists and turns that go with it. In any case, that's how I perceive it and I haven't yet had the privilege of witnessing any problem that is really related to poor Shalit's determinism.

Is your realism naturalistic or transcendental?

Mine was transcendental, but I don't see what difference it makes. And if you want us to use a professional term, I'd appreciate it if you could clarify what you mean by it so I don't get caught up in guessing shades and their meanings.

So that's the difference between us: you see a transcendent value in the mechanism of an automatic machine, and I fail to see a transcendent value in the material mechanism.
I think my position is a little more coherent.

A non-material mechanism, but an automatic one. I fail to see any contribution of free choice to this matter, and certainly not an advantage of coherence.

So now you will have to explain what 'materiality' is and what 'transcendence' is, and why an automatic mechanism is defined by you as 'immaterial'.

Don't be disgusted, okay?

(Because I don't understand the discussion. What is the connection between determinism and the question of materiality? I'm afraid that in the next step I'll also be asked to explain what matrix multiplication is or the taste of apple pie. As far as I understand, determinism has neither a tail nor a sword and is orthogonal to any interesting philosophical question. Arachnotoba is also good, I have nothing to add, and I don't think I'll be able to change my mind from this thread. So time to get cracking)

If you do not wish to continue the discussion, your wish is your honor.

‘The connection between determinism and the question of materiality’ lies in the fact that we both agree on two assumptions: 1. Moral realism must be immaterial; 2. An immaterial value cannot “apply” to a material mechanism. We disagree on the question of whether an automatic mechanism is material or not, and therefore (in accordance with assumption 2) whether moral obligation can apply to it.
And since the purpose of the discussion is to clarify whether the automatic machine called “man” can synchronize with an immaterial moral obligation, it is necessary to clarify whether an automatic machine is material or not.

As stated, if despite this you wish not to continue the discussion – I will respect that.

Let me think about it for a few days, maybe I'll be able to grasp the point you're pressing on about the connection between automation and materiality (I just can't figure out what the connection is. But I'll think about it some more). Maybe we'll wait for an opportunity if one day the topic of free choice itself comes up here in some column, and then maybe it will be more convenient to discuss it (probably all the definitions and refinements, etc., will already be there, and we won't have to do all the work here alone) and not on the outskirts of a busy thread on the Delau Didan website. May peace be with you and peace be with Israel.

Artist

(By the way, in the future, in every column and on every platform, the discussion about the connection between automation and materiality must begin with the definition of the concept ‘materiality’)

(And if you ever want to continue the discussion, I don't mind being the one who has to explain how he defines "materiality". I just think my definition is the simpler one, as any child understands, so I assumed you had a different definition and asked to know it)